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Chetniks

This article is about the World War II movement led by Draža Mihailović. For other uses of this and similar terms, see Chetniks (disambiguation).

The Chetniks (Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic:Четници, Serbo-Croatian Latin: Četnici, pronounced ; Slovene: Četniki), formally the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army, and also the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and the Ravna Gora Movement, was a Yugoslav royalist and Serbian nationalist movement and guerrilla force in Axis-occupied Yugoslavia. Although it was not a homogeneous movement, it was led by Draža Mihailović. While it was anti-Axis in its long-term goals and engaged in marginal resistance activities for limited periods, it also engaged in tactical or selective collaboration with the occupying forces for almost all of the war. The Chetnik movement adopted a policy of collaboration with regard to the Axis, and engaged in cooperation to one degree or another by establishing modus vivendi or operating as "legalised" auxiliary forces under Axis control. Over a period of time, and in different parts of the country, the movement was progressively drawn into collaboration agreements: first with the puppet Government of National Salvation in the German-occupied territory of Serbia, then with the Italians in occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro, with some of the Ustaše forces in northern Bosnia, and, after the Italian capitulation in September 1943, with the Germans directly.

Chetniks
Chetnik flag
inscription reads: "For king and fatherland; freedom or death"
Leaders
Dates of operation1941–1945
Allegiance Yugoslav government-in-exile (until August 1944)
HeadquartersRavna Gora near Suvobor
Active regionsOccupied Yugoslavia
IdeologySee Ideology section
AlliesAllies of World War II

Axis powers

Opponents Partisans (October 1941–May 1945)

Axis powers

Battles and wars
Organization(s)See formations

The Chetniks were active in the uprising in the German-occupied territory of Serbia from July to December 1941. As a result of the Battle of Loznica at the end of August, Mihailović's Chetniks were the first to liberate a European city from Axis control. Following the initial success of the uprising, the German occupiers enacted Adolf Hitler's formula for suppressing anti-Nazi resistance in Eastern Europe, a ratio of 100 hostages executed for every German soldier killed and 50 hostages executed for every soldier wounded. In October 1941, German soldiers and Serbian collaborators perpetrated two massacres against civilians in Kraljevo and Kragujevac, with a combined death toll reaching over 4,500 civilians, most of whom were Serbs. This convinced Mihailović that killing German troops would only result in further unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of Serbs. As a result, he decided to scale back Chetnik guerrilla attacks and wait for an Allied landing in the Balkans. While Chetnik collaboration reached "extensive and systematic" proportions, the Chetniks themselves referred to their policy of collaboration as "using the enemy". The political scientist Sabrina Ramet has observed, "Both the Chetniks' political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply, even voluminously, documented; it is more than a bit disappointing, thus, that people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short run, by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces".

The Chetniks were partners in the pattern of terror and counter-terror that developed in Yugoslavia during World War II. They used terror tactics against Croats in areas where Serbs and Croats were intermixed, against the Muslim population in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Sandžak, and against the Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans and their supporters in all areas. These tactics included the killing of civilians, burning of villages, assassinations and destruction of property and exacerbating existing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs. The terror tactics against the Croats were, to at least an extent, a reaction to the terror carried out by the Ustaše, however the largest Chetnik massacres took place in eastern Bosnia where they preceded any significant Ustashe operations. Croats and Bosniaks living in areas intended to be part of Greater Serbia were to be cleansed of non-Serbs regardless, in accordance with Mihailović's directive of 20 December 1941. The terror against the communist Partisans and their supporters was ideologically driven. Several historians regard Chetnik actions during this period as constituting genocide. Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina range from 50,000 to 68,000, while more than 5,000 victims are registered in the region of Sandžak. About 300 villages and small towns were destroyed, along with a large number of mosques and Catholic churches.

Contents

From an etymological perspective, "Chetnik" is believed to have developed from the Turkish word çete, which means "to plunder and burn down", words related to conflict, such as çatmak and çatışmak. Matija Ban used the word "Chetnik" in 1848 in terms of the need to organise armed units outside the Principality of Serbia to act in opposition to Ottoman rule. The first use of "Chetnik" to describe members of army and police units appeared around the mid-18th century. At end of the 19th century the term was extended to members of military or paramilitary organizations with Serb ethnonationalist aims. Dating from 1904, the Serbian word četnik was commonly used to describe a member of a Balkan guerrilla force called a cheta (četa/чета), meaning "band" or "troop". Today, the word "Chetnik" is used to refer to members of any group that "centres the hegemonic and expansionist politics driven by Greater Serbia ideology".

The original etymology of the word may derive from the Latin word coetus, meaning "coming together, assembly". The suffix -nik is a Slavic common personal suffix meaning "person or thing associated with or involved in".

To 1918

Small-scale rebellious activity akin to guerilla warfare has a long history in the South Slav lands, particularly in those areas that were under Ottoman rule for a long period. In the First Serbian Uprising which began in 1804, bandit companies (hajdučke četa) played an important part until large-scale fighting gave the Ottomans the upper hand and the uprising was suppressed by 1813. A second rebellion broke out two years later, and guerilla warfare was again utilised to significant effect, assisting in the establishment of the partially-independent Principality of Serbia, which was expanded significantly in 1833 and became fully independent in 1878. Throughout this period and until the end of the 19th century interest in guerilla warfare remained, with books on the subject being commissioned by the Serbian government and published in 1848 and 1868. Four years after independence, the principality became the Kingdom of Serbia.

Vojin Popović with a group of Chetnik commanders in 1912

Between 1904 and 1912, small groups of fighters who had been privately recruited, equipped and funded in Serbia, travelled to the region of Macedonia within the Ottoman Empire with the aim of releasing the area from Ottoman rule and annexing it to Serbia, regardless of the wishes of the local population. These groups were, in the main, commanded and led by officers and non-commissioned officers on active duty in the Royal Serbian Army, and the Serbian government soon took over the direction of these activities. Similar forces had been sent to Macedonia by Greece and Bulgaria, who also wished to integrate the region into their own states, resulting in the Serbian Chetniks clashing with their rivals from Bulgaria as well as the Ottoman authorities. Except for the social democratic press, these Chetnik actions were supported in Serbia and interpreted as being in the national interest. These Chetnik activities largely ceased following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire. The Chetniks were active in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913; during the First Balkan War against the Ottomans they were used as vanguards to soften up the enemy ahead of advancing armies, for attacks on communications behind enemy lines, for spreading panic and confusion, as field gendarmerie and to establish basic administration in occupied areas. They were also put to good use against the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War. After the Balkan Wars, Chetniks bands were used in the pacification of the new areas of Serbia gained during the wars, which occasionally involved terrorising civilians.

As they had proven valuable during the Balkan Wars, the Serbian army used Chetniks in World War I in the same way, and while useful they suffered heavy losses. At the end of the Serbian campaign of 1914–1915, they withdrew with the army in the Great Retreat to Corfu and later fought on the Macedonian front. Montenegrin Chetniks also fought against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of that country. In late 1916, new Chetnik companies were being organised to fight in Bulgarian-occupied southeastern Serbia. Concerned about reprisals against a large-scale uprising, the Serbian army sent the veteran Chetnik leader Kosta Pećanac to prevent the outbreak. However, the Bulgarians started conscripting Serbs, and hundreds of men joined the Chetnik detachments. This resulted in the 1917 Toplica Uprising under the leadership of Kosta Vojinović, which Pećanac eventually joined. Successful at first, the uprising was eventually put down by the Bulgarians and Austro-Hungarians, and bloody reprisals against the civilian population followed. Pećanac then used Chetniks for sabotage and raids against the Bulgarian occupation troops, then infiltrated the Austro-Hungarian occupied zone. Just prior to the end of the war, the Chetnik detachments were dissolved, with some sent home and others absorbed by the rest of the army. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created with the merger of Serbia, Montenegro and the South Slav-inhabited areas of Austria-Hungary on 1 December 1918, in the immediate aftermath of the war.

Interwar period

Due to their military record since 1904, the Chetnik veterans were among the leading Serbian patriotic groups in the new state. In 1921, the "Chetnik Association for the Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland" was organised in Belgrade by Chetnik veterans, with organisational aims of cultivating Chetnik history, spreading Chetnik patriotic ideas, and to care for the widows and orphans of Chetniks who had been killed, along with disabled Chetniks. It was also a political pressure group, and from the beginning there were questions about its leadership and political ideology. Initially, the main political influence in the organisation was the liberal Democratic Party, but a challenge for influence by the dominant People's Radical Party led to a split in 1924. The pro-Radical Greater Serbia elements of the association broke away and formed two new organisations in 1924, the "Association of Serbian Chetniks for King and Fatherland" and the "Association of Serbian Chetniks 'Petar Mrkonjić'". In July 1925 these two organisations amalgamated as the "Association of Serbian Chetniks 'Petar Mrkonjić' for King and Fatherland" led by Puniša Račić, who was elected to the National Assembly as a Radical representative in 1927, and in 1928 murdered three Croatian Peasant Party representatives on the floor of the National Assembly. He presided over a great deal of dissension until that year when the organisation ceased to operate. After the imposition of royal dictatorship by King Alexander the following year, at which time the state was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Račić's former organisation was dissolved, and the former dissidents rejoined the original "Chetnik Association for the Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland", which was officially sanctioned.

A group of Chetniks in the early 1920s

Immediately following the end of World War I and the formation of the new state, there was widespread unrest. Pro-Bulgarian sentiment was rife in Macedonia, which was referred to as South Serbia by the Belgrade government. There was little support among the Macedonian populace for the regime. Extensive measures were undertaken to "serbianise" Macedonia, including closing Bulgarian Orthodox Church schools, revising history textbooks, dismissing "unreliable" teachers, banning the use of the Bulgarian language, and imposing lengthy jail terms for those convicted of anti-state activities. Over 300 Macedonian advocates of Greater Bulgaria were murdered in the period 1918–1924, thousands arrested in the same period, and around 50,000 troops were stationed in Macedonia. Thousands of Serb colonists were settled in Macedonia. Bands of Chetniks, including one led by Jovan Babunski, were organised to terrorise the population, kill pro-Bulgarian resistance leaders and impress the local population into forced labour for the army. Resistance by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was met with further terror, which included the formation in 1922 of the Association against Bulgarian Bandits led by Pećanac and Ilija Trifunović-Lune, based out of Štip in eastern Macedonia. This organisation quickly garnered a reputation for indiscriminate terrorisation of the Macedonian populace. Pećanac and his Chetniks were also active in fighting Albanians resisting the Serb and Montenegrin colonisation of Kosovo.

Even under the homogenizing pressures of dictatorship, the Chetniks were not monolithic movement. In 1929, Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin became president of the association, serving until 1932 when he became president of another Serbian nationalist organisation, Narodna Odbrana (National Defence), and established the rival "Association of Old Chetniks", but the latter never challenged the main Chetnik organisation. He was replaced by Pećanac, who continued to lead the organisation until the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Starting in 1929, the main Chetnik organisations established chapters in at least 24 cities and towns outside Serbia proper, many of which had large Croatian populations. This expansion of what remained a Serb "nationalist-chauvinist" movement outside Serbia proper escalated ethnic tensions, especially the conflict between Serbs and Croats. Under Pećanac's leadership, membership of the Chetnik organisation was opened to new young members that had not served in war and were interested in joining for political and economic reasons, and in the course of the 1930s he took the organisation from a nationalist veterans' association focused on protecting veterans' rights, to an aggressively partisan Serb political organisation which reached 500,000 members throughout Yugoslavia in more than 1,000 groups. Trifunović-Birčanin and others were unhappy with the aggressive expansion of the organisation and its move away from traditional Chetnik ideals. After 1935, Chetnik activity was officially banned in both the predominantly Croat Sava Banovina and almost entirely Slovene Drava Banovina, but the Chetnik groups in those regions were able to continue operating at a lower level. During this period, Pećanac formed close ties with the far-right Yugoslav Radical Union government of Milan Stojadinović which ruled Yugoslavia from 1935 to 1939. During the interwar period, limited training on guerilla warfare was given to junior officers of the army, and in 1929 the Handbook on Guerilla Warfare was published by the government to provide guidance. In 1938, the General Staff revised the approach detailed in 1929, recognising that operations similar to those carried out by Chetniks between 1904 and 1918 would not be possible in a modern war, and clearly indicating that it would not entrust any important wartime functions to the Chetnik Association.

Formation

Illustration of the April 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia

After the outbreak of the World War II in September 1939 the General Staff was aware that Yugoslavia was not ready for war against the Axis powers and was concerned about neighboring countries igniting a civil war in Yugoslavia. Despite its misgivings about using Chetniks for guerilla warfare, in April 1940, the General Staff established the Chetnik Command, which eventually comprised six full battalions spread throughout the country. However, it is clear from the series of Yugoslav war plans between 1938 and 1941 that the General Staff had no real commitment to guerilla warfare prior to the April 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, and did not seriously consider employing the Chetnik Association in the role either. A short time before the invasion, Pećanac was approached by the General Staff, authorising him to organise guerilla units in the 5th Army area, and providing him with arms and funds for the purpose; the 5th Army was responsible for the Romanian and Bulgarian borders between the Iron Gates and the Greek border.

On 6 April 1941, Yugoslavia was drawn into World War II when Germany, Italy and Hungary invaded and occupied the country, which was then partitioned. Some Yugoslav territory was annexed by its Axis neighbours: Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy. The Germans engineered and supported the creation of the fascist Ustaše puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), which roughly comprised most of the pre-war Banovina Croatia, along with rest of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and some adjacent territory. Before the defeat, King Peter II and his government went into exile, reforming in June as the Western Allied-recognised Yugoslav government-in-exile in London. All elements of the Chetnik Command were captured during the invasion, and there is no record of them being used for their intended purpose or that elements of these units operated in any organised way after the surrender.

Colonel Draža Mihailović as a Yugoslav military attaché in Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1937

In the early days of the invasion, army Pukovnik (Colonel) Draža Mihailović was the deputy chief of staff of the 2nd Army deployed in Bosnia. On 13 April, he was commanding a unit which was in the area of Doboj on 15 April when it was advised of the decision of the Supreme Staff (the wartime General Staff) to surrender. A few dozen members of the unit, almost exclusively Serbs, joined Mihailović when he decided not to follow these orders, and the group took to the hills. They marched southeast then east, aiming to get to the mountainous interior of what became the German-occupied territory of Serbia in the hope of linking up with other elements of the defeated army that had chosen to keep resisting. In the first few days, Mihailović's group was attacked by German forces. The group was joined by other parties of soldiers but heard no news of others continuing to resist. On 28 April, the group was about 80 strong, and crossed the Drina River into the occupied territory of Serbia the next day, although over the next few days it lost a number of officers and enlisted men who were concerned about the pending hardship and uncertainty. After crossing the Drina, the group was also attacked by gendarmes belonging to the collaborationist puppet Commissioner Government. On 6 May Mihailović's remaining group was surrounded by German troops near Užice and almost completely destroyed. On 13 May, Mihailović arrived at some shepherd huts at Ravna Gora on the western slopes of Suvobor Mountain near the town of Gornji Milanovac in the central part of the occupied territory, by which time his group consisted of only seven officers and 27 other ranks. At this point, now aware that no elements of the army were continuing to fight, they were faced with the decision of whether to surrender to the Germans themselves or form the core of a resistance movement, and Mihailović and his men chose the latter. Due to the location of their headquarters, Mihailović's organisation became known as the "Ravna Gora Movement".

While adherents of the Chetnik movement have claimed that Mihailović's Chetniks were the first resistance movement to be founded in Yugoslavia in World War II, this is not accurate if a resistance movement is defined as a political and military organisation of relatively large numbers of men conducting armed operations intended to be carried on with determination and more or less continuously. Soon after their arrival at Ravna Gora, Mihailović's Chetniks set up a command post and designated themselves the "Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army". While this name was clearly derivative of the earlier Chetniks and evoked the traditions of the long and distinguished record of the Chetniks of earlier conflicts, Mihailović's organisation was in no way connected to the interwar Chetnik associations or the Chetnik Command established in 1940.

Draža Mihailović (centre with glasses) confers with his principal political adviser Dragiša Vasić (second from right) and others in 1943

As early as August, the Chetnik Central National Committee (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Centralni Nacionalni Komitet, CNK; Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic:Централни Национални Комитет) was formed to provide Mihailović with advice on domestic and international political affairs, and to liaise with the civilian populace throughout the occupied territory and in other parts of occupied Yugoslavia where the Chetnik movement had strong support. The members were men who had some standing in Serbian political and cultural circles before the war, and some CNK members also served on the Belgrade Chetnik Committee that supported the movement. Much of the early CNK was drawn from the minuscule Yugoslav Republican Party or the minor Agrarian Party. The three most important members of the CNK, who comprised the executive committee for much of the war, were: Dragiša Vasić, a lawyer, former vice-president of the nationalist Serbian Cultural Club and a former member of the Yugoslav Republican Party; Stevan Moljević, a Bosnian Serb lawyer; and Mladen Žujović, Vasić's law firm partner who had also been a member of the Yugoslav Republican Party. Vasić was the most important of the three, and was designated by Mihailović as the ranking member of a three-man committee, along with Potpukovnik (Lieutenant Colonel) Dragoslav Pavlović and Major Jezdimir Dangić, who were to take over the leadership of the organisation if anything should happen to him. In effect, Vasić was Mihailović's deputy.

Ideology

Main article: Greater Serbia

From the beginning of Mihailović's movement in May 1941 until the Ba Congress in January 1944, the ideology and objectives of the movement were promulgated in a series of documents. In June 1941, two months before he became a key member of the CNK, Moljević wrote a memorandum entitled Homogeneous Serbia, in which he advocated for the creation of a Greater Serbia within a Greater Yugoslavia which would include not only the vast majority of pre-war Yugoslav territory, but also a significant amount of territory that belonged to all of Yugoslavia's neighbours. Within this, Greater Serbia would consist of 65–70 per cent of the total Yugoslav territory and population, and Croatia would be reduced to a small rump. His plan also included large-scale population transfers, evicting the non-Serb population from within the borders of Greater Serbia, although he did not suggest any numbers.

The extent of Greater Serbia envisaged by Moljević

At the same time that Moljević was developing Homogeneous Serbia, the Belgrade Chetnik Committee formulated a proposal which contained territorial provisions very similar to those detailed in Moljević's plan, but went further by providing details of the large-scale population shifts needed to make Greater Serbia ethnically homogenous. It advocated expelling of 2,675,000 people from Greater Serbia, including 1,000,000 Croats and 500,000 Germans. A total of 1,310,000 Serbs would be brought to Greater Serbia from outside its boundaries, of which 300,000 would be Serbs from Croatia. Greater Serbia would not be entirely Serb, however, as about 200,000 Croats would be allowed to stay within its borders. No figures were proposed for shifting Bosnian Muslims out of Greater Serbia, but they were identified as a "problem" to be solved in the final stages of the war and immediately afterwards. The CNK approved the Greater Serbia project after it formed in August. It can be assumed that Mihailović, who was a hard-core Serb nationalist himself, endorsed all or most of both proposals. This is because their contents were reflected in a 1941 Chetnik leaflet entitled Our Way, and he made specific references to them in a proclamation to the Serbian people in December and in a set of detailed instructions dated 20 December 1941 to Pavle Đurišić and Đorđije Lašić, newly appointed Chetnik commanders in the Italian governorate of Montenegro. The Belgrade Chetnik Committee proposal was also smuggled out of occupied Serbia in September and delivered to the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London by the Chetnik agent Miloš Sekulić.

In March 1942, the Chetnik Dinara Division promulgated a statement which was accepted the following month by a meeting of Chetnik commanders from Bosnia, Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia and Lika at Strmica near Knin. This program contained details which were very similar to those included in Mihailović's instructions to Đurišić and Lašić in December 1941. It mentioned the mobilisation of Serbs in these regions to "cleanse" them of other ethnic groups, and adopted several additional strategies: collaboration with the Italian occupiers; determined armed opposition to NDH forces and the Partisans; decent treatment of the Bosnian Muslims to keep them from joining the Partisans, although they could later be eliminated; and the creation of separate Croatian Chetnik units formed from pro-Yugoslav, anti-Partisan Croats.

From 30 November to 2 December 1942, the Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro met at Šahovići in Italian-occupied Montenegro. Mihailović did not attend, but his chief of staff Zaharije Ostojić, Đurišić and Lašić attended, with Đurišić playing the dominant role. It advanced strategies that constituted an important and expanded version of the overall Chetnik program, and the report of the meeting bore an official Chetnik stamp. It reinforced the main Greater Serbia objective of the Chetnik movement, and in addition advocated the retention of the Karađorđević dynasty, espoused a unitary Yugoslavia with self-governing Serb, Croat and Slovene units but excluding entities for other Yugoslav peoples such as Macedonians and Montenegrins as well as other minorities. It envisaged a post-war Chetnik dictatorship that would hold all power within the country with the approval of the King, with a gendarmerie recruited from Chetnik ranks, and intense promotion of Chetnik ideology throughout the country.

The final Chetnik ideological document that appeared prior to the Ba Congress in January 1944 was a manual prepared by the Chetnik leadership around the same time as the Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro in late 1942. It explained that the Chetniks viewed the war in three phases: the invasion and capitulation by others; a period of organising and waiting until conditions warranted a general uprising against the occupying forces; and finally a general attack on the occupiers and all competitors for power, the Chetnik assumption of complete control over Yugoslavia, the expulsion of most national minorities, and arrest of all internal enemies. Crucially, it identified the two most important tasks during the second phase as: Chetnik-led organisation for the third phase without any party political influences; and incapacitation of their internal enemies, with first priority being the Partisans. Revenge against the Partisans and Ustaše was incorporated into the manual as a "sacred duty".

The manual paid some lip service to Yugoslavism, but the Chetniks did not really wish to become an all-Yugoslav movement because that was inconsistent with their main objective of achieving a Greater Serbia within Greater Yugoslavia. Due to their Serb nationalist stance, they never developed a realistic view of the "national question" in Yugoslavia because they disregarded the legitimate interests of the other Yugoslav peoples. Their ideology was therefore never attractive to non-Serbs except for those Macedonians and Montenegrins who considered themselves Serbs. The only new aspect of the Chetnik Greater Serbia ideology from the long-standing traditional one was their plan to "cleanse" Greater Serbia of non-Serbs, which was clearly a response to the massacres of Serbs by the Ustaše in the NDH.

The final documents detailing Chetnik ideology were produced by the Ba Congress called by Mihailović in January 1944, in response to the November 1943 Second Session of the communist-led Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian: Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ) of the Partisans. The Second Session of AVNOJ had resolved that post-war Yugoslavia would be a federal republic based on six equal constituent republics, asserted that it was the sole legitimate government of Yugoslavia, and denied the right of the King to return from exile before a popular referendum to determine the future of his rule. The month after the Second Session of AVNOJ, the major Allied powers met at Tehran and decided to provide their exclusive support to the Partisans and withdraw support from the Chetniks. The congress was held in circumstances where large parts of the Chetnik movement had been progressively drawn into collaboration with the occupying forces and their helpers over the course of the war, and may have been held with the tacit approval of the Germans.

The document that was produced by the Ba Congress was called The Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement and came in two parts. The first part, The Yugoslav Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement stated that Yugoslavia would be a democratic federation with three units, one each for the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and national minorities would be expelled. The second part, The Serbian Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement reinforced the existing Chetnik idea that all Serbian provinces would be united in the Serbian unit within the federal arrangement, based on the solidarity between all Serb regions of Yugoslavia, under a unicameral parliament. The congress also resolved that Yugoslavia should be a constitutional monarchy headed by a Serb sovereign. According to some historians, the new program of the Chetniks was social-democratic Yugoslavism, with a change to a federal Yugoslav structure with a dominant Serb unit, but in asserting the need to gather all Serbs into a single entity, The Serbian Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement was reminiscent of Homogeneous Serbia. The congress also did not recognise Macedonia and Montenegro as separate nations, and also implied that Croatia and Slovenia would effectively be appendages to the Serbian entity. The net effect of this, according to the historian Jozo Tomasevich, was that the country would not only return to the same Serb-dominated state it had been in during the interwar period, but would be worse than that, particularly for the Croats. He concludes that this outcome was to be expected given the overwhelmingly Serb makeup of the congress, which included only two or three Croats, one Slovene and one Bosnian Muslim among its more than 300 attendees. The historian Marko Attila Hoare agrees that despite its superficial Yugoslavism, the congress had clear Greater Serbia inclinations. The congress expressed an interest in reforming the economic, social, and cultural position of the country, particularly regarding democratic ideals. This was a significant departure from previous Chetnik goals expressed earlier in the war, especially in terms of promoting democratic principles with some socialist features. Tomasevich observes that these new goals were probably more related to achieving propaganda objectives than reflecting actual intentions, given that there was no real interest in considering the needs of the non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia. The practical outcome of the congress was the establishment of a single political party for the movement, the Yugoslav Democratic National Union (Serbo-Croatian: Jugoslovenska demokratska narodna zajednica, JDNZ), and an expansion of the CNK, however the congress did nothing to improve the position of the Chetnik movement.

Beyond the main Serbian irredentist objective, Mihailović's Chetnik movement was an extreme Serb nationalist organisation, and while it paid lip service to Yugoslavism, it was actually opposed to it. It was also anti-Croat, anti-Muslim, supported the monarchy, and was anti-communist. Given the ethnic and religious divisions in Yugoslavia, the narrow ideology of the Chetnik movement seriously impinged on its military and political potential. The political scientist Sabrina Ramet has observed, "Both the Chetniks' political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply, even voluminously, documented; it is more than a bit disappointing, thus, that people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short run, by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces".

Composition and organisation

A Chetnik with a M37 light machine gun

The Chetniks were almost exclusively made up of Serbs except for a large number of Montenegrins who identified as Serbs, and consisted of "local defence units, marauding bands of Serb villagers, anti-partisan auxiliaries, forcibly mobilised peasants, and armed refugees, which small groups of uncaptured Yugoslav officers was attempting without success to mold into an organised fighting force". The aforementioned Chetnik manual of late 1942 discussed the idea of enlisting a significant number of Croats for the movement, but the movement only attracted small groups of Chetnik-aligned Croats in central Dalmatia and Primorje, and they were never of any political or military significance within the Chetniks. A small group of Slovenes under Major Karl Novak in the Italian-annexed Province of Ljubljana also supported Mihailović, but they also never played an important role.

Women in Chetniks units

There had been long standing mutual animosity between Muslims and Serbs throughout Bosnia, and in the period of late April and May 1941, the first Chetnik mass atrocities were carried out against non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other ethnically heterogeneous areas. A few Sandžak and Bosnian Muslims supported Mihailović, and some Jews joined the Chetniks, especially those who were members of the right-wing Zionist Betar movement, but they were alienated by Serb xenophobia and eventually left, with some defecting to the Partisans. The collaboration of the Chetniks with the Italians and later Germans may have also been a factor in the Jewish rejection of the Chetnik movement. The vast majority of Orthodox priests supported the Chetniks with some, notably Momčilo Đujić and Savo Božić, becoming commanders.

Chetnik policies barred women from performing significant roles. No women took part in fighting units and were restricted to nursing and occasional intelligence work. The low status of female peasants in areas of Yugoslavia where Chetniks were strongest could have been utilized and advantageous in military, political, and psychological terms. The treatment of women was a fundamental difference between the Chetniks and Partisans and Chetnik propaganda disparaged the female role in the Partisans.

Early activities

The Chetniks and the Partisans led captured Germans through Užice, autumn 1941.

Initially, Mihailović's organisation was focussed on recruiting and establishing groups in different areas, raising funds, establishing a courier network, and collecting arms and ammunition. From the very beginning their strategy was to organise and build up their strength, but postpone armed operations against the occupation forces until they were withdrawing in the face of a hoped-for landing by the Western Allies in Yugoslavia.

The pre-war Chetnik leader Pećanac soon came to an arrangement with Nedić's collaborationist regime in the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia. Colonel Draža Mihailović, who was "interested in resisting the occupying powers", set up his headquarters in Ravna Gora and named his group "The Ravna Gora Movement" in order to distinguish it from the Pećanac Chetniks. However, other Chetniks were engaged in collaboration with the Germans and the Chetnik name became again associated with Mihailović.

The movement was later to be renamed the "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland", although the original name of the movement remained the most common in use throughout the war, even among the Chetniks themselves. It is these forces that are generally referred to as "the Chetniks" throughout World War II although the name was also used by other smaller groups including those of Pećanac, Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić. In June 1941, following the start of Operation Barbarossa, the communist-led Partisans under Josip Broz Tito organised an uprising and in the period between June and November 1941, the Chetniks and Partisans largely cooperated in their anti-Axis activities.[citation needed]

Chetnik uprisings, often in conjunction with the Partisans, against Axis occupation forces began in early July 1941 in Western Serbia. Uprisings in the areas of Loznica, Rogatica, Banja Koviljača and Olovo lead to early victories. On 19 September 1941, Tito and Mihailović met for the first time in Struganik where Tito offered Mihailović the chief-of-staff post in return for the merger of their units. Mihailović refused to attack the Germans, fearing reprisals, but promised to not attack the Partisans. According to Mihailović the reason was humanitarian: the prevention of German reprisals against Serbs at the published rate of 100 civilians for every German soldier killed, 50 civilians for every soldier wounded. On 20 October, Tito proposed a 12-point program to Mihailović as the basis of cooperation. Six days later, Tito and Mihailović met at Mihailović's headquarters where Mihailović rejected principal points of Tito's proposal including the establishment of common headquarters, joint military actions against the Germans and quisling formations, establishment of a combined staff for the supply of troops, and the formation of national liberation committees. These disagreements lead to uprisings being quashed in Montenegro and Novi Pazar due to poor coordination between the resistance forces. Mihailović's fears for ongoing reprisals became a reality with two mass murder campaigns conducted against Serb civilians in Kraljevo and Kragujevac, reaching a combined death toll of over 4,500 civilians.[citation needed] Killings in the Independent State of Croatia were also in full swing with thousands of Serb civilians being killed by the Ustaše militia and death squads. In late October, Mihailović concluded the Partisans, rather than Axis forces, were the primary enemies of the Chetniks.

To avoid reprisals against Serb civilians, Mihailović's Chetniks fought as a guerrilla force, rather than a regular army. It has been estimated that three-quarters of the Orthodox clergy in occupied Yugoslavia supported the Chetniks, while some like Momčilo Đujić became prominent Chetnik commanders. While the Partisans opted for overt acts of sabotage that led to reprisals against civilians by Axis forces, the Chetniks opted for a more subtle form of resistance. Instead of detonating TNT to destroy railway tracks and disrupt Axis railway lines, Chetniks contaminated railway fuel sources and tampered with mechanical components, ensuring trains would either derail or breakdown at random times. Martin suggests that these acts of sabotage significantly crippled supplies lines for the Afrika Korps fighting in North Africa.

On 2 November, Mihailović's Chetniks attacked Partisan headquarters in Užice. The attack was driven back and a counterattack followed the next day, the Chetniks lost 1,000 men in these two battles and a large amount of weaponry. On 18 November, Mihailović accepted a truce offer from Tito though attempts to establish a common front failed. That month, the British government, upon the request of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, insisted Tito make Mihailović the commander-in-chief of resistance forces in Yugoslavia, a demand he refused.

German warrant for Mihailović offering a reward of 100,000 gold marks for his capture, dead or alive, 1943

Partisan-Chetnik truces were repeatedly violated by the Chetniks, first with the killing of a local Partisan commander in October and then later, under orders of Mihailović's staff, massacring 30 Partisan supporters, mostly girls and wounded individuals, in November. Despite this, Chetniks and Partisans in eastern Bosnia continued to cooperate for some time.

In December 1941 the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London under King Peter II promoted Mihailović to Brigadier-General and named him commander of the Yugoslav Home Army. By this time Mihailović had established friendly relations with Nedić and his Government of National Salvation and the Germans who he requested weaponry from to fight the Partisans. This was rejected by General Franz Böhme who stated they could deal with the Partisans themselves and demanded Mihailović's surrender. Around this time the Germans launched an attack on Mihailović's forces in Ravna Gora and effectively routed the Chetniks from the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia. The bulk of the Chetnik forces retreated into eastern Bosnia and Sandžak and the centre of Chetnik activity moved to the Independent State of Croatia. The British liaison to Mihailović advised Allied command to stop supplying the Chetniks after their attacks on the Partisans in the German attack on Užice, but Britain continued to do so.

Throughout the period of 1941 and 1942, both the Chetniks and Partisans provided refugee for Allied POWs, especially ANZAC troops who escaped from railway carriages en route via Yugoslavia to Axis POW camps. According to Lawrence, following the Allied defeat at the Battle of Crete, POWs were transported via Yugoslavia in railway carriages with some ANZAC troops escaping in occupied Serbia. Chetniks under the command of Mihailović provided refugee to these ANZAC troops and were either repatriated or recaptured by Axis forces.

Axis offensives

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In April 1942 the Communists in Bosnia established two Shock Anti-Chetnik Battalions (Grmeč and Kozara) composed of 1,200 best soldiers of Serb ethnicity to struggle against Chetniks. Later during the war, the Allies were seriously considering an invasion of the Balkans, so the Yugoslav resistance movements increased in strategic importance, and there was a need to determine which of the two factions was fighting the Germans. A number of Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents were sent to Yugoslavia to determine the facts on the ground. According to new archival evidence, published in 1980 for the first time, some actions against Axis carried by Mihailović and his Chetniks, with British liaison officer Brigadier Armstrong, were mistakenly credited to Tito and his Communist forces. In the meantime, the Germans, also aware of the growing importance of Yugoslavia, decided to wipe out the Partisans with determined offensives. The Chetniks, by this time, had agreed to provide support for the German operations, and were in turn granted supplies and munitions to increase their effectiveness.

The first of these large anti-Partisan offensives was Fall Weiss, also known as the Battle of Neretva. The Chetniks participated with a significant, 20,000-strong, force providing assistance to the German and Italian encirclement from the east (the far bank of the river Neretva). However, Tito's Partisans managed to break through the encirclement, cross the river, and engage the Chetniks. The conflict resulted in a near-total Partisan victory, after which the Chetniks were almost entirely incapacitated in the area west of the Drina river. The Partisans continued on, and later again escaped the Germans in the Battle of Sutjeska. In the meantime, the Allies stopped planning an invasion of the Balkans and finally rescinded their support for the Chetniks and instead supplied the Partisans. At the Teheran Conference of 1943 and the Yalta Conference of 1945, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided to split their influence in Yugoslavia in half.

Axis collaboration

German Generalmajor (Brigadier) Friedrich Stahl stands alongside an Ustaše officer and Chetnik commander Rade Radić in central Bosnia in mid–1942.

Throughout the war, the Chetnik movement remained mostly inactive against the occupation forces, and increasingly collaborated with the Axis, eventually losing its international recognition as the Yugoslav resistance force. After a brief initial period of cooperation, the Partisans and the Chetniks quickly started fighting against each other. Gradually, the Chetniks ended up primarily fighting the Partisans instead of the occupation forces, and started cooperating with the Axis in a struggle to destroy the Partisans, receiving increasing amounts of logistical assistance. Mihailović admitted to a British colonel that the Chetniks' principal enemies were "the partisans, the Ustasha, the Muslims, the Croats and last the Germans and Italians" [in that order].

At the start of the conflict, Chetnik forces were active in uprising against the Axis occupation and had contacts and negotiations with the Partisans. This changed when the talks broke down, and they proceeded to attack the latter (who were actively fighting the Germans), while continuing to engage the Axis only in minor skirmishes. Attacking the Germans provoked strong retaliation and the Chetniks increasingly started to negotiate with them to stop further bloodshed. Negotiations with the occupiers were aided by the two sides' mutual goal of destroying the Partisans. This collaboration first appeared during the operations on the Partisan "Užice Republic", where Chetniks played a part in the general Axis attack.

Collaboration with the Italians

Chetnik commander Momčilo Đujić (left) with an Italian officer

Chetnik collaboration with the occupation forces of fascist Italy took place in three main areas: in Italian-occupied (and Italian-annexed) Dalmatia; in the Italian puppet state of Montenegro; and in the Italian-annexed and later German-occupied Ljubljana Province in Slovenia. The collaboration in Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most widespread. The split between Partisans and Chetniks took place earlier in those areas.

The Partisans considered all occupation forces to be "the fascist enemy", while the Chetniks hated the Ustaše but balked at fighting the Italians, and had approached the Italian VI Army Corps (General Renzo Dalmazzo, Commander) as early as July and August 1941 for assistance, via a Serb politician from Lika, Stevo Rađenović. In particular, Chetnik vojvodas ("leaders") Trifunović-Birčanin and Jevđević were favorably disposed towards the Italians, believing Italian occupation over all of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be detrimental to the influence of the Ustaše state.[citation needed] Another reason for collaboration was a necessity to protect Serbs from the Ustaše and Balli Kombëtar. When the Balli Kombëtar earmarked the Visoki Dečani monastery for destruction, Italian troops were sent in to protect the Orthodox monastery from destruction and highlighted to the Chetniks the necessity for collaboration.

Chetnik commander Pavle Đurišić (left) making a speech to the Chetniks in the presence of General Pirzio Biroli, Italian governor of Montenegro

For this reason, they sought an alliance with the Italian occupation forces in Yugoslavia. The Chetniks noticed that Italy on occupied territories implemented a traditional policy of deceiving Croats with the help of Serbs and they believed that Italy, in case of victory of the Axis powers, would favor Serbs in Lika, northern Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Serbian autonomy would be created in this area under Italian protectorate. The Italians (especially General Dalmazzo) looked favorably on these approaches and hoped to first avoid fighting the Chetniks, and then use them against the Partisans, a strategy which they thought would give them an "enormous advantage". An agreement was concluded on 11 January 1942 between the representative of the Italian 2nd Army, Captain Angelo De Matteis and the Chetnik representative for southeastern Bosnia, Mutimir Petković, and was later signed by Draža Mihailović's chief delegate in Bosnia, Major Boško Todorović. Among other provisions of the agreement, it was agreed that the Italians would support Chetnik formations with arms and provisions, and would facilitate the release of "recommended individuals" from Axis concentration camps (Jasenovac, Rab, etc.). The chief interest of both the Chetniks and Italians would be to assist each other in combating Partisan-led resistance. According to Martin, the Chetnik-Italian truce received approval from British Intelligence as it was seen as a way of garnering intelligence. Birčanin was instructed to gather information on harbor facilities, troop movements, mining operations and Axis communications in preparation for an Allied invasion of the Dubrovnik coast scheduled for 1943, an invasion that never eventuated.

Momčilo Đujić with Chetniks and Italians

In the following months of 1942, General Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian 2nd Army, worked on developing a Linea di condotta ("Policy Directive") on relations with Chetniks, Ustaše and Partisans. In line with these efforts, General Vittorio Ambrosio outlined the Italian policy in Yugoslavia: All negotiations with the (quisling) Ustaše were to be avoided, but contacts with the Chetniks were "advisable." As for the Partisans, it was to be "struggle to the bitter end". This meant that General Roatta was essentially free to take action with regard to the Chetniks as he saw fit. In April 1942 Chetniks and Italians cooperated in battles with Partisans around Knin.

He outlined the four points of his policy in his report to the Italian Army General Staff:

To support the Chetniks sufficiently to make them fight against the communists, but not so much as to allow them too much latitude in their own action; to demand and assure that the Chetniks do not fight against the Croatian forces and authorities; to allow them to fight against the communists on their own initiative (so that they can "slaughter each other"); and finally to allow them to fight in parallel with the Italian and German forces, as do the nationalist bands [Chetniks and separatist Greens] in Montenegro.

General Mario Roatta, 1942
Chetnik commander Dobroslav Jevđević conferring with Italian officers in February 1943

During 1942 and 1943, an overwhelming proportion of Chetnik forces in the Italian-controlled areas of occupied Yugoslavia were organized as Italian auxiliary forces in the form of the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (Milizia volontaria anti comunista, MVAC). According to General Giacomo Zanussi (then a Colonel and Roatta's chief of staff), there were 19,000 to 20,000 Chetniks in the MVAC in Italian-occupied parts of the Independent State of Croatia alone. The Chetniks were extensively supplied with thousands of rifles, grenades, mortars and artillery pieces. In a memorandum dated 26 March 1943 to the Italian Army General Staff, entitled "The Conduct of the Chetniks".[citation needed]

The allegiance between the Chetniks and Italians was crucial in protecting Serbs in the Lika and Dalmatian region from ongoing attacks from the Ustaše. Italian forces provided Serb civilians with weapons to protect their villages and accommodated thousands of Serb civilians escaping the ongoing genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia. Đujić used these events as a way of justifying the allegiance and when ordered by Mihailović in February 1943 to break this allegiance, Đujić refused and stated that a break in a truce would mean certain death to tens of thousands of Serb civilians.

Chetniks and Italians in Jablanica in 1943

Italian officers noted the ultimate control of these collaborating Chetnik units remained in the hands of Draža Mihailović, and contemplated the possibility of a hostile reorientation of these troops in light of the changing strategic situation. The commander of these troops was Trifunović-Birčanin, who arrived in Italian-annexed Split in October 1941 and received his orders directly from Mihailović in the spring of 1942. By the time Italy capitulated on 8 September 1943, all Chetnik detachments in the Italian-controlled parts of the Independent State of Croatia had, at one time or another, collaborated with the Italians against the Partisans. This collaboration lasted right up until the Italian capitulation when Chetnik troops switched to supporting the German occupation in trying to force the Partisans out of the coastal cities which the Partisans liberated after the Italian withdrawal. After the Allies did not land in Dalmatia as they had hoped, these Chetnik detachments entered into collaboration with the Germans in order to avoid being caught between the Germans and the Partisans.

Collaboration with the Independent State of Croatia

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Chetnik representatives meeting in Bosnia with Ustaše and Croatian Home Guard officers of the Independent State of Croatia

The Chetnik groups were in fundamental disagreement with the Ustaše on practically all issues, but they found a common enemy in the Partisans, and this was the overriding reason for the collaboration which ensued between the Ustaše authorities of the NDH and Chetnik detachments in Bosnia.[citation needed] Agreement between commander major Emil Rataj and commander of Chetnik organizations in the Mrkonjić Grad area Uroš Drenović was signed on 27 April 1942 after heavy defeat in the conflict with Kozara Partisan battalion. Contracting parties obliged to a joint struggle against the Partisans, in return, Serb villages would be protected by the NDH authorities together with the Chetniks from "attacks by communists, so-called Partisans." Chetnik commanders between Vrbas and Sana on 13 May 1942, gave a written confession to the NDH authorities about cessation of hostilities and that they would voluntarily take part in the fight against the Partisans.

In Banja Luka two days later was signed agreement on the cessation of hostilities against the Chetniks in the area between Vrbas and Sana and on the withdrawal of Home Guard units from this area, between Petar Gvozdić and Chetnik commanders Lazar Tešanović (Chetnik detachment "Obilić") and Cvetko Aleksić (Chetnik detachment "Mrkonjić"). After several signed agreements, Chetnik commanders at a meeting near Kotor Varoš concluded that the remaining Chetnik detachments would also sign such agreements because they realized that such agreements had great benefits for the Chetnik movement. NDH authorities during May and June 1942, signed such agreements and with some east Bosnian Chetniks detachments. Commandant of Ozren Chetnik detachment Cvijetin Todić requested a meeting to reach an agreement with representatives of the NDH authorities. Ante Pavelic appointed persons for these negotiations and he gave these conditions: that they return to homes, hand over weapons and be loyal to the authorities of NDH. In return, it was promised that every Serbian village would receive weapons to fight the Partisans, that they would get state employment, and those Chetniks who stood out in the fight against the Partisans would receive decorations and awards. Ozren and Trebava Chetnik detachments signed this agreement on 28 May 1942. On 30 May 1942 Majevica Chetnik detachment signed agreement with one important novelty in this agreement, Chetniks from the area of Ozren and Trebava were given "self-governing power" i.e. autonomy which would be performed by the Chetniks' commanders. An almost identical agreement was signed on 14 June 1942 with the Zenica Chetnik detachment. In the later period similar agreements were signed with Chetnik detachments in the area of Lika and northern Dalmatia.

During the next three weeks, three additional agreements were signed, covering a large part of the area of Bosnia (comprising the Chetnik detachments within it). By the provision of these agreements, the Chetniks were to cease hostilities against the Ustaše state, and the Ustaše would establish regular administration in these areas. According to report of Edmund Glaise-Horstenau from 26 February 1944 based on official NDH data, in the NDH territory existed thirty five Chetnik groups of which nineteen groups with 17,500 men collaborated with Croatian and German authorities while as rebel Chetniks existed sixteen groups with 5,800-man. The Chetniks recognized the sovereignty of the Independent State of Croatia and became a legalized movement in it. The main provision, Art. 5 of the agreement, stated as follows:

Chetnik commander Uroš Drenović (far left) drinking with Croatian Home Guard and Ustaše troops

As long as there is danger from the Partisan armed bands, the Chetnik formations will cooperate voluntarily with the Croatian military in fighting and destroying the Partisans and in those operations they will be under the overall command of the Croatian armed forces. (... ) Chetnik formations may engage in operations against the Partisans on their own, but this they will have to report, on time, to the Croatian military commanders.

Chetnik-Ustaše collaboration agreement, 28 May 1942

Military and political expediency best explained these agreements, as historian Enver Redžić notes: "The Ustasha-Chetnik accords were driven neither by a confluence of Serbian and Croatian national interests nor by mutual desire for acceptance and respect, but rather because each side needed to obstruct Partisan advances." The agreements did not stop crimes against Serbs by the Ustaše or against Muslims and Croats by the Chetniks. They persisted in areas where the other had control and in regions where no agreements existed.

The necessary ammunition and provisions were supplied to the Chetniks by the Ustaše military. Chetniks who were wounded in such operations would be cared for in NDH hospitals, while the orphans and widows of Chetniks killed in action would be supported by the Ustaše state. Persons specifically recommended by Chetnik commanders would be returned home from the Ustaše concentration camps. These agreements covered the majority of Chetnik forces in Bosnia east of the German-Italian demarcation line, and lasted throughout most of the war. Since Croatian forces were immediately subordinate to the German military occupation, collaboration with Croatian forces was, in fact, indirect collaboration with the Germans.

Although the Dinara Division under the command of Đujić received support from the NDH, Chetniks under the command of Mihailović refused to collaborate with the NDH. Throughout the war Mihailović continued to refer to the NDH as an enemy and engaged Ustaše forces in the Serbian border areas. Mihailović's animosity towards the Ustaše was due to the ongoing genocidal policies of the NDH against the Serb population and other minority groups.

Fleeing the Partisans, in March 1945 Pavle Đurišić negotiated an agreement with the Ustaše and Ustaše-supported Montenegrin separatist, Sekula Drljević, to provide safe conduct for his Chetniks across the NDH. The Ustaše agreed to this, but when the Chetniks failed to follow the agreed-upon withdrawal route, the Ustaše attacked the Chetniks at Lijevče Field, afterward killing the captured commanders, while the remaining Chetniks continued to withdraw to Austria with the NDH army and under their military command.

Ustaše leader, Ante Pavelić ordered the NDH military to give Momčilo Đujić and his Dinara Division Chetniks "orderly and unimpeded passage", with which Đujić and his forces fled across the NDH to Slovenia and Italy. By his own admission, in April 1945, Ante Pavelić received "two generals from the headquarters of Draža Mihailović and reached an agreement with them on a joint fight against Tito's communists". In early May 1945 Chetnik forces withdrew through Ustaše-held Zagreb; many of these were later killed, along with captured Ustaše, by the Partisans as part of the Bleiburg repatriations.

Case White

Main article: Case White
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One major Chetnik collaboration with the Axis took place during the "Battle of the Neretva", the final phase of "Case White", known in Yugoslav historiography as the "Fourth Enemy Offensive". In 1942, Partisans forces were on the rise, having established large liberated territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chetnik forces, partially because of their collaboration with the Italian occupation, were also gaining in strength, however, but were no match to the Partisans and required Axis logistical support to attack the liberated territories. In light of the changing strategic situation, Hitler and the German high command decided to disarm the Chetniks and destroy the Partisans for good. In spite of Hitler's insistence, Italian forces in the end refused to disarm the Chetniks (thus rendering that course of action impossible), under the justification that the Italian occupation forces could not afford to lose the Chetniks as allies in their maintenance of the occupation.

Collaboration with the Germans

A group of Chetniks pose with German soldiers in an unidentified village in Serbia

When Germans invaded Yugoslavia they met in the Chetniks an organization trained and adapted for guerilla warfare. Although there were some clashes between the Germans and the Chetniks as early as May 1941, Mihailović thought of resistance in terms of setting up an organisation which, when the time was ripe, would rise against the occupying forces. British policy with regard to European resistance movements was to restrain them from activities which would lead to their premature destruction, and this policy coincided initially with the concepts on the basis of which Mihailović's movement was being operated. In order to dissociate himself from the Chetniks who collaborated with the Germans, Mihailović at first called its movement the "Ravna Gora Movement".

As early as spring 1942, the Germans favored the collaboration agreement the Ustaše and the Chetniks had established in a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Ustaše military was supplied by, and immediately subordinate to, the German military occupation, collaboration between the two constituted indirect German-Chetnik collaboration. This was all favorable to the Germans primarily because the agreement was directed against the Partisans, contributed to the pacification of areas significant for German war supplies, and reduced the need for additional German occupation troops (as Chetniks were assisting the occupation). After the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943, the German 114th Jäger Division even incorporated a Chetnik detachment in its advance to retake the Adriatic coast from the Partisans who had temporarily liberated it. The report on German-Chetnik collaboration of the XV Army Corps on 19 November 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army states that the Chetniks were "leaning on the German forces" for close to a year.

A group of Chetniks pose with German officers

German-Chetnik collaboration entered a new phase after the Italian surrender, because the Germans now had to police a much larger area than before and fight the Partisans in the whole of Yugoslavia. Consequently, they significantly liberalized their policy towards the Chetniks and mobilized all Serb nationalist forces against the Partisans. The 2nd Panzer Army oversaw these developments: the XV Army Corps was now officially allowed to utilize Chetniks troops and forge a "local alliance". The first formal and direct agreement between the German occupation forces and the Chetniks took place in early October 1943 between the German-led 373rd (Croatian) Infantry Division and a detachment of Chetniks under Mane Rokvić operating in western Bosnia and Lika. The Germans subsequently even used Chetnik troops for guard duty in occupied Split, Dubrovnik, Šibenik, and Metković.

NDH troops were not used, despite Ustaše demands, as mass desertions of Croat troops to the Partisans rendered them unreliable. From this point on, the German occupation actually started to "openly favor" Chetnik (Serb) troops over the Croat formations of the NDH, due to the pro-Partisan dispositions of the Croatian rank-and-file. The Germans paid little attention to frequent Ustaše protests about this.

Ustaše Major Mirko Blaž (Deputy Commander, 7th Brigade of the Poglavnik's Personal Guard) observed that:

The Germans are not interested in politics, they take everything from a military point of view. They need troops that can hold certain positions and clear certain areas of the Partisans. If they ask us to do it, we cannot do it. The Chetniks can.

Major Mirko Blaž, 5 March 1944.
Chetnik commander Đorđije Lašić (first from right) with German officer and Chetniks in Podgorica 1944

When appraising the situation in the western part of the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia, Bosnia, Lika, and Dalmatia, Captain Merrem, intelligence officer with the German commander-in-chief southeastern Europe, was "full of praise" for Chetnik units collaborating with the Germans, and for the smooth relations between the Germans and Chetnik units on the ground. In addition, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army observed in a letter to the Ustaše liaison officer that the Chetniks fighting the Partisans in Eastern Bosnia were "making a worthwhile contribution to the Croatian state", and that the 2nd Army "refused in principle" to accept Croatian complaints against the usage of these units. German-Chetnik collaboration continued to take place until the very end of the war, with the tacit approval of Draža Mihailović and the Chetnik Supreme Command in the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia. Though Mihailović himself never actually signed any agreements, he endorsed the policy for the purpose of eliminating the Partisan threat.

Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs commented:

Though he himself [Draža Mihailović] shrewdly refrained from giving his personal view in public, no doubt to have a free hand for every eventuality (e.g. Allied landing on the Balkans), he allowed his commanders to negotiate with Germans and to co-operate with them. And they did so, more and more ...

Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, 1945

The loss of Allied support in 1943 caused the Chetniks to lean more than ever towards the Germans for assistance against the Partisans. On 14 August 1944, the Tito-Šubašić agreement between the Partisans and the Yugoslav King and government-in-exile was signed on the island of Vis. The document called on all Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs to join the Partisans. Mihailović and the Chetniks refused to follow the order and abide by the agreement and continued to engage the Partisans (by now the official Yugoslav Allied force). Consequently, on 29 August 1944, King Peter II dismissed Mihailović as Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Tito in his place. Tito at this point became the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav state and the joint government.[citation needed]

Collaboration with the Government of National Salvation

In the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia, the Germans initially installed Milan Aćimović, as leader, but later replaced him with General Milan Nedić, former minister of war, who governed until 1944. Aćimović instead later served as the key liaison between the Germans and the Chetniks. In the second half of August 1941, prior to Nedić assuming power, the Germans arranged with Kosta Pećanac for the transfer of several thousand of his Chetniks to serve as auxiliaries for the gendarmerie. Collaboration between the Government of National Salvation and Mihailović's Chetniks began in fall of 1941 and lasted until the end of German occupation.

Nedić was initially firmly opposed to Mihailović and the Chetniks. On 4 September 1941, Mihailović sent Major Aleksandar Mišić and Miodrag Pavlović to enter a meeting with Nedić and nothing was accomplished. After Mihailović shifted his policy of mild cooperation with the Partisans to becoming hostile to them and ceasing anti-German activity in late October 1941, Nedić relaxed his opposition. On 15 October, Colonel Milorad Popović, acting on behalf of Nedić, gave Mihailović about 500,000 dinars (in addition to an equal amount given on 4 October) to persuade the Chetniks to collaborate. On 26 October 1941, Popović gave an additional 2,500,000 dinars.

By mid-November 1941, Mihailović put 2,000 of his men under Nedić's direct command and shortly later these men joined the Germans in an anti-Partisan operation. When the Germans launched Operation Mihailović on 6–7 December 1941, with the intent of capturing Mihailović and removing his headquarters in Ravna Gora, he escaped, probably because he was warned of the attack by Aćimović on 5 December.[citation needed]

In June 1942, Mihailović left the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia for Montenegro and was out of contact with the Nedić authorities until he returned. In September 1942, Mihailović orchestrated civil disobedience against the Nedić government via the use of leaflets and clandestine radio transmitter messages. This civil obedience may have been orchestrated in order to use as a cover to conduct sabotage operations on railway lines used to supply Axis forces in North Africa, however it has been disputed. In the fall of 1942 the Chetniks of Mihailović (and Pećanac) who had been legalized by the Nedić administration were dissolved. By 1943, Nedić feared that the Chetniks would become the primary collaborator with the Germans and after the Chetniks murdered Ceka Đorđević, deputy minister of internal affairs, in March 1944 he opted to replace him with a prominent Chetnik in the hopes of quelling the rivalry. A report prepared in April 1944 by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services commented that:

[Mihailović] should be viewed in the same light as Nedić, Ljotić, and the Bulgarian occupation forces.

Office of Strategic Services report, April 1944

In mid-August 1944, Mihailović, Nedić, and Dragomir Jovanović met in the village of Ražani secretly where Nedić agreed to give one hundred million dinars for wages and to request from the Germans arms and ammunition for Mihailović. On 6 September 1944, under the authority of the Germans and formalization by Nedić, Mihailović took command over the entire military force of the Nedić administration, including the Serbian State Guard, Serbian Volunteer Corps, and the Serbian Border Guard.

Contacts with Hungary

In mid-1943, the Hungarian General Staff arranged a meeting between a Serbian officer in the Nedić regime and Mihailović. The officer was instructed to express to Mihailović Hungary's regret for the massacre at Novi Sad and to promise that those responsible would be punished. Hungary recognised Mihailović as the representative of the Yugoslav government-in-exile and asked him, in the event of an Allied landing in the Balkans, not to enter Hungary with his troops, but to leave the border question to the peace conference. After contact was established, food, medicine, munitions and horses were sent to Mihailović. During his visit to Rome in April 1943, Prime Minister Miklós Kállay talked about Italo-Hungarian cooperation with the Chetniks, but Mussolini said he favoured Tito.

Hungary also tried to contact Mihailović through the royal Yugoslav government's representative in Istanbul in order to cooperate against the Partisans. The Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Momčilo Ninčić, reportedly sent a message to Istanbul asking the Hungarians to send an envoy and a Serb politician from the Hungarian-occupied territories to negotiate. Nothing came of these contacts, but Mihailović sent a representative, Čedomir Bošnjaković, to Budapest. For their part the Hungarians sent arms, medicine and released Serbian POWs willing to serve with the Chetniks down the Danube.

After the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, the Chetnik relationship was one of the few foreign contacts independent of German influence that Hungary had. A Hungarian diplomat, L. Hory, formerly posted in Belgrade, twice visited Mihailović in Bosnia, and the Hungarians continued to send him munitions, even across Croatian territory. The last contact between Mihailović and Hungary occurred on 13 October 1944, shortly before the German-sponsored coup of 15 October.

Terror tactics and cleansing actions

Chetnik ideology revolved around the notion of a Greater Serbia within the borders of Yugoslavia, to be created out of all territories in which Serbs were found, even if the numbers were small. This goal had long been the foundation of the movement for a Greater Serbia. During Axis occupation the notion of clearing or "ethnically cleansing" these territories was introduced largely in response to the massacres of Serbs by the Ustashe in the Independent State of Croatia. However, the largest Chetnik massacres took place in eastern Bosnia where they preceded any significant Ustashe operations. According to Pavlowitch, terror tactics were committed by local commanders of the Chetnik organisation. Mihailović disapproved these acts of ethnic cleansing against civilians, however he failed to take action in stopping these acts of terror, given the lack of command he had over local commanders and the rudimentary methods of communication that existed in the Chetnik command structure.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, use of terror tactics had a long tradition in the area as various oppressed groups sought their freedom and atrocities were committed by all parties engaged in conflict in Yugoslavia. During the early stages of the occupation, the Ustaše had also recruited a number of Muslims to aid in the persecutions of the Serbs, and even though only a relatively small number of Croats and Muslims engaged in these activities, and many opposed them, those actions initiated a cycle of violence and retribution between the Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims, as each sought to rid the others from the territories they controlled.

In particular, Ustaše ideologues were concerned with the large Serb minority in the NDH, and initiated acts of terror on a wide scale in May 1941. Two months later, in July, the Germans protested the brutality of these actions. Reprisals followed, as in the case of Nevesinje, where Serb peasants staged an uprising in response to the persecution, drove out the Ustaše militia, but then engaged in reprisals, killing hundreds of Muslims and some Croats, whom they associated with the Ustaše.

The "Instructions" ("Instrukcije") of 1941, ordering ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks, Croats, and others.

A directive dated 20 December 1941, addressed to newly appointed commanders in Montenegro, Major Đorđije Lašić and Captain Pavle Đurišić, outlined, among other things, the cleansing of non-Serb populations in order to create a Greater Serbia:

  1. The struggle for the liberty of our whole nation under the scepter of His Majesty King Peter II;
  2. the creation of a Great Yugoslavia and within it of a Great Serbia which is to be ethnically pure and is to include Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srijem, the Banat, and Bačka;
  3. the struggle for the inclusion into Yugoslavia of all still unliberated Slovene territories under the Italians and Germans (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, and Carinthia) as well as Bulgaria, and northern Albania with Skadar;
  4. the cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and a-national elements;
  5. the creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Directive of 20 December 1941

The authenticity of the directive is disputed. Some have attributed the directive as having come from Mihailović. Others have claimed that there is no original and that it may have been a forgery made by Đurišić to suit his purposes. Mihailović's headquarters sent further instructions to the commander of the Second Sarajevo Chetnik Brigade clarifying the goal: "It should be made clear to everyone that, after the war or when the time becomes appropriate, we will complete our task and that no one except the Serbs will be left in Serbian lands. Explain this to [our] people and ensure that they make this their priority. You cannot put this in writing or announce it publicly, because the Turks [Muslims] would hear about it too, and this must not be spread around by word of mouth."

The Chetniks systemically massacred Muslims in villages that they captured. In late autumn of 1941 the Italians handed over the towns of Višegrad, Goražde, Foča and the surrounding areas, in south-east Bosnia to the Chetniks to run as a puppet administration and NDH forces were compelled by the Italians to withdraw from there. After the Chetniks gained control of Goražde on 29 November 1941, they began a massacre of Home Guard prisoners and NDH officials that became a systematic massacre of the local Muslim civilian population, with several hundred murdered and their bodies left hanging in the town or thrown into the Drina river. On 5 December 1941, the Chetniks received the town of Foča from the Italians and proceeded to massacre around five hundred Muslims. In August 1942, detachments under command of Zaharije Ostojić killed at least 2,000 Muslims in Čajniče and Foča area. Since the spring of 1942 in certain military actions of Chetniks and Italians in Lika, northern Dalmatia, Gorski kotar and Kordun, killings are becoming more frequent while villages were looted and burned. The most victims were NOP activists and their families, while population of that area was intimidated, especially Serbs. Momčilo Đujić in 1942 proclamation for the population of Lika and western Bosnia ordered all Chetnik units to "occupy all villages and towns and take all power into their hands", threatening to "destroy all settlements to the ground" if they resist regardless of whether these settlements are Croatian or Serbian. Additional massacres against the Muslims in the area of Foča took place in August 1942. In total, over two thousand people were killed in Foča.

In early January, the Chetniks entered Srebrenica and killed around a thousand Muslim civilians in the town and in nearby villages. Around the same time the Chetniks made their way to Višegrad where deaths were reportedly in the thousands. Massacres continued in the following months in the region. In the village of Žepa alone about three hundred were killed in late 1941. In early January, Chetniks massacred fifty-four Muslims in Čelebić and burned down the village. On 3 March, a contingent of Chetniks burned forty-two Muslim villagers to death in Drakan.

Đurišić's report of 13 February 1943 detailing the massacres of Muslims in the counties of Čajniče and Foča in southeastern Bosnia and in the county of Pljevlja in Sandžak

In early January 1943 and again in early February, Montenegrin Chetnik units were ordered to carry out "cleansing actions" against Muslims, first in the Bijelo Polje county in Sandžak and then in February in the Čajniče county and part of Foča county in southeastern Bosnia, and in part of the Pljevlja county in Sandžak. On 10 January 1943, Pavle Đurišić, the Chetnik officer in charge of these operations, submitted a report to Mihailović, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. His report included the results of these "cleansing operations", which according to Tomasevich, were that "thirty-three Muslim villages had been burned down, and 400 Muslim fighters (members of the Muslim self-protection militia supported by the Italians) and about 1,000 women and children had been killed, as against 14 Chetnik dead and 26 wounded".

In another report sent by Đurišić dated 13 February 1943, he reported that: "Chetniks killed about 1,200 Muslim fighters and about 8,000 old people, women, and children; Chetnik losses in the action were 22 killed and 32 wounded". He added that "during the operation the total destruction of the Muslim inhabitants was carried out regardless of sex and age". The total number of deaths in anti-Muslim operations between January and February 1943 is estimated at 10,000. The casualty rate would have been higher had not a great number of Muslims already fled, most to Sarajevo, when the February action began.

According to a statement from the Chetnik Supreme Command from 24 February 1943, these were countermeasures taken against Muslim aggressive activities; however, all circumstances show that these massacres were committed in accordance with implementing the directive of 20 December 1941. In March 1943, Mihailović listed the Chetnik action in Sandžak as one of his successes noting they had "liquidated all Muslims in the villages except those in the small towns".

Actions against Croats were smaller in scale but similar in action. In the summer of 1941, Trubar, Bosansko Grahovo[dubiousdiscuss] and Krnjeuša were the sites of the first massacres and other attacks against ethnic Croats in the southwestern Bosnian Krajina. Throughout August and September 1942, Chetniks, under the command of Petar Baćović, intensified their actions against local Croats across the hinterland areas of southern Dalmatia. On 29 August, Chetniks killed between 141 and 160 Croats from several villages in the Zabiokovlje, Biokovo and Cetina areas while participating in the Italian anti-Partisan "Operation Albia". Throughout September 1942, Chetniks killed 900 Croats around the town of Makarska.

In early October 1942 in the village of Gata near Split, an estimated one hundred people were killed and many homes burnt purportedly as reprisal for the destruction of some roads in the area and carried out on the Italians' account. In that same October, formations under the command of Petar Baćović and Dobroslav Jevđević, who were participating in the Italian Operation Alfa in the area of Prozor, massacred a minimum of five hundred Croats and Muslims and burnt numerous villages, other estimates for victims of this massacre go as high as 2,500 killed.[citation not found] Baćović noted that "Our Chetniks killed all men 15 years of age or older. ... Seventeen villages were burned to the ground." Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian Second Army, objected to these "massive slaughters" of noncombatant civilians and threatened to halt Italian aid to the Chetniks if they did not end.

Chetniks in Šumadija kill a Partisan through heart extraction.

Croatian historian Vladimir Žerjavić initially estimated the number of Muslims and Croats killed by the Chetniks as 65,000 (33,000 Muslims and 32,000 Croats; both combatants and civilians). In 1997, he revised this figure down to 47,000 dead (29,000 Muslims and 18,000 Croats). According to Vladimir Geiger of the Croatian Institute of History, Zdravko Dizdar, a historian, estimates Chetniks killed a total of 50,000 Croats and Muslims – mostly civilians – between 1941 and 1945. According to Ramet, the Chetniks completely destroyed 300 villages and small towns and a large number of mosques and Catholic churches. Some historians contend that during this period genocide was committed against Muslims and Croats.

The Partisans were also targets of terror tactics. In the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia, apart from a few terrorist acts against Nedić's and Ljotić's men, and in Montenegro against separatists, terror was directed solely against the Partisans, their families and sympathizers, on ideological grounds. The goal was the complete destruction of the Partisans. The Chetniks created lists of individuals that were to be liquidated and special units known as "black trojkas" were trained to carry out these acts of terror. During the summer of 1942, using names supplied by Mihailović, lists of individual Nedić and Ljotić supporters to be assassinated or threatened were broadcast over BBC radio during news programming in Serbo-Croatian. Once the British discovered this, the broadcasts were halted, although this did not prevent the Chetniks from continuing to carry out assassinations.

Loss of Allied support

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To gather intelligence, official intelligence missions of the western Allies were sent into both the Partisans and the Chetniks. The intelligence gathered by liaisons were crucial to the success of supply missions and was the primary influence on Allied strategy in Yugoslavia. The search for intelligence ultimately resulted in the demise of the Chetniks and their eclipse by the Partisans. The head of British mission Colonel Bailey was instrumental for wrecking the position of Mihailović with British side.

The Germans were executing Case Black, one of a series of offensives aimed at the resistance fighters, when F.W.D. Deakin was sent by the British to gather information. His reports contained two important observations. The first was that the Partisans were courageous and aggressive in battling the German 1st Mountain and 104th Light Division, had suffered significant casualties, and required support. The second observation was that the entire German 1st Mountain Division had transited from Russia on rail lines through Chetnik-controlled territory. British intercepts of German message traffic confirmed Chetnik timidity.

Draža Mihailović with McDowell and other US officers

All in all, intelligence reports resulted in increased Allied interest in Yugoslavia air operations, and a shift in policy. In September 1943, British policy dictated equal aid to the Chetniks and Partisans, but by December, relations between the Chetniks and British soured after Chetniks refused to obey orders to sabotage the Germans without the guarantee of an Allied landing in the Balkans. Over time British support moved away from the Chetniks, who refused to stop collaborating with the Italians and Germans instead of fighting them, towards the Partisans, who were eager to increase their anti-Axis activity.

After the Tehran Conference, the Partisans received official recognition as the legitimate national liberation force by the Allies, who subsequently set up the Balkan Air Force (under the influence and suggestion of Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean) with the aim to provide increased supplies and tactical air support for the Partisans. In February 1944, Mihailovic's Chetniks failed to fulfill British demands to demolish key bridges over the Morava and Ibar rivers, causing the British to withdraw their liaisons and halt supplying the Chetniks. Although British support for the Chetniks ceased, the Americans were less than enthusiastic about British abandonment of the anti-communist Chetniks. As support shifted towards the Partisans, Mihailović's Chetniks attempted to recommence Allied support for the Chetniks by displaying their eagerness to help the Allies. This eagerness to help was put into practice when the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) approached Mihailovic's Chetniks in mid 1944 to organise the airlift of downed US airmen. This operation known as the Halyard Mission resulted in the rescue of 417 US airmen that were previously kept safe by Mihailovic's Chetniks. Mihailović later received the Legion of Merit from US President Harry S. Truman for the rescue of Allied pilots.

Joint US/Chetnik military ceremony in Pranjani 6 September 1944: Capt. Nick Lalich (OSS), Gen. Dragoljub Mihailović (Yugoslav Army in the Homeland), and Col. Robert McDowell (OSS)

On 14 August 1944, the Tito-Šubašić agreement between Partisans and the Government in exile was signed on the island of Vis. The document called on all Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs to join the Partisans. Mihailović and the Chetniks refused to accept the Royal Government's agreement and continued to engage the Partisans, by now the official Yugoslav Allied force. Consequently, on 29 August 1944, King Peter II dismissed Mihailović as Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Josip Broz Tito in his place. On 6 October 1944, the Nedić government transferred the Serbian State Guard to Mihailović's command, although cooperation proved impossible and they separated in January 1945 while in Bosnia.

Cooperation with the Soviets

In September 1944, the Soviets invaded and occupied Romania and Bulgaria, removing them from the war and putting Soviet forces on the borders of Yugoslavia. The Chetniks were not unprepared for this, and throughout the war their propaganda strove to harness the pro-Russian and pan-Slavic sympathies of the majority of the Serb population. The distinction between the Russian people and their communist government was belaboured, as was the supposed difference between Yugoslav Partisans, who were allegedly Trotskyists, and the Soviets, who were Stalinists.

On 10 September 1944, a Chetnik mission of approximately 150 men, led by Lieutenant Colonel Velimir Piletić, commander of northeastern Serbia, crossed the Danube into Romania and established contact with Soviet forces at Craiova. Their main purpose, according to the memoirs of one of them, Lt. Col. Miodrag Ratković, was to establish Soviet agreement to certain political goals: a cessation of the civil war through Soviet mediation, free elections supervised by the Allied powers and the postponement of any war-related trials until after elections. Before the mission could go on to Bucharest, where the American and British military missions were, they were denounced by one of Piletić's aides as British spies and arrested by the Soviets on 1 October.

Although the Chetniks believed they could fight as allies of the Soviets at the same time as they fought the Partisans, they did manage some local cooperation with the former while antagonising the Germans. In a circular of 5 October, Mihailović wrote: "We consider the Russians as our allies. The struggle against Tito's forces in Serbia will be continued." The Germans were aware of the Chetniks' disposition through radio intercepts, and their intelligence reported on 19 October that "the Chetniks have never been prepared by Draža Mihailović through appropriate propaganda for a fighting encounter with the Russians. Draža Mihailović has on the contrary upheld the fiction that the Russians as allies of the Americans and the British will never act against the interests of the Serbian nationalists."

The commander of a group of the Shock Corps, Lt. Col. Keserović, was the first Chetnik officer to cooperate with the Soviets. In mid-October his troops met Soviet forces advancing into central eastern Serbia from Bulgaria and together they captured the town of Kruševac, the Soviets leaving Keserović in charge of the town. Within three days, Keserović was warning his fellow commanders that the Russians were only talking with the Partisans and disarming the Chetniks. Keserović reported to Supreme Command on 19 October that his delegate to the Soviet division had returned with a message ordering his men to be disarmed and incorporated in the Partisan armed forces by 18 October.

Another Chetnik commander to cooperate with the Soviets was Captain Predrag Raković of the Second Ravna Gora Corps, whose men participated in the capture of Čačak, where they captured 339 soldiers of the Russisches Schutzkorps Serbien (whom they turned over to the Soviets). Raković apparently had a written agreement with the local Soviet commander, placing himself and his men under Soviet command in return for recognition that they were Mihailović's men. After a protest from Tito to Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin, commander of the front, Keserović's and Raković's cooperation came to an end. By 11 November the latter had gone into hiding and his forces had fled west to avoid being disarmed and placed under Partisan control.

Retreat and dissolution

Finally, in April and May 1945, as the victorious Partisans took possession of the country's territory, many Chetniks retreated toward Italy and a smaller group toward Austria. Many were captured by the Partisans or returned to Yugoslavia by British forces while a number were killed following repatriation from Bleiburg. Some were tried for treason and were sentenced to prison terms or death. Many were summarily executed, especially in the first months after the end of the war. Mihailović and his few remaining followers tried to fight their way back to the Ravna Gora, but he was captured by Partisan forces. In March 1946, Mihailović was brought to Belgrade, where he was tried and executed on charges of treason in July. During the closing years of World War II, many Chetniks defected from their units, as the Partisan commander-in-chief, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, proclaimed a general amnesty to all defecting forces for a time. After the end of WWII Yugoslav authority undertook radical actions to destroy remaining Chetnik groups, especially in Lika area. One of the radical methods was forced displacement of Serbs from the area of Gospić, Plaški, Donji Lapac and Gračac. Chetnik attacks on villages were recorded in June 1945, as it were attack on Dobroselo. The main part of the Chetniks was located in the area of Lapac while in the winter of 1946 actions were organized against them which testifies about the seriousness of the Chetnik threat.

SFR Yugoslavia

After the end of World War II, the Chetniks were banned in the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 29 November 1945, King Peter II was deposed by the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly after an overwhelming referendum result. Chetnik leaders either escaped the country or were arrested by the authorities. On 13 March 1946, Mihailović was captured by OZNA, the Yugoslav security agency. He was put on trial, found guilty of high treason against Yugoslavia, sentenced to death and then executed by firing squad on 17 July.

In 1947, Đujić was tried and sentenced in absentia for war crimes by Yugoslavia. He was declared a war criminal who as commander of the Dinara Division was responsible for organizing and carrying out a series of mass murders, massacres, tortures, rapes, robberies, and imprisonments, and collaborating with the German and Italian occupiers. He was accused of being responsible for the deaths of 1,500 people during the war.

Following his arrival in the United States, Đujić and his fighters played a role in the foundation of the Ravna Gora Movement of Serbian Chetniks. Other Chetniks factions found their way to the midwestern United States and to Australia.

According to Denis Bećirović after the war state structures of Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, considered most Serbian Orthodox priests as potential or real enemies of the state. The negative attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards the Serbian Orthodox Church was also influenced by the fact that some priests during the war supported Chetnik movement. In documents of the Commission for Religious Affairs states that "most priests during the war supported and cooperated with Draža Mihailović's movement; that they protected and maintained contact with war criminals; and that they appointed persons in the administration of church institutions who were convicted of collaborating with the occupier".

In January 1951, the Yugoslav government charged 16 individuals that were Chetnik in orientation with being part of a conspiracy that plotted to overthrow the government and reinstate King Petar with French and American military intelligence assistance. Of the charged, 15 were sentenced to long prison sentences and one was sentenced to death. On 12 January 1952, the government reported four or five Chetnik "brigades" numbering around 400 men each still existed and were at the borders of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and in Montenegrin forests, attacking meetings of the communist party and police buildings. As late as November 1952, small Chetnik groups operated in mountains and forests around Kalinovik and Trnovo. Trials of wartime Chetniks carried on until 1957.

In 1957, Blagoje Jovović along with other former Chetniks living in Argentina received a tip off from an ex-Italian general as to the whereabouts of Ante Pavelić, former Poglavnik of the NDH who was hiding in Argentina. At the time Pavelić had escaped to Argentina with the help from members of the Catholic clergy via the escape route known as the ratlines. Jovović and other Chetniks put into action an assassination plan and on 10 April 1957, Jovović was able to track down Pavelić. Pavelić survived the assassination attempt after receiving two gunshot wounds, only to succumb to injuries and die two years later on 28 December 1959.

In 1975, Nikola Kavaja, a diaspora Chetnik-sympathizer living in Chicago and belonging to the Serbian National Defense Council (SNDC), was, at his own initiative, responsible for bombing a Yugoslav consul's home, the first in a series of attacks targeting the Yugoslav state in the United States and Canada. He and his co-conspirators were captured in a sting set up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and convicted for terrorism for the incident and for planning to bomb two Yugoslav receptions on Yugoslavia's Republic Day. Later that year, during his flight to receive his sentence, he hijacked the American Airlines Flight 293 with the intention of crashing the plane into Tito's Belgrade headquarters, but was dissuaded; he ultimately received a 67-year prison sentence.

Yugoslav Wars

Momčilo Đujić delivering a speech in Canada, July 1991.

After Slobodan Milošević's assumption of power in 1989 various Chetnik groups made a "comeback" and his regime "made a decisive contribution to launching the Chetnik insurrection in 1990–1992 and to funding it thereafter". Chetnik ideology was influenced by the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. On 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Serbs in north Dalmatia, Knin, Obrovac, and Benkovac where there were "old Chetnik strongholds", held the first anti-Croatian government demonstrations.

On the same day, Momčilo Đujić declared Vojislav Šešelj "at once assumes the role of a Chetnik vojvoda" and ordered him "to expel all Croats, Albanians, and other foreign elements from holy Serbian soil", stating he would return only when Serbia was cleansed of "the last Jew, Albanian, and Croat". The Serbian Orthodox Church began the procession of the reliquary of Prince Lazar, who participated in the Battle of Kosovo and was canonized, and in the summer it reached the Zvornik-Tuzla eparchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina where there was a feeling of "historic tragedy of the Serb people, which is experiencing a new Kosovo" accompanied by nationalist declarations and Chetnik iconography.

Later that year, Vojislav Šešelj, Vuk Drašković, and Mirko Jović formed the Serbian National Renewal (SNO), a Chetnik party. In March 1990, Drašković and Šešelj splintered to form a separate Chetnik party, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). On 18 June 1990, Šešelj organized the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SČP) though it wasn't permitted official registration due to its obvious Chetnik identification. On 23 February 1991, it merged with the National Radical Party (NRS), establishing the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) with Šešelj as president and Tomislav Nikolić as vice president. It was a Chetnik party, oriented towards neo-fascism with a striving for the territorial expansion of Serbia. In July 1991, Serb-Croat clashes broke out in Croatia and rallies were held in the Ravna Gora mountains with chants in favor of war and recollected "glories" of Chetnik massacres of Croats and Muslims during World War II. The SPO held many rallies at Ravna Gora

During the Yugoslav Wars, many Serb paramilitaries styled themselves as Chetniks. The SRS's military wing was known as "Chetniks" and received weaponry from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbian police. Šešelj personally helped arm Serbs in Croatia and recruited volunteers in Serbia and Montenegro, sending 5,000 men to Croatia and up to 30,000 to Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Šešelj "the Chetniks never acted outside the umbrella of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Serbian police". Željko Ražnatović, a self-styled Chetnik, led a Chetnik force called the Serb Volunteer Guard (SDG), established on 11 October 1990. The SDG was connected to the Serbian Ministry of Interior, operated under JNA command, and reported directly to Milošević. It had between 1,000 and 1,500 men. Jović, at the time the Serbian Minister of the Interior, organized the youth wing of the SNO into the White Eagles, a paramilitary closely based on the World War II Chetnik movement, and called for "a Christian, Orthodox Serbia with no Muslims and no unbelievers." It came to be associated with the SRS though Šešelj denied the connection.

Both the White Eagles and SDG received instructions from the Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service. In September–October 1991, the Ozren Chetniks were established to "carry on the 'best' Chetnik traditions of the Second World War". A paramilitary group called the Chetnik Avengers also existed and was led by Milan Lukić who later took command of the White Eagles. A Chetnik unit led by Slavko Aleksić operated under the command of the Army of Republika Srpska. In 1991 it fought in the Krajina area of Croatia and in 1992 around Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, the president of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, used the subordinate Chetnik forces of Šešelj and Ražnatović as part of their plan to expel non-Serbs and form a Greater Serbia through the use of ethnic cleansing, terror, and demoralization. Šešelj's and Ražnatović's formations acted as "autonomous" groups in the RAM Plan which sought to organize Serbs outside Serbia, consolidate control of the Serbian Democratic Parties (SDS), and prepare arms and ammunition in an effort to establish a country where "all Serbs with their territories would live together in the same state." According to historian Noel Malcolm the "steps taken by Karadžić and his party – [declaring Serb] "Autonomous Regions", the arming of the Serb population, minor local incidents, non-stop propaganda, the request for federal army "protection" – matched exactly what had been done in Croatia. Few observers could doubt that a single plan was in operation."

Chetnik units engaged in mass murders and war crimes. In 1991, the Croatian town of Erdut was forcefully taken over by the SDG and JNA and annexed to the puppet state of Republic of Serbian Krajina. Croats and other non-Serbs were either expelled or killed with Serbs repopulating empty villages in the area. On 1 April 1992, the SDG attacked Bijeljina and carried out a massacre of Muslim civilians. On 4 April, Chetnik irregulars helped the JNA in shelling Sarajevo. On 6 April, Chetniks and the JNA attacked Bijeljina, Foča, Bratunac, and Višegrad. On 9 April, the SDG and Šešelj's Chetniks aided the JNA and special units of the Serbian security force in overtaking Zvornik and ridding it of its local Muslim population.

Reports sent by Ražnatović to Milošević, Ratko Mladić, and Blagoje Adžić stated the plan was progressing, noting that the psychological attack on the Bosniak population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was effective and should continue. Chetnik forces also engaged in mass murder in Vukovar and Srebrenica. The White Eagles were responsible for massacres in Voćin, Višegrad, Foča, Sjeverin, and Štrpci, and for terrorizing the Muslim population in Sandžak. In September 1992, Chetniks attempted to force Sandžak Muslims in Pljevlja to flee by demolishing their stores and houses whilst shouting "Turks leave" and "this is Serbia". By mid-1993, they suffered over a hundred bombings, kidnappings, expulsions, and shootings. The SPO threatened Muslims with expulsion when reacting to requests for autonomy in Sandžak.

On 15 May 1993, Šešelj proclaimed eighteen (18) Chetnik fighters as vojvodas, naming towns that were cleansed of non-Serbs in their citation, and they were blessed by an Orthodox priest afterwards. Šešelj came to be described as "a man whose killer commando units operating in Croatia and Bosnia carried on the very worst of the Chetnik tradition."

Vojislav Šešelj under trial at the ICTY.

Later the SRS became a government coalition partner of Milosević and in 1998, Đujić publicly stated that he regretted awarding that title to Šešelj. He was quoted as saying, "I was naïve when I nominated Šešelj [as] Vojvoda; I ask my people to forgive me. The greatest gravedigger of Serbdom is Slobodan Milošević" and that he is "disappointed in Šešelj for openly collaborating with Milošević's Socialist Party, with Communists who have only changed their name. ... Šešelj has sullied the reputation of Chetniks and Serbian nationalism." In 2000, Ražnatović was assassinated before facing prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In 2003, Šešelj surrendered himself to the ICTY to face war crimes charges and was acquitted in 2016.

Nikolić, whom Šešelj had, in 1993, proclaimed vojvoda and awarded the Order of Chetnik Knights for his subordinates' "personal courage in defending the fatherland", took over the SRS. He vowed to pursue a Greater Serbia "through peaceful means". In 2008, Lukić was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The British journalist Misha Glenny, author of "The Fall of Yugoslavia", stated that the revival of the Serb nationalists in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was one of the most "hideous and frightening aspects of the fall of communism in Serbia and Yugoslavia" and "this breed, which finds nurture in the perpetration of unspeakable acts of brutality, encapsulates all that is irrational and unacceptable in Balkan society."

Serbian historiography

In the 1980s, Serbian historians initiated the process of reexamining the narrative of how World War II was told in Yugoslavia, which was accompanied by the rehabilitation of Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović. Being preoccupied with the era, Serbian historians have looked to vindicate Chetnik history by portraying Chetniks as righteous freedom fighters battling the Nazis while removing from history books the ambiguous alliances with the Italians and Germans. Whereas the crimes committed by Chetniks against Croats and Muslims in Serbian historiography are overall "cloaked in silence".

Serbia

Monument to Draža Mihailović on Ravna Gora.

In Serbia there has been a revival of Chetnik movement. Since the early 1990s, the SPO has annually held the "Ravna Gora Parliament" and in 2005 it was organized with state funding for the first time. Croatian president Stjepan Mesić later cancelled a planned visit to Serbia as it coincided with the gathering. People who attend the Parliament wear Chetnik iconography and T-shirts with the image of Mihailović or of Mladić, who is on trial at the ICTY on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The SRS headed by Nikolić, still in favor of a Greater Serbia and rooted in the Chetnik movement, won the 2003 elections with 27.7 percent and gained 82 seats of the 250 available. In 2005, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church backed the SRS. It later won the 2007 elections with 28.7 percent of the vote. In 2008, Nikolić split with SRS over the issue of cooperation with the European Union and formed the Serbian Progressive Party.

Serbian textbooks have contained historical revisionism of the Chetnik role in World War II since the 1990s. Reinterpretation and revisionism has focused primarily on three areas: Chetnik-Partisan relations, Axis collaboration, and crimes against civilians. The 2002 Serbian textbook intended for the final years of high schools hailed Chetniks as national patriots, minimized the Partisan movement, and resulted in protests from historians who viewed the work as dubious. It contained no mention of Chetnik collaboration or of atrocities committed by Chetniks on non-Serbs. Chetniks that killed individuals who cooperated with communists were said to have been renegades. The Chetniks were referred to as "the core of the Serb civic resistance" and "contrary to the communists, who wanted to split up the Serb ethnic space, sought to expand Serbia by incorporating Montenegro, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, part of Dalmatia including Dubrovnik and Zadar, the whole Srem, including Vukovar, Vinkovi, and Dalj, Kosovo and Metohija, and South Serbia (Macedonia)", and were portrayed as betrayed by the Western Allies. The Chetnik movement is claimed to be the sole one with "Serb national interests" and their defeat was equated with the defeat of Serbia, stating in bold that: "In the Second World War, the Serbian citizenry was destroyed, the national movement shattered, and the intelligentsia demolished." After public criticism, the 2006 textbook for the final year of elementary school mentioned collaboration, but attempted to justify it and stated all factions of the war collaborated.

In March 2004, the National Assembly of Serbia passed a new law that equalized the Chetniks and Partisans as equivalent anti-fascists. The vote was 176 for, 24 against and 4 abstained. Vojislav Mihailović, the Vice President of the Serbian Parliament and grandson of Draža Mihailović, stated it was "late, but it provides satisfaction to a good portion of Serbia, their descendants. They will not get financial resources, but will have the satisfaction that their grandfathers, fathers, were true fighters for a free Serbia." Partisan war veterans' associations criticized the law and stated that Serbia was "the first country in Europe to declare a quisling movement as being liberating and anti-fascist." In 2009, Serbian courts rehabilitated one of the chief Chetnik ideologues Dragiša Vasić. In September 2012, the Constitutional Court of Serbia declared the 2004 law unconstitutional stating Chetnik veterans were not permitted an allowance and medical assistance while still maintaining their rights to a pension and rehabilitation.[citation not found] According to Goran Marković, today's revisionists see the Chetnik movement as anti-fascist although in November 1941 this movement began collaborating with the occupiers and other quislings, it actually means that in 1941 we had an anti-fascist movement which refused to fight against fascism and collaborated with fascism.

The Serbian basketball player Milan Gurović has a tattoo of Mihailović on his left arm which has resulted in a ban since 2004 in playing in Croatia where it is "considered an incitement ... of racial, national or religious hatred". Later Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey enacted such a ban. Serbian rock musician and poet Bora Đorđević, leader of the highly popular rock band Riblja Čorba, is also a self-declared Chetnik, but calling it a "national movement that is much older than the WWII", and adding that he does not hate other nations and has never been a member of the SRS nor advocated Greater Serbia.

Montenegro

In May 2002, plans were prepared for a "Montenegrin Ravna Gora" memorial complex to be located near Berane. The complex was to be dedicated to Đurišić, who not only spent some of his youth at Berane but had also established his wartime headquarters there. In June 2003, Vesna Kilibarda, the Montenegrin Minister of Culture, banned the construction of the monument saying that the Ministry of Culture had not applied for approval to erect it.

The Association of War Veterans of the National Liberation Army (SUBNOR) objected to the construction of the monument saying that Đurišić was a war criminal who was responsible for the deaths of many colleagues of the veterans association and 7,000 Muslims. The association was also concerned about the organizations that backed the construction including the Serbian Orthodox Church and its Montenegrin wing which is led by Metropolitan Amfilohije. The Muslim Association of Montenegro condemned the construction and stated that "this is an attempt to rehabilitate him and it is a great insult to the children of the innocent victims and the Muslim people in Montenegro." On 4 July, the Montenegrin government forbade the unveiling of the monument stating that it "caused public concern, encouraged division among the citizens of Montenegro, and incited national and religious hatred and intolerance." A press release from the committee in charge of the construction of the monument stated that the actions taken by the government were "absolutely illegal and inappropriate". On 7 July, the stand that was prepared for the erection of the monument was removed by the police.

In 2011, the Montenegrin Serb political party New Serb Democracy (NOVA) renewed efforts for a monument to be built and stated that Đurišić and other royal Yugoslav officers were "leaders of the 13 July uprising" and that they "continued their struggle to liberate the country under the leadership of King Peter and the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia."

Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 22 July 1996, the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina created a veteran rights law that explicitly covered former Chetniks, but did not include former Partisans.

During the Bosnian War, the main traffic road in Brčko was renamed the "Boulevard of General Draža Mihailović" and on 8 September 1997 a statue of Mihailović was established in the town's center. In 2000, the street was renamed the "Boulevard of Peace" and in 2004, after lobbying by Bosniak returnees and intervention from the Office of the High Representative, the statue was moved to an Orthodox cemetery located at the outskirts of Brčko. It was removed on 20 October 2005 and on 18 August 2013 unveiled in Višegrad.

In May 1998, the Chetnik Ravna Gora Movement of Republika Srpska was founded and proclaimed itself the military branch of the SDS and the SRS. In April 1998, the "key date in its recent history" occurred when Šešelj had held a speech for a gathering in Brčko with representatives from the SDS, the SRS, the Serb National Alliance (SNS), the Assembly of Serb Sisters of Mother Jevrosima, the High Council of Chetnik Veterans of Republika Srpska, and the Chetnik Ravna Gora Movement of Serbia in attendance. In April 1999 it was legally registered and later renamed the Serb National Homeland Movement. Important individuals in its beginnings included: Karadžić, Mladić, Nikola Poplašen, Dragan Čavić, Mirko Banjac, Mirko Blagojević, Velibor Ostojić, Vojo Maksimović and Božidar Vučurević. It operated in fourteen regions where members work in "trojkas" and infiltrate various civilian organisations. On 5 May 2001, it disrupted cornerstone laying ceremonies for the destroyed Omer Pasha Mosque in Trebinje and on 7 May for the destroyed Ferhat Pasha Mosque in Banja Luka. The Bosnian magazine Dani linked to the Oslobođenje newspapers, claimed that the "international community" and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe designated it a terrorist and pro-fascist organization. In 2005, United States president George W. Bush issued an executive order and its US assets were, among other organizations, frozen for obstructing the Dayton Agreement.

On 12 July 2007, a day after the 12th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre and the burial of a further 465 victims, a group of men dressed in Chetnik uniforms marched the streets of Srebrenica. They all wore badges of military units which committed the massacre in July 1995. On 11 July 2009, after the burial of 543 victims in Srebrenica, members of the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement desecrated the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina, marched in the streets wearing T-shirts with the face of Mladić and sang Chetnik songs. A group of men and women associated with the Serbian far-right group Obraz "chanted insults directed towards the victims and in support of the Chetnik movement, calling for eradication of Islam." A full report of the incident was submitted to the local District Prosecutor's Office but no one has been prosecuted. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been campaigning for a creation of a law that would ban the group within Bosnia.

Croatia

Milorad Pupovac of the Independent Democratic Serb Party in Croatia (the present-day leader of Serbs of Croatia and member of the Parliament of Croatia), described the organization as "fascist collaborators".

United States

Serbian-Americans set up a monument dedicated to Pavle Đurišić at the Serbian cemetery in Libertyville, Illinois. The management and players of the football club Red Star Belgrade visited it on 23 May 2010.

Ukraine

In March 2014, Serb volunteers calling themselves Chetniks, led by Serbian ultra-nationalist Bratislav Živković, travelled to Sevastopol in Crimea to support the pro-Russian side in the Crimean crisis. They spoke of "common Slavic blood and Orthodox faith", cited similarities with the Cossacks, and claimed to be returning the favour of Russian volunteers who fought on the Serbian side of the Yugoslav Wars. Participating in the ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine since its inception in early 2014, it was reported in August 2014 that Chetniks killed 23 Ukrainian soldiers and took out a "significant amount of armored vehicles" during clashes with the Ukrainian army. Most of the sympathisers are from Serbia, Serb-inhabited areas of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and according to Ukrainian sources, they killed hundreds of Ukrainians during the war. According to Serb paramilitary fighter in Ukraine, Milutin Malisic, who was a former fighter in Kosovo, he stated that "Serbs have a responsibility to their Orthodox Brethren."

Chetnik fighters in Ukraine, 2014. Bratislav Živković is seen in the center of the second row.

According to Belgrade-based security expert Zoran Dragišić, it is indoctrination that draws young Serbian people, some of them almost children, to join the war. A 2014 law in Serbia denounces war tourism among Serb nationals as illegal and in 2018, Serb paramilitary chief Bratislav Zivkovic was arrested in Serbia for having joined the separatist movement in Russia. Zivkovic was banned from Romania for 15 years in 2017 after having spied on NATO-bases in 2017.

In June 2018, Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation into 54 suspected members of a pro-Russian foreign legion. Among the suspects were six Serbs, who later fought in Syria, taking part in attacks on Ukrainian troops in the eastern part of the country in 2014. Former special police spokesperson Radomir Počuča posted regular videos, photos and Esther entries on Facebook. Ukrainian ambassador in Serbia Oleksandr Aleksandrovych stated in November 2017 that Serbia was not doing enough to stop Serb nationals from fighting in eastern Ukraine. Aleksandrovych stated that roughly 300 Serbs were operating in Ukraine, and he stated that Serb tourists would be halted at the border, and if acting suspicious, would be arrested since they were "there to kill Ukrainians". Kyiv then warned Belgrade. Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić insisted that Serbia respect Ukraine's territorial integrity.

The term "Chetnik" is sometimes used as a derogatory term for a Serbian nationalist or an ethnic Serb in general. According to Jasminka Udovički, during the Croatian War of Independence, the Croatian media referred to Serbs as "bearded Chetnik hordes", "terrorists and conspirators" and a "people ill inclined to democracy". Demonizing "Serbo-Chetnik terrorists" became a main preoccupation. During the Bosnian War, the term entered the mutual ethnic-centered propaganda waged by the warring insides and thus for the Bosnian side it was increasingly used to refer to the enemy and villain, imagined as "primitive, untidy, long-haired and bearded."

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  • "-nik". Online Etymology Dictionary. 2020. Retrieved23 July 2020.
  • "cete". merriam-webster.com. Me

    Chetniks
Chetniks Language Watch Edit 160 160 Redirected from Cetniks This article is about the World War II movement led by Draza Mihailovic For other uses of this and similar terms see Chetniks disambiguation The Chetniks Serbo Croatian Cyrillic Chetnici Serbo Croatian Latin Cetnici pronounced tʃɛ tniːtsi Slovene Cetniki formally the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army and also the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and the Ravna Gora Movement was a Yugoslav royalist and Serbian nationalist movement and guerrilla force 1 2 3 in Axis occupied Yugoslavia Although it was not a homogeneous movement 4 it was led by Draza Mihailovic While it was anti Axis in its long term goals and engaged in marginal resistance activities for limited periods 5 it also engaged in tactical or selective collaboration with the occupying forces for almost all of the war 6 The Chetnik movement 7 adopted a policy of collaboration 8 with regard to the Axis and engaged in cooperation to one degree or another by establishing modus vivendi or operating as legalised auxiliary forces under Axis control 9 Over a period of time and in different parts of the country the movement was progressively 10 drawn into collaboration agreements first with the puppet Government of National Salvation in the German occupied territory of Serbia 11 then with the Italians in occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro with some of the Ustase forces in northern Bosnia and after the Italian capitulation in September 1943 with the Germans directly 12 ChetniksChetnik flag inscription reads For king and fatherland freedom or death LeadersDraza Mihailovic Ilija Trifunovic Bircanin Dobroslav Jevđevic Pavle Đurisic Momcilo Đujic Zaharije Ostojic Petar Bacovic Vojislav Lukacevic Dragutin Keserovic Jezdimir Dangic Nikola Kalabic Dragoslav Racic Velimir Piletic Karl NovakDates of operation1941 1945AllegianceYugoslav government in exile until August 1944 King Peter II of YugoslaviaHeadquartersRavna Gora near SuvoborActive regionsOccupied YugoslaviaIdeologySee Ideology sectionAlliesAllies of World War II United States United Kingdom until 1944 Yugoslav government in exile until August 1944 Partisans July October 1941 Axis powers Balli Kombetar Italy 1941 43 Montenegro Germany from 1942 Government of National Salvation Serbian Volunteer Corps 1944 45 Serbian State Guard 1944 45 Hungary Independent State of Croatia 1942 45 Slovene Home Guard Russian Protective Corps 1941 44 OpponentsPartisans October 1941 May 1945 Axis powers Independent State of Croatia 1941 42 1945 Germany 1941 43 Government of National Salvation Serbian Volunteer Corps 1941 44 Serbian State Guard 1941 44 Albania 1943 44 Italy 1941 Albania 1941 43 Bulgaria Pecanac Chetniks Sandzak Muslim militia Russian Protective Corps 1944 Battles and wars1941 Uprising in Serbia Drvar uprising Battle of Loznica Capture of Banja Koviljaca Attack on Sabac Attack on Krusevac Macva operation Operation Uzice Siege of Kraljevo Uprising in Montenegro Srb uprising Siege of Rogatica Capture of Olovo Battle for Novi Pazar Operation Mihailovic 1942 Operation Trio Chetnik sabotage of Axis communication lines Montenegro offensive Kozara Offensive Operation Alfa Operation Kopaonik 1943 Case White Operation Kugelblitz Battle of Grcarice Siege of Turjak Battle of Visegrad 1944 Operation Rosselsprung 1944 Operation Halyard Battle of Knin 1945 Mostar Operation Sarajevo Operation Battle of Lijevce Field Trieste operation Battle of Zelengora Battle of PoljanaOrganization s See formations The Chetniks were active in the uprising in the German occupied territory of Serbia from July to December 1941 As a result of the Battle of Loznica at the end of August Mihailovic s Chetniks were the first to liberate a European city from Axis control 13 14 Following the initial success of the uprising the German occupiers enacted Adolf Hitler s formula for suppressing anti Nazi resistance in Eastern Europe a ratio of 100 hostages executed for every German soldier killed and 50 hostages executed for every soldier wounded In October 1941 German soldiers and Serbian collaborators perpetrated two massacres against civilians in Kraljevo and Kragujevac with a combined death toll reaching over 4 500 civilians most of whom were Serbs This convinced Mihailovic that killing German troops would only result in further unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of Serbs As a result he decided to scale back Chetnik guerrilla attacks and wait for an Allied landing in the Balkans 15 While Chetnik collaboration reached extensive and systematic proportions 16 the Chetniks themselves referred to their policy of collaboration 8 as using the enemy 12 The political scientist Sabrina Ramet has observed Both the Chetniks political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply even voluminously documented it is more than a bit disappointing thus that people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state which they intended to advance in the short run by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces 8 The Chetniks were partners in the pattern of terror and counter terror that developed in Yugoslavia during World War II They used terror tactics against Croats in areas where Serbs and Croats were intermixed against the Muslim population in Bosnia Herzegovina and Sandzak and against the Communist led Yugoslav Partisans and their supporters in all areas These tactics included the killing of civilians burning of villages assassinations and destruction of property and exacerbating existing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs 17 The terror tactics against the Croats were to at least an extent a reaction to the terror carried out by the Ustase 18 however the largest Chetnik massacres took place in eastern Bosnia where they preceded any significant Ustashe operations 19 Croats and Bosniaks living in areas intended to be part of Greater Serbia were to be cleansed of non Serbs regardless in accordance with Mihailovic s directive of 20 December 1941 18 The terror against the communist Partisans and their supporters was ideologically driven 20 Several historians regard Chetnik actions during this period as constituting genocide 21 22 23 Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina range from 50 000 to 68 000 while more than 5 000 victims are registered in the region of Sandzak About 300 villages and small towns were destroyed along with a large number of mosques and Catholic churches Contents 1 Etymology 2 Background 2 1 To 1918 2 2 Interwar period 3 History 3 1 Formation 3 2 Ideology 3 3 Composition and organisation 3 4 Early activities 3 5 Axis offensives 3 6 Axis collaboration 3 6 1 Collaboration with the Italians 3 6 2 Collaboration with the Independent State of Croatia 3 6 3 Case White 3 6 4 Collaboration with the Germans 3 6 5 Collaboration with the Government of National Salvation 3 6 6 Contacts with Hungary 3 7 Terror tactics and cleansing actions 3 8 Loss of Allied support 3 9 Cooperation with the Soviets 3 10 Retreat and dissolution 4 Aftermath 4 1 SFR Yugoslavia 5 Legacy 5 1 Yugoslav Wars 5 2 Serbian historiography 6 Contemporary period 6 1 Serbia 6 2 Montenegro 6 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 4 Croatia 6 5 United States 6 6 Ukraine 7 Derogatory usage 8 See also 9 Citations 10 References 10 1 Books 10 2 Journals 10 3 News 10 4 Web 11 Further reading 12 External linksEtymologyFrom an etymological perspective Chetnik is believed to have developed from the Turkish word cete which means to plunder and burn down words related to conflict such as catmak and catismak Matija Ban used the word Chetnik in 1848 in terms of the need to organise armed units outside the Principality of Serbia to act in opposition to Ottoman rule The first use of Chetnik to describe members of army and police units appeared around the mid 18th century At end of the 19th century the term was extended to members of military or paramilitary organizations with Serb ethnonationalist aims 24 Dating from 1904 the Serbian word cetnik was commonly used to describe a member of a Balkan guerrilla force called a cheta ceta cheta meaning band or troop 25 Today the word Chetnik is used to refer to members of any group that centres the hegemonic and expansionist politics driven by Greater Serbia ideology 24 The original etymology of the word may derive from the Latin word coetus meaning coming together assembly 26 The suffix nik is a Slavic common personal suffix meaning person or thing associated with or involved in 27 BackgroundTo 1918 Main articles Serbian Chetnik Organization Chetniks in the Balkan Wars and Chetniks in occupied Serbia 1916 18 Small scale rebellious activity akin to guerilla warfare has a long history in the South Slav lands particularly in those areas that were under Ottoman rule for a long period In the First Serbian Uprising which began in 1804 bandit companies hajducke ceta played an important part until large scale fighting gave the Ottomans the upper hand and the uprising was suppressed by 1813 A second rebellion broke out two years later and guerilla warfare was again utilised to significant effect assisting in the establishment of the partially independent Principality of Serbia which was expanded significantly in 1833 and became fully independent in 1878 28 Throughout this period and until the end of the 19th century interest in guerilla warfare remained with books on the subject being commissioned by the Serbian government and published in 1848 and 1868 29 Four years after independence the principality became the Kingdom of Serbia 30 Vojin Popovic with a group of Chetnik commanders in 1912 Between 1904 and 1912 small groups of fighters who had been privately recruited equipped and funded in Serbia travelled to the region of Macedonia within the Ottoman Empire with the aim of releasing the area from Ottoman rule and annexing it to Serbia regardless of the wishes of the local population These groups were in the main commanded and led by officers and non commissioned officers on active duty in the Royal Serbian Army and the Serbian government soon took over the direction of these activities Similar forces had been sent to Macedonia by Greece and Bulgaria who also wished to integrate the region into their own states resulting in the Serbian Chetniks clashing with their rivals from Bulgaria as well as the Ottoman authorities Except for the social democratic press these Chetnik actions were supported in Serbia and interpreted as being in the national interest 31 32 These Chetnik activities largely ceased following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire 33 The Chetniks were active in the Balkan Wars of 1912 1913 during the First Balkan War against the Ottomans they were used as vanguards to soften up the enemy ahead of advancing armies for attacks on communications behind enemy lines for spreading panic and confusion as field gendarmerie and to establish basic administration in occupied areas They were also put to good use against the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War After the Balkan Wars Chetniks bands were used in the pacification of the new areas of Serbia gained during the wars which occasionally involved terrorising civilians 34 As they had proven valuable during the Balkan Wars the Serbian army used Chetniks in World War I in the same way and while useful they suffered heavy losses At the end of the Serbian campaign of 1914 1915 they withdrew with the army in the Great Retreat to Corfu and later fought on the Macedonian front Montenegrin Chetniks also fought against the Austro Hungarian occupation of that country In late 1916 new Chetnik companies were being organised to fight in Bulgarian occupied southeastern Serbia Concerned about reprisals against a large scale uprising the Serbian army sent the veteran Chetnik leader Kosta Pecanac to prevent the outbreak However the Bulgarians started conscripting Serbs and hundreds of men joined the Chetnik detachments This resulted in the 1917 Toplica Uprising under the leadership of Kosta Vojinovic which Pecanac eventually joined Successful at first the uprising was eventually put down by the Bulgarians and Austro Hungarians and bloody reprisals against the civilian population followed 35 Pecanac then used Chetniks for sabotage and raids against the Bulgarian occupation troops then infiltrated the Austro Hungarian occupied zone 36 Just prior to the end of the war the Chetnik detachments were dissolved with some sent home and others absorbed by the rest of the army 37 The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was created with the merger of Serbia Montenegro and the South Slav inhabited areas of Austria Hungary on 1 December 1918 in the immediate aftermath of the war 38 Interwar period Main article Chetniks in the interwar period Due to their military record since 1904 the Chetnik veterans were among the leading Serbian patriotic groups in the new state In 1921 the Chetnik Association for the Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland was organised in Belgrade by Chetnik veterans with organisational aims of cultivating Chetnik history spreading Chetnik patriotic ideas and to care for the widows and orphans of Chetniks who had been killed along with disabled Chetniks It was also a political pressure group and from the beginning there were questions about its leadership and political ideology Initially the main political influence in the organisation was the liberal Democratic Party but a challenge for influence by the dominant People s Radical Party led to a split in 1924 The pro Radical Greater Serbia elements of the association broke away and formed two new organisations in 1924 the Association of Serbian Chetniks for King and Fatherland and the Association of Serbian Chetniks Petar Mrkonjic In July 1925 these two organisations amalgamated as the Association of Serbian Chetniks Petar Mrkonjic for King and Fatherland led by Punisa Racic who was elected to the National Assembly as a Radical representative in 1927 and in 1928 murdered three Croatian Peasant Party representatives on the floor of the National Assembly He presided over a great deal of dissension until that year when the organisation ceased to operate After the imposition of royal dictatorship by King Alexander the following year at which time the state was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Racic s former organisation was dissolved and the former dissidents rejoined the original Chetnik Association for the Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland 39 which was officially sanctioned 40 A group of Chetniks in the early 1920s Immediately following the end of World War I and the formation of the new state there was widespread unrest 41 Pro Bulgarian sentiment was rife in Macedonia which was referred to as South Serbia by the Belgrade government There was little support among the Macedonian populace for the regime Extensive measures were undertaken to serbianise Macedonia including closing Bulgarian Orthodox Church schools revising history textbooks dismissing unreliable teachers banning the use of the Bulgarian language and imposing lengthy jail terms for those convicted of anti state activities Over 300 Macedonian advocates of Greater Bulgaria were murdered in the period 1918 1924 thousands arrested in the same period and around 50 000 troops were stationed in Macedonia Thousands of Serb colonists were settled in Macedonia Bands of Chetniks including one led by Jovan Babunski were organised to terrorise the population kill pro Bulgarian resistance leaders and impress the local population into forced labour for the army 42 Resistance by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was met with further terror which included the formation in 1922 of the Association against Bulgarian Bandits led by Pecanac and Ilija Trifunovic Lune based out of Stip in eastern Macedonia This organisation quickly garnered a reputation for indiscriminate terrorisation of the Macedonian populace 43 Pecanac and his Chetniks were also active in fighting Albanians resisting the Serb and Montenegrin colonisation of Kosovo 44 Even under the homogenizing pressures of dictatorship the Chetniks were not monolithic movement 40 In 1929 Ilija Trifunovic Bircanin became president of the association serving until 1932 when he became president of another Serbian nationalist organisation Narodna Odbrana National Defence and established the rival Association of Old Chetniks but the latter never challenged the main Chetnik organisation He was replaced by Pecanac 45 who continued to lead the organisation until the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 46 Starting in 1929 the main Chetnik organisations established chapters in at least 24 cities and towns outside Serbia proper many of which had large Croatian populations This expansion of what remained a Serb nationalist chauvinist movement outside Serbia proper escalated ethnic tensions especially the conflict between Serbs and Croats 47 48 Under Pecanac s leadership membership of the Chetnik organisation was opened to new young members that had not served in war and were interested in joining for political and economic reasons and in the course of the 1930s he took the organisation from a nationalist veterans association focused on protecting veterans rights to an aggressively partisan Serb political organisation which reached 500 000 members throughout Yugoslavia in more than 1 000 groups 45 49 Trifunovic Bircanin and others were unhappy with the aggressive expansion of the organisation and its move away from traditional Chetnik ideals 45 After 1935 Chetnik activity was officially banned in both the predominantly Croat Sava Banovina and almost entirely Slovene Drava Banovina but the Chetnik groups in those regions were able to continue operating at a lower level 45 During this period Pecanac formed close ties with the far right Yugoslav Radical Union government of Milan Stojadinovic which ruled Yugoslavia from 1935 to 1939 50 During the interwar period limited training on guerilla warfare was given to junior officers of the army and in 1929 the Handbook on Guerilla Warfare was published by the government to provide guidance 51 In 1938 the General Staff revised the approach detailed in 1929 recognising that operations similar to those carried out by Chetniks between 1904 and 1918 would not be possible in a modern war and clearly indicating that it would not entrust any important wartime functions to the Chetnik Association 52 HistoryMain article World War II in Yugoslavia Formation See also Invasion of Yugoslavia Illustration of the April 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia After the outbreak of the World War II in September 1939 the General Staff was aware that Yugoslavia was not ready for war against the Axis powers and was concerned about neighboring countries igniting a civil war in Yugoslavia 53 Despite its misgivings about using Chetniks for guerilla warfare 52 in April 1940 the General Staff established the Chetnik Command 53 which eventually comprised six full battalions spread throughout the country However it is clear from the series of Yugoslav war plans between 1938 and 1941 that the General Staff had no real commitment to guerilla warfare prior to the April 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia and did not seriously consider employing the Chetnik Association in the role either 52 A short time before the invasion 52 Pecanac was approached by the General Staff 54 authorising him to organise guerilla units in the 5th Army area 55 and providing him with arms and funds for the purpose 52 the 5th Army was responsible for the Romanian and Bulgarian borders between the Iron Gates and the Greek border 56 On 6 April 1941 Yugoslavia was drawn into World War II when Germany Italy and Hungary invaded and occupied the country which was then partitioned Some Yugoslav territory was annexed by its Axis neighbours Hungary Bulgaria and Italy The Germans engineered and supported the creation of the fascist Ustase puppet state the Independent State of Croatia Croatian Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska NDH which roughly comprised most of the pre war Banovina Croatia along with rest of present day Bosnia and Herzegovina and some adjacent territory 57 Before the defeat King Peter II and his government went into exile reforming in June as the Western Allied recognised Yugoslav government in exile in London 58 All elements of the Chetnik Command were captured during the invasion and there is no record of them being used for their intended purpose or that elements of these units operated in any organised way after the surrender 52 54 Colonel Draza Mihailovic as a Yugoslav military attache in Prague Czechoslovakia in 1937 In the early days of the invasion army Pukovnik Colonel Draza Mihailovic was the deputy chief of staff of the 2nd Army deployed in Bosnia 59 On 13 April he was commanding a unit which was in the area of Doboj on 15 April when it was advised of the decision of the Supreme Staff the wartime General Staff to surrender 60 A few dozen members of the unit almost exclusively Serbs joined Mihailovic when he decided not to follow these orders and the group took to the hills They marched southeast then east aiming to get to the mountainous interior of what became the German occupied territory of Serbia in the hope of linking up with other elements of the defeated army that had chosen to keep resisting 59 61 In the first few days Mihailovic s group was attacked by German forces The group was joined by other parties of soldiers but heard no news of others continuing to resist On 28 April the group was about 80 strong 59 and crossed the Drina River into the occupied territory of Serbia the next day 61 although over the next few days it lost a number of officers and enlisted men who were concerned about the pending hardship and uncertainty After crossing the Drina the group was also attacked by gendarmes belonging to the collaborationist puppet Commissioner Government 59 On 6 May Mihailovic s remaining group was surrounded by German troops near Uzice and almost completely destroyed 62 On 13 May Mihailovic arrived at some shepherd huts at Ravna Gora on the western slopes of Suvobor Mountain near the town of Gornji Milanovac in the central part of the occupied territory 59 by which time his group consisted of only seven officers and 27 other ranks 62 At this point now aware that no elements of the army were continuing to fight they were faced with the decision of whether to surrender to the Germans themselves or form the core of a resistance movement and Mihailovic and his men chose the latter Due to the location of their headquarters Mihailovic s organisation became known as the Ravna Gora Movement 63 While adherents of the Chetnik movement have claimed that Mihailovic s Chetniks were the first resistance movement to be founded in Yugoslavia in World War II 64 this is not accurate if a resistance movement is defined as a political and military organisation of relatively large numbers of men conducting armed operations intended to be carried on with determination and more or less continuously 65 Soon after their arrival at Ravna Gora Mihailovic s Chetniks set up a command post and designated themselves the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army 66 67 While this name was clearly derivative of the earlier Chetniks and evoked the traditions of the long and distinguished record of the Chetniks of earlier conflicts Mihailovic s organisation was in no way connected to the interwar Chetnik associations or the Chetnik Command established in 1940 54 66 Draza Mihailovic centre with glasses confers with his principal political adviser Dragisa Vasic second from right and others in 1943 As early as August the Chetnik Central National Committee Serbo Croatian Latin Centralni Nacionalni Komitet CNK Serbo Croatian Cyrillic Centralni Nacionalni Komitet was formed to provide Mihailovic with advice on domestic and international political affairs and to liaise with the civilian populace throughout the occupied territory and in other parts of occupied Yugoslavia where the Chetnik movement had strong support The members were men who had some standing in Serbian political and cultural circles before the war and some CNK members also served on the Belgrade Chetnik Committee that supported the movement Much of the early CNK was drawn from the minuscule Yugoslav Republican Party or the minor Agrarian Party 68 69 70 The three most important members of the CNK who comprised the executive committee for much of the war were Dragisa Vasic a lawyer former vice president of the nationalist Serbian Cultural Club and a former member of the Yugoslav Republican Party 71 72 Stevan Moljevic a Bosnian Serb lawyer 19 71 and Mladen Zujovic Vasic s law firm partner who had also been a member of the Yugoslav Republican Party Vasic was the most important of the three and was designated by Mihailovic as the ranking member of a three man committee along with Potpukovnik Lieutenant Colonel Dragoslav Pavlovic and Major Jezdimir Dangic who were to take over the leadership of the organisation if anything should happen to him 71 In effect Vasic was Mihailovic s deputy 72 Ideology Main article Greater Serbia See also Serbian nationalism and Ba Congress From the beginning of Mihailovic s movement in May 1941 until the Ba Congress in January 1944 the ideology and objectives of the movement were promulgated in a series of documents 73 In June 1941 two months before he became a key member of the CNK Moljevic wrote a memorandum entitled Homogeneous Serbia in which he advocated for the creation of a Greater Serbia within a Greater Yugoslavia which would include not only the vast majority of pre war Yugoslav territory but also a significant amount of territory that belonged to all of Yugoslavia s neighbours Within this Greater Serbia would consist of 65 70 per cent of the total Yugoslav territory and population and Croatia would be reduced to a small rump His plan also included large scale population transfers evicting the non Serb population from within the borders of Greater Serbia although he did not suggest any numbers 74 75 76 The extent of Greater Serbia envisaged by Moljevic At the same time that Moljevic was developing Homogeneous Serbia the Belgrade Chetnik Committee formulated a proposal which contained territorial provisions very similar to those detailed in Moljevic s plan but went further by providing details of the large scale population shifts needed to make Greater Serbia ethnically homogenous It advocated expelling of 2 675 000 people from Greater Serbia including 1 000 000 Croats and 500 000 Germans A total of 1 310 000 Serbs would be brought to Greater Serbia from outside its boundaries of which 300 000 would be Serbs from Croatia Greater Serbia would not be entirely Serb however as about 200 000 Croats would be allowed to stay within its borders No figures were proposed for shifting Bosnian Muslims out of Greater Serbia but they were identified as a problem to be solved in the final stages of the war and immediately afterwards 77 The CNK approved the Greater Serbia project after it formed in August 78 It can be assumed that Mihailovic 79 who was a hard core Serb nationalist himself 80 endorsed all or most of both proposals This is because their contents were reflected in a 1941 Chetnik leaflet entitled Our Way and he made specific references to them in a proclamation to the Serbian people in December and in a set of detailed instructions dated 20 December 1941 to Pavle Đurisic and Đorđije Lasic newly appointed Chetnik commanders in the Italian governorate of Montenegro The Belgrade Chetnik Committee proposal was also smuggled out of occupied Serbia in September and delivered to the Yugoslav government in exile in London by the Chetnik agent Milos Sekulic 77 In March 1942 the Chetnik Dinara Division promulgated a statement which was accepted the following month by a meeting of Chetnik commanders from Bosnia Herzegovina northern Dalmatia and Lika at Strmica near Knin This program contained details which were very similar to those included in Mihailovic s instructions to Đurisic and Lasic in December 1941 It mentioned the mobilisation of Serbs in these regions to cleanse them of other ethnic groups and adopted several additional strategies collaboration with the Italian occupiers determined armed opposition to NDH forces and the Partisans decent treatment of the Bosnian Muslims to keep them from joining the Partisans although they could later be eliminated and the creation of separate Croatian Chetnik units formed from pro Yugoslav anti Partisan Croats 81 From 30 November to 2 December 1942 the Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro met at Sahovici in Italian occupied Montenegro Mihailovic did not attend but his chief of staff Zaharije Ostojic Đurisic and Lasic attended 81 with Đurisic playing the dominant role 82 It advanced strategies that constituted an important and expanded version of the overall Chetnik program and the report of the meeting bore an official Chetnik stamp It reinforced the main Greater Serbia objective of the Chetnik movement and in addition advocated the retention of the Karađorđevic dynasty espoused a unitary Yugoslavia with self governing Serb Croat and Slovene units but excluding entities for other Yugoslav peoples such as Macedonians and Montenegrins as well as other minorities It envisaged a post war Chetnik dictatorship that would hold all power within the country with the approval of the King with a gendarmerie recruited from Chetnik ranks and intense promotion of Chetnik ideology throughout the country 81 The final Chetnik ideological document that appeared prior to the Ba Congress in January 1944 was a manual prepared by the Chetnik leadership around the same time as the Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro in late 1942 It explained that the Chetniks viewed the war in three phases the invasion and capitulation by others a period of organising and waiting until conditions warranted a general uprising against the occupying forces and finally a general attack on the occupiers and all competitors for power the Chetnik assumption of complete control over Yugoslavia the expulsion of most national minorities and arrest of all internal enemies Crucially it identified the two most important tasks during the second phase as Chetnik led organisation for the third phase without any party political influences and incapacitation of their internal enemies with first priority being the Partisans 83 Revenge against the Partisans and Ustase was incorporated into the manual as a sacred duty 84 The manual paid some lip service to Yugoslavism but the Chetniks did not really wish to become an all Yugoslav movement because that was inconsistent with their main objective of achieving a Greater Serbia within Greater Yugoslavia Due to their Serb nationalist stance they never developed a realistic view of the national question in Yugoslavia because they disregarded the legitimate interests of the other Yugoslav peoples Their ideology was therefore never attractive to non Serbs except for those Macedonians and Montenegrins who considered themselves Serbs The only new aspect of the Chetnik Greater Serbia ideology from the long standing traditional one was their plan to cleanse Greater Serbia of non Serbs which was clearly a response to the massacres of Serbs by the Ustase in the NDH 85 The final documents detailing Chetnik ideology were produced by the Ba Congress called by Mihailovic in January 1944 86 87 88 in response to the November 1943 Second Session of the communist led Anti Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia Serbo Croatian Antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije AVNOJ of the Partisans 89 90 91 The Second Session of AVNOJ had resolved that post war Yugoslavia would be a federal republic based on six equal constituent republics asserted that it was the sole legitimate government of Yugoslavia and denied the right of the King to return from exile before a popular referendum to determine the future of his rule 92 The month after the Second Session of AVNOJ the major Allied powers met at Tehran and decided to provide their exclusive support to the Partisans and withdraw support from the Chetniks 89 The congress was held in circumstances where large parts of the Chetnik movement had been progressively drawn into collaboration with the occupying forces and their helpers over the course of the war 10 12 and may have been held with the tacit approval of the Germans 93 94 The document that was produced by the Ba Congress was called The Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement and came in two parts The first part The Yugoslav Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement stated that Yugoslavia would be a democratic federation with three units one each for the Serbs Croats and Slovenes and national minorities would be expelled 86 The second part The Serbian Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement reinforced the existing Chetnik idea that all Serbian provinces would be united in the Serbian unit within the federal arrangement based on the solidarity between all Serb regions of Yugoslavia under a unicameral parliament The congress also resolved that Yugoslavia should be a constitutional monarchy headed by a Serb sovereign 86 95 According to some historians the new program of the Chetniks was social democratic Yugoslavism 96 with a change to a federal Yugoslav structure with a dominant Serb unit 97 but in asserting the need to gather all Serbs into a single entity The Serbian Goals of the Ravna Gora Movement was reminiscent of Homogeneous Serbia The congress also did not recognise Macedonia and Montenegro as separate nations and also implied that Croatia and Slovenia would effectively be appendages to the Serbian entity The net effect of this according to the historian Jozo Tomasevich was that the country would not only return to the same Serb dominated state it had been in during the interwar period but would be worse than that particularly for the Croats He concludes that this outcome was to be expected given the overwhelmingly Serb makeup of the congress 98 which included only two or three Croats one Slovene and one Bosnian Muslim among its more than 300 attendees 99 95 The historian Marko Attila Hoare agrees that despite its superficial Yugoslavism the congress had clear Greater Serbia inclinations 100 The congress expressed an interest in reforming the economic social and cultural position of the country particularly regarding democratic ideals This was a significant departure from previous Chetnik goals expressed earlier in the war especially in terms of promoting democratic principles with some socialist features Tomasevich observes that these new goals were probably more related to achieving propaganda objectives than reflecting actual intentions given that there was no real interest in considering the needs of the non Serb peoples of Yugoslavia 101 The practical outcome of the congress was the establishment of a single political party for the movement the Yugoslav Democratic National Union Serbo Croatian Jugoslovenska demokratska narodna zajednica JDNZ and an expansion of the CNK 102 103 however the congress did nothing to improve the position of the Chetnik movement 104 91 Beyond the main Serbian irredentist objective 105 Mihailovic s Chetnik movement was an extreme Serb nationalist organisation 106 and while it paid lip service to Yugoslavism 107 it was actually opposed to it 105 108 109 It was also anti Croat 105 108 anti Muslim 105 108 supported the monarchy 107 and was anti communist 86 Given the ethnic and religious divisions in Yugoslavia the narrow ideology of the Chetnik movement seriously impinged on its military and political potential 80 The political scientist Sabrina Ramet has observed Both the Chetniks political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply even voluminously documented it is more than a bit disappointing thus that people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state which they intended to advance in the short run by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces 8 Composition and organisation A Chetnik with a M37 light machine gun The Chetniks were almost exclusively made up of Serbs except for a large number of Montenegrins who identified as Serbs 110 and consisted of local defence units marauding bands of Serb villagers anti partisan auxiliaries forcibly mobilised peasants and armed refugees which small groups of uncaptured Yugoslav officers was attempting without success to mold into an organised fighting force 111 The aforementioned Chetnik manual of late 1942 discussed the idea of enlisting a significant number of Croats for the movement but the movement only attracted small groups of Chetnik aligned Croats in central Dalmatia and Primorje and they were never of any political or military significance within the Chetniks 112 A small group of Slovenes under Major Karl Novak in the Italian annexed Province of Ljubljana also supported Mihailovic but they also never played an important role 113 Women in Chetniks units There had been long standing mutual animosity between Muslims and Serbs throughout Bosnia 114 and in the period of late April and May 1941 the first Chetnik mass atrocities were carried out against non Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other ethnically heterogeneous areas 115 A few Sandzak and Bosnian Muslims supported Mihailovic 116 115 and some Jews joined the Chetniks especially those who were members of the right wing Zionist Betar movement but they were alienated by Serb xenophobia and eventually left 117 with some defecting to the Partisans 118 The collaboration of the Chetniks with the Italians and later Germans may have also been a factor in the Jewish rejection of the Chetnik movement 117 The vast majority of Orthodox priests supported the Chetniks with some notably Momcilo Đujic and Savo Bozic becoming commanders 119 Chetnik policies barred women from performing significant roles 120 No women took part in fighting units and were restricted to nursing and occasional intelligence work The low status of female peasants in areas of Yugoslavia where Chetniks were strongest could have been utilized and advantageous in military political and psychological terms The treatment of women was a fundamental difference between the Chetniks and Partisans 121 and Chetnik propaganda disparaged the female role in the Partisans 120 Early activities The Chetniks and the Partisans led captured Germans through Uzice autumn 1941 Initially Mihailovic s organisation was focussed on recruiting and establishing groups in different areas raising funds establishing a courier network and collecting arms and ammunition 66 122 From the very beginning their strategy was to organise and build up their strength but postpone armed operations against the occupation forces until they were withdrawing in the face of a hoped for landing by the Western Allies in Yugoslavia 66 67 The pre war Chetnik leader Pecanac soon came to an arrangement with Nedic s collaborationist regime in the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia 123 Colonel Draza Mihailovic who was interested in resisting the occupying powers set up his headquarters in Ravna Gora and named his group The Ravna Gora Movement in order to distinguish it from the Pecanac Chetniks However other Chetniks were engaged in collaboration with the Germans and the Chetnik name became again associated with Mihailovic 124 The movement was later to be renamed the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland 125 126 although the original name of the movement remained the most common in use throughout the war even among the Chetniks themselves It is these forces that are generally referred to as the Chetniks throughout World War II although the name was also used by other smaller groups including those of Pecanac Nedic and Dimitrije Ljotic 123 In June 1941 following the start of Operation Barbarossa the communist led Partisans under Josip Broz Tito organised an uprising and in the period between June and November 1941 the Chetniks and Partisans largely cooperated in their anti Axis activities citation needed Chetnik uprisings often in conjunction with the Partisans against Axis occupation forces began in early July 1941 in Western Serbia Uprisings in the areas of Loznica Rogatica Banja Koviljaca and Olovo lead to early victories On 19 September 1941 Tito and Mihailovic met for the first time in Struganik where Tito offered Mihailovic the chief of staff post in return for the merger of their units Mihailovic refused to attack the Germans fearing reprisals but promised to not attack the Partisans 127 According to Mihailovic the reason was humanitarian the prevention of German reprisals against Serbs at the published rate of 100 civilians for every German soldier killed 50 civilians for every soldier wounded 128 On 20 October Tito proposed a 12 point program to Mihailovic as the basis of cooperation Six days later Tito and Mihailovic met at Mihailovic s headquarters where Mihailovic rejected principal points of Tito s proposal including the establishment of common headquarters joint military actions against the Germans and quisling formations establishment of a combined staff for the supply of troops and the formation of national liberation committees 127 These disagreements lead to uprisings being quashed in Montenegro and Novi Pazar due to poor coordination between the resistance forces Mihailovic s fears for ongoing reprisals became a reality with two mass murder campaigns conducted against Serb civilians in Kraljevo and Kragujevac reaching a combined death toll of over 4 500 civilians citation needed Killings in the Independent State of Croatia were also in full swing with thousands of Serb civilians being killed by the Ustase militia and death squads 129 In late October Mihailovic concluded the Partisans rather than Axis forces were the primary enemies of the Chetniks 130 To avoid reprisals against Serb civilians Mihailovic s Chetniks fought as a guerrilla force rather than a regular army 131 It has been estimated that three quarters of the Orthodox clergy in occupied Yugoslavia supported the Chetniks while some like Momcilo Đujic became prominent Chetnik commanders 132 133 While the Partisans opted for overt acts of sabotage that led to reprisals against civilians by Axis forces the Chetniks opted for a more subtle form of resistance Instead of detonating TNT to destroy railway tracks and disrupt Axis railway lines Chetniks contaminated railway fuel sources and tampered with mechanical components ensuring trains would either derail or breakdown at random times 134 Martin suggests that these acts of sabotage significantly crippled supplies lines for the Afrika Korps fighting in North Africa 135 On 2 November Mihailovic s Chetniks attacked Partisan headquarters in Uzice The attack was driven back and a counterattack followed the next day the Chetniks lost 1 000 men in these two battles and a large amount of weaponry On 18 November Mihailovic accepted a truce offer from Tito though attempts to establish a common front failed 136 That month the British government upon the request of the Yugoslav government in exile insisted Tito make Mihailovic the commander in chief of resistance forces in Yugoslavia a demand he refused 137 German warrant for Mihailovic offering a reward of 100 000 gold marks for his capture dead or alive 1943 Partisan Chetnik truces were repeatedly violated by the Chetniks first with the killing of a local Partisan commander in October and then later under orders of Mihailovic s staff massacring 30 Partisan supporters mostly girls and wounded individuals in November Despite this Chetniks and Partisans in eastern Bosnia continued to cooperate for some time 137 In December 1941 the Yugoslav government in exile in London under King Peter II promoted Mihailovic to Brigadier General and named him commander of the Yugoslav Home Army By this time Mihailovic had established friendly relations with Nedic and his Government of National Salvation and the Germans who he requested weaponry from to fight the Partisans This was rejected by General Franz Bohme who stated they could deal with the Partisans themselves and demanded Mihailovic s surrender 138 Around this time the Germans launched an attack on Mihailovic s forces in Ravna Gora and effectively routed the Chetniks from the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia The bulk of the Chetnik forces retreated into eastern Bosnia and Sandzak and the centre of Chetnik activity moved to the Independent State of Croatia 139 The British liaison to Mihailovic advised Allied command to stop supplying the Chetniks after their attacks on the Partisans in the German attack on Uzice but Britain continued to do so 140 Throughout the period of 1941 and 1942 both the Chetniks and Partisans provided refugee for Allied POWs especially ANZAC troops who escaped from railway carriages en route via Yugoslavia to Axis POW camps According to Lawrence following the Allied defeat at the Battle of Crete POWs were transported via Yugoslavia in railway carriages with some ANZAC troops escaping in occupied Serbia Chetniks under the command of Mihailovic provided refugee to these ANZAC troops and were either repatriated or recaptured by Axis forces 141 Axis offensives This section needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources Chetniks news newspapers books scholar JSTOR November 2015 Learn how and when to remove this template message Main article Seven anti Partisan offensives In April 1942 the Communists in Bosnia established two Shock Anti Chetnik Battalions Grmec and Kozara composed of 1 200 best soldiers of Serb ethnicity to struggle against Chetniks 142 143 Later during the war the Allies were seriously considering an invasion of the Balkans so the Yugoslav resistance movements increased in strategic importance and there was a need to determine which of the two factions was fighting the Germans A number of Special Operations Executive SOE agents were sent to Yugoslavia to determine the facts on the ground According to new archival evidence published in 1980 for the first time some actions against Axis carried by Mihailovic and his Chetniks with British liaison officer Brigadier Armstrong were mistakenly credited to Tito and his Communist forces 144 In the meantime the Germans also aware of the growing importance of Yugoslavia decided to wipe out the Partisans with determined offensives The Chetniks by this time had agreed to provide support for the German operations and were in turn granted supplies and munitions to increase their effectiveness The first of these large anti Partisan offensives was Fall Weiss also known as the Battle of Neretva The Chetniks participated with a significant 20 000 strong force providing assistance to the German and Italian encirclement from the east the far bank of the river Neretva However Tito s Partisans managed to break through the encirclement cross the river and engage the Chetniks The conflict resulted in a near total Partisan victory after which the Chetniks were almost entirely incapacitated in the area west of the Drina river The Partisans continued on and later again escaped the Germans in the Battle of Sutjeska In the meantime the Allies stopped planning an invasion of the Balkans and finally rescinded their support for the Chetniks and instead supplied the Partisans At the Teheran Conference of 1943 and the Yalta Conference of 1945 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided to split their influence in Yugoslavia in half Axis collaboration See also Yugoslavia and the Allies German Generalmajor Brigadier Friedrich Stahl stands alongside an Ustase officer and Chetnik commander Rade Radic in central Bosnia in mid 1942 Throughout the war the Chetnik movement remained mostly inactive against the occupation forces and increasingly collaborated with the Axis eventually losing its international recognition as the Yugoslav resistance force 139 145 146 After a brief initial period of cooperation the Partisans and the Chetniks quickly started fighting against each other Gradually the Chetniks ended up primarily fighting the Partisans instead of the occupation forces and started cooperating with the Axis in a struggle to destroy the Partisans receiving increasing amounts of logistical assistance Mihailovic admitted to a British colonel that the Chetniks principal enemies were the partisans the Ustasha the Muslims the Croats and last the Germans and Italians in that order 147 At the start of the conflict Chetnik forces were active in uprising against the Axis occupation and had contacts and negotiations with the Partisans This changed when the talks broke down and they proceeded to attack the latter who were actively fighting the Germans while continuing to engage the Axis only in minor skirmishes Attacking the Germans provoked strong retaliation and the Chetniks increasingly started to negotiate with them to stop further bloodshed Negotiations with the occupiers were aided by the two sides mutual goal of destroying the Partisans This collaboration first appeared during the operations on the Partisan Uzice Republic where Chetniks played a part in the general Axis attack 145 Collaboration with the Italians Chetnik commander Momcilo Đujic left with an Italian officer Chetnik collaboration with the occupation forces of fascist Italy took place in three main areas in Italian occupied and Italian annexed Dalmatia in the Italian puppet state of Montenegro and in the Italian annexed and later German occupied Ljubljana Province in Slovenia The collaboration in Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most widespread The split between Partisans and Chetniks took place earlier in those areas 145 The Partisans considered all occupation forces to be the fascist enemy while the Chetniks hated the Ustase but balked at fighting the Italians and had approached the Italian VI Army Corps General Renzo Dalmazzo Commander as early as July and August 1941 for assistance via a Serb politician from Lika Stevo Rađenovic In particular Chetnik vojvodas leaders Trifunovic Bircanin and Jevđevic were favorably disposed towards the Italians believing Italian occupation over all of Bosnia Herzegovina would be detrimental to the influence of the Ustase state citation needed Another reason for collaboration was a necessity to protect Serbs from the Ustase and Balli Kombetar 148 When the Balli Kombetar earmarked the Visoki Decani monastery for destruction Italian troops were sent in to protect the Orthodox monastery from destruction and highlighted to the Chetniks the necessity for collaboration 149 Chetnik commander Pavle Đurisic left making a speech to the Chetniks in the presence of General Pirzio Biroli Italian governor of Montenegro For this reason they sought an alliance with the Italian occupation forces in Yugoslavia The Chetniks noticed that Italy on occupied territories implemented a traditional policy of deceiving Croats with the help of Serbs and they believed that Italy in case of victory of the Axis powers would favor Serbs in Lika northern Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Serbian autonomy would be created in this area under Italian protectorate 150 The Italians especially General Dalmazzo looked favorably on these approaches and hoped to first avoid fighting the Chetniks and then use them against the Partisans a strategy which they thought would give them an enormous advantage An agreement was concluded on 11 January 1942 between the representative of the Italian 2nd Army Captain Angelo De Matteis and the Chetnik representative for southeastern Bosnia Mutimir Petkovic and was later signed by Draza Mihailovic s chief delegate in Bosnia Major Bosko Todorovic Among other provisions of the agreement it was agreed that the Italians would support Chetnik formations with arms and provisions and would facilitate the release of recommended individuals from Axis concentration camps Jasenovac Rab etc The chief interest of both the Chetniks and Italians would be to assist each other in combating Partisan led resistance 139 145 According to Martin the Chetnik Italian truce received approval from British Intelligence as it was seen as a way of garnering intelligence 151 Bircanin was instructed to gather information on harbor facilities troop movements mining operations and Axis communications in preparation for an Allied invasion of the Dubrovnik coast scheduled for 1943 an invasion that never eventuated Momcilo Đujic with Chetniks and Italians In the following months of 1942 General Mario Roatta commander of the Italian 2nd Army worked on developing a Linea di condotta Policy Directive on relations with Chetniks Ustase and Partisans In line with these efforts General Vittorio Ambrosio outlined the Italian policy in Yugoslavia All negotiations with the quisling Ustase were to be avoided but contacts with the Chetniks were advisable As for the Partisans it was to be struggle to the bitter end This meant that General Roatta was essentially free to take action with regard to the Chetniks as he saw fit 145 In April 1942 Chetniks and Italians cooperated in battles with Partisans around Knin 152 He outlined the four points of his policy in his report to the Italian Army General Staff To support the Chetniks sufficiently to make them fight against the communists but not so much as to allow them too much latitude in their own action to demand and assure that the Chetniks do not fight against the Croatian forces and authorities to allow them to fight against the communists on their own initiative so that they can slaughter each other and finally to allow them to fight in parallel with the Italian and German forces as do the nationalist bands Chetniks and separatist Greens in Montenegro General Mario Roatta 1942 145 Chetnik commander Dobroslav Jevđevic conferring with Italian officers in February 1943 During 1942 and 1943 an overwhelming proportion of Chetnik forces in the Italian controlled areas of occupied Yugoslavia were organized as Italian auxiliary forces in the form of the Anti Communist Volunteer Militia Milizia volontaria anti comunista MVAC According to General Giacomo Zanussi then a Colonel and Roatta s chief of staff there were 19 000 to 20 000 Chetniks in the MVAC in Italian occupied parts of the Independent State of Croatia alone The Chetniks were extensively supplied with thousands of rifles grenades mortars and artillery pieces In a memorandum dated 26 March 1943 to the Italian Army General Staff entitled The Conduct of the Chetniks citation needed The allegiance between the Chetniks and Italians was crucial in protecting Serbs in the Lika and Dalmatian region from ongoing attacks from the Ustase 151 Italian forces provided Serb civilians with weapons to protect their villages and accommodated thousands of Serb civilians escaping the ongoing genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia Đujic used these events as a way of justifying the allegiance and when ordered by Mihailovic in February 1943 to break this allegiance Đujic refused and stated that a break in a truce would mean certain death to tens of thousands of Serb civilians 153 Chetniks and Italians in Jablanica in 1943 Italian officers noted the ultimate control of these collaborating Chetnik units remained in the hands of Draza Mihailovic and contemplated the possibility of a hostile reorientation of these troops in light of the changing strategic situation The commander of these troops was Trifunovic Bircanin who arrived in Italian annexed Split in October 1941 and received his orders directly from Mihailovic in the spring of 1942 By the time Italy capitulated on 8 September 1943 all Chetnik detachments in the Italian controlled parts of the Independent State of Croatia had at one time or another collaborated with the Italians against the Partisans 154 This collaboration lasted right up until the Italian capitulation when Chetnik troops switched to supporting the German occupation in trying to force the Partisans out of the coastal cities which the Partisans liberated after the Italian withdrawal 139 145 After the Allies did not land in Dalmatia as they had hoped these Chetnik detachments entered into collaboration with the Germans in order to avoid being caught between the Germans and the Partisans 154 Collaboration with the Independent State of Croatia See also Ustase and Independent State of Croatia This article needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources Chetniks news newspapers books scholar JSTOR June 2020 Learn how and when to remove this template message Chetnik representatives meeting in Bosnia with Ustase and Croatian Home Guard officers of the Independent State of Croatia The Chetnik groups were in fundamental disagreement with the Ustase on practically all issues but they found a common enemy in the Partisans and this was the overriding reason for the collaboration which ensued between the Ustase authorities of the NDH and Chetnik detachments in Bosnia citation needed Agreement between commander major Emil Rataj and commander of Chetnik organizations in the Mrkonjic Grad area Uros Drenovic was signed on 27 April 1942 after heavy defeat in the conflict with Kozara Partisan battalion Contracting parties obliged to a joint struggle against the Partisans in return Serb villages would be protected by the NDH authorities together with the Chetniks from attacks by communists so called Partisans 155 156 Chetnik commanders between Vrbas and Sana on 13 May 1942 gave a written confession to the NDH authorities about cessation of hostilities and that they would voluntarily take part in the fight against the Partisans In Banja Luka two days later was signed agreement on the cessation of hostilities against the Chetniks in the area between Vrbas and Sana and on the withdrawal of Home Guard units from this area between Petar Gvozdic and Chetnik commanders Lazar Tesanovic Chetnik detachment Obilic and Cvetko Aleksic Chetnik detachment Mrkonjic 155 After several signed agreements Chetnik commanders at a meeting near Kotor Varos concluded that the remaining Chetnik detachments would also sign such agreements because they realized that such agreements had great benefits for the Chetnik movement NDH authorities during May and June 1942 signed such agreements and with some east Bosnian Chetniks detachments Commandant of Ozren Chetnik detachment Cvijetin Todic requested a meeting to reach an agreement with representatives of the NDH authorities Ante Pavelic appointed persons for these negotiations and he gave these conditions that they return to homes hand over weapons and be loyal to the authorities of NDH In return it was promised that every Serbian village would receive weapons to fight the Partisans that they would get state employment and those Chetniks who stood out in the fight against the Partisans would receive decorations and awards Ozren and Trebava Chetnik detachments signed this agreement on 28 May 1942 On 30 May 1942 Majevica Chetnik detachment signed agreement with one important novelty in this agreement Chetniks from the area of Ozren and Trebava were given self governing power i e autonomy which would be performed by the Chetniks commanders An almost identical agreement was signed on 14 June 1942 with the Zenica Chetnik detachment In the later period similar agreements were signed with Chetnik detachments in the area of Lika and northern Dalmatia 155 157 During the next three weeks three additional agreements were signed covering a large part of the area of Bosnia comprising the Chetnik detachments within it By the provision of these agreements the Chetniks were to cease hostilities against the Ustase state and the Ustase would establish regular administration in these areas According to report of Edmund Glaise Horstenau from 26 February 1944 based on official NDH data in the NDH territory existed thirty five Chetnik groups of which nineteen groups with 17 500 men collaborated with Croatian and German authorities while as rebel Chetniks existed sixteen groups with 5 800 man 158 The Chetniks recognized the sovereignty of the Independent State of Croatia and became a legalized movement in it 159 The main provision Art 5 of the agreement stated as follows Chetnik commander Uros Drenovic far left drinking with Croatian Home Guard and Ustase troops As long as there is danger from the Partisan armed bands the Chetnik formations will cooperate voluntarily with the Croatian military in fighting and destroying the Partisans and in those operations they will be under the overall command of the Croatian armed forces Chetnik formations may engage in operations against the Partisans on their own but this they will have to report on time to the Croatian military commanders Chetnik Ustase collaboration agreement 28 May 1942 145 Military and political expediency best explained these agreements as historian Enver Redzic notes The Ustasha Chetnik accords were driven neither by a confluence of Serbian and Croatian national interests nor by mutual desire for acceptance and respect but rather because each side needed to obstruct Partisan advances 160 161 The agreements did not stop crimes against Serbs by the Ustase or against Muslims and Croats by the Chetniks They persisted in areas where the other had control and in regions where no agreements existed 159 The necessary ammunition and provisions were supplied to the Chetniks by the Ustase military Chetniks who were wounded in such operations would be cared for in NDH hospitals while the orphans and widows of Chetniks killed in action would be supported by the Ustase state Persons specifically recommended by Chetnik commanders would be returned home from the Ustase concentration camps These agreements covered the majority of Chetnik forces in Bosnia east of the German Italian demarcation line and lasted throughout most of the war Since Croatian forces were immediately subordinate to the German military occupation collaboration with Croatian forces was in fact indirect collaboration with the Germans 145 146 Although the Dinara Division under the command of Đujic received support from the NDH Chetniks under the command of Mihailovic refused to collaborate with the NDH Throughout the war Mihailovic continued to refer to the NDH as an enemy and engaged Ustase forces in the Serbian border areas 162 163 Mihailovic s animosity towards the Ustase was due to the ongoing genocidal policies of the NDH against the Serb population and other minority groups 163 Fleeing the Partisans in March 1945 Pavle Đurisic negotiated an agreement with the Ustase and Ustase supported Montenegrin separatist Sekula Drljevic to provide safe conduct for his Chetniks across the NDH 164 The Ustase agreed to this but when the Chetniks failed to follow the agreed upon withdrawal route the Ustase attacked the Chetniks at Lijevce Field afterward killing the captured commanders while the remaining Chetniks continued to withdraw to Austria with the NDH army and under their military command 164 Ustase leader Ante Pavelic ordered the NDH military to give Momcilo Đujic and his Dinara Division Chetniks orderly and unimpeded passage 165 with which Đujic and his forces fled across the NDH to Slovenia and Italy By his own admission in April 1945 Ante Pavelic received two generals from the headquarters of Draza Mihailovic and reached an agreement with them on a joint fight against Tito s communists In early May 1945 Chetnik forces withdrew through Ustase held Zagreb many of these were later killed along with captured Ustase by the Partisans as part of the Bleiburg repatriations Case White Main article Case White This section does not cite any sources Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed November 2016 Learn how and when to remove this template message One major Chetnik collaboration with the Axis took place during the Battle of the Neretva the final phase of Case White known in Yugoslav historiography as the Fourth Enemy Offensive In 1942 Partisans forces were on the rise having established large liberated territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina Chetnik forces partially because of their collaboration with the Italian occupation were also gaining in strength however but were no match to the Partisans and required Axis logistical support to attack the liberated territories In light of the changing strategic situation Hitler and the German high command decided to disarm the Chetniks and destroy the Partisans for good In spite of Hitler s insistence Italian forces in the end refused to disarm the Chetniks thus rendering that course of action impossible under the justification that the Italian occupation forces could not afford to lose the Chetniks as allies in their maintenance of the occupation Collaboration with the Germans A group of Chetniks pose with German soldiers in an unidentified village in Serbia When Germans invaded Yugoslavia they met in the Chetniks an organization trained and adapted for guerilla warfare 166 Although there were some clashes between the Germans and the Chetniks as early as May 1941 Mihailovic thought of resistance in terms of setting up an organisation which when the time was ripe would rise against the occupying forces 167 British policy with regard to European resistance movements was to restrain them from activities which would lead to their premature destruction and this policy coincided initially with the concepts on the basis of which Mihailovic s movement was being operated 168 In order to dissociate himself from the Chetniks who collaborated with the Germans Mihailovic at first called its movement the Ravna Gora Movement 123 As early as spring 1942 the Germans favored the collaboration agreement the Ustase and the Chetniks had established in a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina Since the Ustase military was supplied by and immediately subordinate to the German military occupation collaboration between the two constituted indirect German Chetnik collaboration This was all favorable to the Germans primarily because the agreement was directed against the Partisans contributed to the pacification of areas significant for German war supplies and reduced the need for additional German occupation troops as Chetniks were assisting the occupation After the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943 the German 114th Jager Division even incorporated a Chetnik detachment in its advance to retake the Adriatic coast from the Partisans who had temporarily liberated it 169 The report on German Chetnik collaboration of the XV Army Corps on 19 November 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army states that the Chetniks were leaning on the German forces for close to a year 145 A group of Chetniks pose with German officers German Chetnik collaboration entered a new phase after the Italian surrender because the Germans now had to police a much larger area than before and fight the Partisans in the whole of Yugoslavia Consequently they significantly liberalized their policy towards the Chetniks and mobilized all Serb nationalist forces against the Partisans The 2nd Panzer Army oversaw these developments the XV Army Corps was now officially allowed to utilize Chetniks troops and forge a local alliance The first formal and direct agreement between the German occupation forces and the Chetniks took place in early October 1943 between the German led 373rd Croatian Infantry Division and a detachment of Chetniks under Mane Rokvic operating in western Bosnia and Lika The Germans subsequently even used Chetnik troops for guard duty in occupied Split Dubrovnik Sibenik and Metkovic 169 NDH troops were not used despite Ustase demands as mass desertions of Croat troops to the Partisans rendered them unreliable From this point on the German occupation actually started to openly favor Chetnik Serb troops over the Croat formations of the NDH due to the pro Partisan dispositions of the Croatian rank and file The Germans paid little attention to frequent Ustase protests about this 139 145 Ustase Major Mirko Blaz Deputy Commander 7th Brigade of the Poglavnik s Personal Guard observed that The Germans are not interested in politics they take everything from a military point of view They need troops that can hold certain positions and clear certain areas of the Partisans If they ask us to do it we cannot do it The Chetniks can Major Mirko Blaz 5 March 1944 145 Chetnik commander Đorđije Lasic first from right with German officer and Chetniks in Podgorica 1944 When appraising the situation in the western part of the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia Bosnia Lika and Dalmatia Captain Merrem intelligence officer with the German commander in chief southeastern Europe was full of praise for Chetnik units collaborating with the Germans and for the smooth relations between the Germans and Chetnik units on the ground In addition the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army observed in a letter to the Ustase liaison officer that the Chetniks fighting the Partisans in Eastern Bosnia were making a worthwhile contribution to the Croatian state and that the 2nd Army refused in principle to accept Croatian complaints against the usage of these units German Chetnik collaboration continued to take place until the very end of the war with the tacit approval of Draza Mihailovic and the Chetnik Supreme Command in the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia Though Mihailovic himself never actually signed any agreements he endorsed the policy for the purpose of eliminating the Partisan threat 145 146 Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs commented Though he himself Draza Mihailovic shrewdly refrained from giving his personal view in public no doubt to have a free hand for every eventuality e g Allied landing on the Balkans he allowed his commanders to negotiate with Germans and to co operate with them And they did so more and more Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs 1945 170 The loss of Allied support in 1943 caused the Chetniks to lean more than ever towards the Germans for assistance against the Partisans On 14 August 1944 the Tito Subasic agreement between the Partisans and the Yugoslav King and government in exile was signed on the island of Vis The document called on all Croats Slovenes and Serbs to join the Partisans Mihailovic and the Chetniks refused to follow the order and abide by the agreement and continued to engage the Partisans by now the official Yugoslav Allied force Consequently on 29 August 1944 King Peter II dismissed Mihailovic as Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Tito in his place Tito at this point became the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav state and the joint government citation needed Collaboration with the Government of National Salvation In the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia the Germans initially installed Milan Acimovic as leader but later replaced him with General Milan Nedic former minister of war who governed until 1944 Acimovic instead later served as the key liaison between the Germans and the Chetniks 171 In the second half of August 1941 prior to Nedic assuming power the Germans arranged with Kosta Pecanac for the transfer of several thousand of his Chetniks to serve as auxiliaries for the gendarmerie 172 Collaboration between the Government of National Salvation and Mihailovic s Chetniks began in fall of 1941 and lasted until the end of German occupation 173 Nedic was initially firmly opposed to Mihailovic and the Chetniks On 4 September 1941 Mihailovic sent Major Aleksandar Misic and Miodrag Pavlovic to enter a meeting with Nedic and nothing was accomplished After Mihailovic shifted his policy of mild cooperation with the Partisans to becoming hostile to them and ceasing anti German activity in late October 1941 Nedic relaxed his opposition On 15 October Colonel Milorad Popovic acting on behalf of Nedic gave Mihailovic about 500 000 dinars in addition to an equal amount given on 4 October to persuade the Chetniks to collaborate On 26 October 1941 Popovic gave an additional 2 500 000 dinars 174 By mid November 1941 Mihailovic put 2 000 of his men under Nedic s direct command and shortly later these men joined the Germans in an anti Partisan operation 174 When the Germans launched Operation Mihailovic on 6 7 December 1941 with the intent of capturing Mihailovic and removing his headquarters in Ravna Gora he escaped probably because he was warned of the attack by Acimovic on 5 December citation needed In June 1942 Mihailovic left the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia for Montenegro and was out of contact with the Nedic authorities until he returned In September 1942 Mihailovic orchestrated civil disobedience against the Nedic government via the use of leaflets and clandestine radio transmitter messages 125 This civil obedience may have been orchestrated in order to use as a cover to conduct sabotage operations on railway lines used to supply Axis forces in North Africa however it has been disputed 175 In the fall of 1942 the Chetniks of Mihailovic and Pecanac who had been legalized by the Nedic administration were dissolved By 1943 Nedic feared that the Chetniks would become the primary collaborator with the Germans and after the Chetniks murdered Ceka Đorđevic deputy minister of internal affairs in March 1944 he opted to replace him with a prominent Chetnik in the hopes of quelling the rivalry A report prepared in April 1944 by the U S Office of Strategic Services commented that Mihailovic should be viewed in the same light as Nedic Ljotic and the Bulgarian occupation forces Office of Strategic Services report April 1944 174 In mid August 1944 Mihailovic Nedic and Dragomir Jovanovic met in the village of Razani secretly where Nedic agreed to give one hundred million dinars for wages and to request from the Germans arms and ammunition for Mihailovic On 6 September 1944 under the authority of the Germans and formalization by Nedic Mihailovic took command over the entire military force of the Nedic administration including the Serbian State Guard Serbian Volunteer Corps and the Serbian Border Guard 176 Contacts with Hungary In mid 1943 the Hungarian General Staff arranged a meeting between a Serbian officer in the Nedic regime and Mihailovic The officer was instructed to express to Mihailovic Hungary s regret for the massacre at Novi Sad and to promise that those responsible would be punished Hungary recognised Mihailovic as the representative of the Yugoslav government in exile and asked him in the event of an Allied landing in the Balkans not to enter Hungary with his troops but to leave the border question to the peace conference After contact was established food medicine munitions and horses were sent to Mihailovic During his visit to Rome in April 1943 Prime Minister Miklos Kallay talked about Italo Hungarian cooperation with the Chetniks but Mussolini said he favoured Tito 177 Hungary also tried to contact Mihailovic through the royal Yugoslav government s representative in Istanbul in order to cooperate against the Partisans The Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Momcilo Nincic reportedly sent a message to Istanbul asking the Hungarians to send an envoy and a Serb politician from the Hungarian occupied territories to negotiate Nothing came of these contacts but Mihailovic sent a representative Cedomir Bosnjakovic to Budapest For their part the Hungarians sent arms medicine and released Serbian POWs willing to serve with the Chetniks down the Danube 178 After the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944 the Chetnik relationship was one of the few foreign contacts independent of German influence that Hungary had A Hungarian diplomat L Hory formerly posted in Belgrade twice visited Mihailovic in Bosnia and the Hungarians continued to send him munitions even across Croatian territory 179 The last contact between Mihailovic and Hungary occurred on 13 October 1944 shortly before the German sponsored coup of 15 October 180 Terror tactics and cleansing actions See also Chetnik war crimes in World War II Chetnik ideology revolved around the notion of a Greater Serbia within the borders of Yugoslavia to be created out of all territories in which Serbs were found even if the numbers were small This goal had long been the foundation of the movement for a Greater Serbia During Axis occupation the notion of clearing or ethnically cleansing these territories was introduced largely in response to the massacres of Serbs by the Ustashe in the Independent State of Croatia 85 However the largest Chetnik massacres took place in eastern Bosnia where they preceded any significant Ustashe operations 19 According to Pavlowitch terror tactics were committed by local commanders of the Chetnik organisation Mihailovic disapproved these acts of ethnic cleansing against civilians however he failed to take action in stopping these acts of terror given the lack of command he had over local commanders and the rudimentary methods of communication that existed in the Chetnik command structure 181 Prior to the outbreak of World War II use of terror tactics had a long tradition in the area as various oppressed groups sought their freedom and atrocities were committed by all parties engaged in conflict in Yugoslavia 182 During the early stages of the occupation the Ustase had also recruited a number of Muslims to aid in the persecutions of the Serbs and even though only a relatively small number of Croats and Muslims engaged in these activities and many opposed them those actions initiated a cycle of violence and retribution between the Catholics Orthodox and Muslims as each sought to rid the others from the territories they controlled 183 In particular Ustase ideologues were concerned with the large Serb minority in the NDH and initiated acts of terror on a wide scale in May 1941 Two months later in July the Germans protested the brutality of these actions Reprisals followed as in the case of Nevesinje where Serb peasants staged an uprising in response to the persecution drove out the Ustase militia but then engaged in reprisals killing hundreds of Muslims and some Croats whom they associated with the Ustase 184 The Instructions Instrukcije of 1941 ordering ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks Croats and others A directive dated 20 December 1941 addressed to newly appointed commanders in Montenegro Major Đorđije Lasic and Captain Pavle Đurisic outlined among other things the cleansing of non Serb populations in order to create a Greater Serbia 79 The struggle for the liberty of our whole nation under the scepter of His Majesty King Peter II the creation of a Great Yugoslavia and within it of a Great Serbia which is to be ethnically pure and is to include Serbia Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina Srijem the Banat and Backa the struggle for the inclusion into Yugoslavia of all still unliberated Slovene territories under the Italians and Germans Trieste Gorizia Istria and Carinthia as well as Bulgaria and northern Albania with Skadar the cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and a national elements the creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro as well as between Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandzak and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina Directive of 20 December 1941 79 The authenticity of the directive is disputed 185 Some have attributed the directive as having come from Mihailovic 186 187 188 Others have claimed that there is no original and that it may have been a forgery made by Đurisic to suit his purposes 189 190 Mihailovic s headquarters sent further instructions to the commander of the Second Sarajevo Chetnik Brigade clarifying the goal It should be made clear to everyone that after the war or when the time becomes appropriate we will complete our task and that no one except the Serbs will be left in Serbian lands Explain this to our people and ensure that they make this their priority You cannot put this in writing or announce it publicly because the Turks Muslims would hear about it too and this must not be spread around by word of mouth 191 The Chetniks systemically massacred Muslims in villages that they captured In late autumn of 1941 the Italians handed over the towns of Visegrad Gorazde Foca and the surrounding areas in south east Bosnia to the Chetniks to run as a puppet administration and NDH forces were compelled by the Italians to withdraw from there 192 After the Chetniks gained control of Gorazde on 29 November 1941 they began a massacre of Home Guard prisoners and NDH officials that became a systematic massacre of the local Muslim civilian population with several hundred murdered and their bodies left hanging in the town or thrown into the Drina river On 5 December 1941 the Chetniks received the town of Foca from the Italians and proceeded to massacre around five hundred Muslims 193 In August 1942 detachments under command of Zaharije Ostojic killed at least 2 000 Muslims in Cajnice and Foca area 194 Since the spring of 1942 in certain military actions of Chetniks and Italians in Lika northern Dalmatia Gorski kotar and Kordun killings are becoming more frequent while villages were looted and burned The most victims were NOP activists and their families while population of that area was intimidated especially Serbs Momcilo Đujic in 1942 proclamation for the population of Lika and western Bosnia ordered all Chetnik units to occupy all villages and towns and take all power into their hands threatening to destroy all settlements to the ground if they resist regardless of whether these settlements are Croatian or Serbian 195 Additional massacres against the Muslims in the area of Foca took place in August 1942 In total over two thousand people were killed in Foca 196 In early January the Chetniks entered Srebrenica and killed around a thousand Muslim civilians in the town and in nearby villages Around the same time the Chetniks made their way to Visegrad where deaths were reportedly in the thousands Massacres continued in the following months in the region 197 In the village of Zepa alone about three hundred were killed in late 1941 In early January Chetniks massacred fifty four Muslims in Celebic and burned down the village On 3 March a contingent of Chetniks burned forty two Muslim villagers to death in Drakan 197 Đurisic s report of 13 February 1943 detailing the massacres of Muslims in the counties of Cajnice and Foca in southeastern Bosnia and in the county of Pljevlja in Sandzak In early January 1943 and again in early February Montenegrin Chetnik units were ordered to carry out cleansing actions against Muslims first in the Bijelo Polje county in Sandzak and then in February in the Cajnice county and part of Foca county in southeastern Bosnia and in part of the Pljevlja county in Sandzak 198 On 10 January 1943 Pavle Đurisic the Chetnik officer in charge of these operations submitted a report to Mihailovic Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command His report included the results of these cleansing operations which according to Tomasevich were that thirty three Muslim villages had been burned down and 400 Muslim fighters members of the Muslim self protection militia supported by the Italians and about 1 000 women and children had been killed as against 14 Chetnik dead and 26 wounded 198 In another report sent by Đurisic dated 13 February 1943 he reported that Chetniks killed about 1 200 Muslim fighters and about 8 000 old people women and children Chetnik losses in the action were 22 killed and 32 wounded 198 He added that during the operation the total destruction of the Muslim inhabitants was carried out regardless of sex and age 199 The total number of deaths in anti Muslim operations between January and February 1943 is estimated at 10 000 The casualty rate would have been higher had not a great number of Muslims already fled most to Sarajevo when the February action began 198 According to a statement from the Chetnik Supreme Command from 24 February 1943 these were countermeasures taken against Muslim aggressive activities however all circumstances show that these massacres were committed in accordance with implementing the directive of 20 December 1941 196 In March 1943 Mihailovic listed the Chetnik action in Sandzak as one of his successes noting they had liquidated all Muslims in the villages except those in the small towns 200 Actions against Croats were smaller in scale but similar in action 18 In the summer of 1941 Trubar Bosansko Grahovo dubious discuss and Krnjeusa were the sites of the first massacres and other attacks against ethnic Croats in the southwestern Bosnian Krajina 201 Throughout August and September 1942 Chetniks under the command of Petar Bacovic intensified their actions against local Croats across the hinterland areas of southern Dalmatia On 29 August Chetniks killed between 141 and 160 Croats from several villages in the Zabiokovlje Biokovo and Cetina areas while participating in the Italian anti Partisan Operation Albia 202 203 Throughout September 1942 Chetniks killed 900 Croats around the town of Makarska 204 In early October 1942 in the village of Gata near Split an estimated one hundred people were killed and many homes burnt purportedly as reprisal for the destruction of some roads in the area and carried out on the Italians account In that same October formations under the command of Petar Bacovic and Dobroslav Jevđevic who were participating in the Italian Operation Alfa in the area of Prozor massacred a minimum of five hundred Croats and Muslims and burnt numerous villages other estimates for victims of this massacre go as high as 2 500 killed 205 citation not found 20 Bacovic noted that Our Chetniks killed all men 15 years of age or older Seventeen villages were burned to the ground Mario Roatta commander of the Italian Second Army objected to these massive slaughters of noncombatant civilians and threatened to halt Italian aid to the Chetniks if they did not end 206 Chetniks in Sumadija kill a Partisan through heart extraction Croatian historian Vladimir Zerjavic initially estimated the number of Muslims and Croats killed by the Chetniks as 65 000 33 000 Muslims and 32 000 Croats both combatants and civilians In 1997 he revised this figure down to 47 000 dead 29 000 Muslims and 18 000 Croats According to Vladimir Geiger of the Croatian Institute of History Zdravko Dizdar a historian estimates Chetniks killed a total of 50 000 Croats and Muslims mostly civilians between 1941 and 1945 207 According to Ramet the Chetniks completely destroyed 300 villages and small towns and a large number of mosques and Catholic churches 206 Some historians contend that during this period genocide was committed against Muslims 208 209 210 and Croats 21 22 23 The Partisans were also targets of terror tactics In the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia apart from a few terrorist acts against Nedic s and Ljotic s men and in Montenegro against separatists terror was directed solely against the Partisans their families and sympathizers on ideological grounds The goal was the complete destruction of the Partisans 211 The Chetniks created lists of individuals that were to be liquidated and special units known as black trojkas were trained to carry out these acts of terror 196 During the summer of 1942 using names supplied by Mihailovic lists of individual Nedic and Ljotic supporters to be assassinated or threatened were broadcast over BBC radio during news programming in Serbo Croatian Once the British discovered this the broadcasts were halted although this did not prevent the Chetniks from continuing to carry out assassinations 212 Loss of Allied support This section needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed November 2016 Learn how and when to remove this template message To gather intelligence official intelligence missions of the western Allies were sent into both the Partisans and the Chetniks The intelligence gathered by liaisons were crucial to the success of supply missions and was the primary influence on Allied strategy in Yugoslavia The search for intelligence ultimately resulted in the demise of the Chetniks and their eclipse by the Partisans The head of British mission Colonel Bailey was instrumental for wrecking the position of Mihailovic with British side 213 The Germans were executing Case Black one of a series of offensives aimed at the resistance fighters when F W D Deakin was sent by the British to gather information His reports contained two important observations The first was that the Partisans were courageous and aggressive in battling the German 1st Mountain and 104th Light Division had suffered significant casualties and required support The second observation was that the entire German 1st Mountain Division had transited from Russia on rail lines through Chetnik controlled territory British intercepts of German message traffic confirmed Chetnik timidity Draza Mihailovic with McDowell and other US officers All in all intelligence reports resulted in increased Allied interest in Yugoslavia air operations and a shift in policy 145 In September 1943 British policy dictated equal aid to the Chetniks and Partisans but by December relations between the Chetniks and British soured after Chetniks refused to obey orders to sabotage the Germans without the guarantee of an Allied landing in the Balkans Over time British support moved away from the Chetniks who refused to stop collaborating with the Italians and Germans instead of fighting them towards the Partisans who were eager to increase their anti Axis activity 214 After the Tehran Conference the Partisans received official recognition as the legitimate national liberation force by the Allies who subsequently set up the Balkan Air Force under the influence and suggestion of Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean with the aim to provide increased supplies and tactical air support for the Partisans 215 In February 1944 Mihailovic s Chetniks failed to fulfill British demands to demolish key bridges over the Morava and Ibar rivers causing the British to withdraw their liaisons and halt supplying the Chetniks 216 Although British support for the Chetniks ceased the Americans were less than enthusiastic about British abandonment of the anti communist Chetniks 217 As support shifted towards the Partisans Mihailovic s Chetniks attempted to recommence Allied support for the Chetniks by displaying their eagerness to help the Allies 218 This eagerness to help was put into practice when the Office of Strategic Services OSS approached Mihailovic s Chetniks in mid 1944 to organise the airlift of downed US airmen This operation known as the Halyard Mission resulted in the rescue of 417 US airmen that were previously kept safe by Mihailovic s Chetniks Mihailovic later received the Legion of Merit from US President Harry S Truman for the rescue of Allied pilots 219 Joint US Chetnik military ceremony in Pranjani 6 September 1944 Capt Nick Lalich OSS Gen Dragoljub Mihailovic Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and Col Robert McDowell OSS On 14 August 1944 the Tito Subasic agreement between Partisans and the Government in exile was signed on the island of Vis The document called on all Croats Slovenes and Serbs to join the Partisans Mihailovic and the Chetniks refused to accept the Royal Government s agreement and continued to engage the Partisans by now the official Yugoslav Allied force Consequently on 29 August 1944 King Peter II dismissed Mihailovic as Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Josip Broz Tito in his place On 6 October 1944 the Nedic government transferred the Serbian State Guard to Mihailovic s command although cooperation proved impossible and they separated in January 1945 while in Bosnia 215 Cooperation with the Soviets In September 1944 the Soviets invaded and occupied Romania and Bulgaria removing them from the war and putting Soviet forces on the borders of Yugoslavia The Chetniks were not unprepared for this and throughout the war their propaganda strove to harness the pro Russian and pan Slavic sympathies of the majority of the Serb population The distinction between the Russian people and their communist government was belaboured as was the supposed difference between Yugoslav Partisans who were allegedly Trotskyists and the Soviets who were Stalinists 220 On 10 September 1944 a Chetnik mission of approximately 150 men led by Lieutenant Colonel Velimir Piletic commander of northeastern Serbia crossed the Danube into Romania and established contact with Soviet forces at Craiova 221 Their main purpose according to the memoirs of one of them Lt Col Miodrag Ratkovic was to establish Soviet agreement to certain political goals a cessation of the civil war through Soviet mediation free elections supervised by the Allied powers and the postponement of any war related trials until after elections Before the mission could go on to Bucharest where the American and British military missions were they were denounced by one of Piletic s aides as British spies and arrested by the Soviets on 1 October 222 Although the Chetniks believed they could fight as allies of the Soviets at the same time as they fought the Partisans they did manage some local cooperation with the former while antagonising the Germans In a circular of 5 October Mihailovic wrote We consider the Russians as our allies The struggle against Tito s forces in Serbia will be continued The Germans were aware of the Chetniks disposition through radio intercepts and their intelligence reported on 19 October that the Chetniks have never been prepared by Draza Mihailovic through appropriate propaganda for a fighting encounter with the Russians Draza Mihailovic has on the contrary upheld the fiction that the Russians as allies of the Americans and the British will never act against the interests of the Serbian nationalists 222 The commander of a group of the Shock Corps Lt Col Keserovic was the first Chetnik officer to cooperate with the Soviets In mid October his troops met Soviet forces advancing into central eastern Serbia from Bulgaria and together they captured the town of Krusevac the Soviets leaving Keserovic in charge of the town Within three days Keserovic was warning his fellow commanders that the Russians were only talking with the Partisans and disarming the Chetniks Keserovic reported to Supreme Command on 19 October that his delegate to the Soviet division had returned with a message ordering his men to be disarmed and incorporated in the Partisan armed forces by 18 October 223 Another Chetnik commander to cooperate with the Soviets was Captain Predrag Rakovic of the Second Ravna Gora Corps whose men participated in the capture of Cacak where they captured 339 soldiers of the Russisches Schutzkorps Serbien whom they turned over to the Soviets Rakovic apparently had a written agreement with the local Soviet commander placing himself and his men under Soviet command in return for recognition that they were Mihailovic s men After a protest from Tito to Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin commander of the front Keserovic s and Rakovic s cooperation came to an end By 11 November the latter had gone into hiding and his forces had fled west to avoid being disarmed and placed under Partisan control 224 Retreat and dissolution Finally in April and May 1945 as the victorious Partisans took possession of the country s territory many Chetniks retreated toward Italy and a smaller group toward Austria Many were captured by the Partisans or returned to Yugoslavia by British forces while a number were killed following repatriation from Bleiburg Some were tried for treason and were sentenced to prison terms or death Many were summarily executed especially in the first months after the end of the war Mihailovic and his few remaining followers tried to fight their way back to the Ravna Gora but he was captured by Partisan forces In March 1946 Mihailovic was brought to Belgrade where he was tried and executed on charges of treason in July During the closing years of World War II many Chetniks defected from their units as the Partisan commander in chief Marshal Josip Broz Tito proclaimed a general amnesty to all defecting forces for a time 225 After the end of WWII Yugoslav authority undertook radical actions to destroy remaining Chetnik groups especially in Lika area One of the radical methods was forced displacement of Serbs from the area of Gospic Plaski Donji Lapac and Gracac Chetnik attacks on villages were recorded in June 1945 as it were attack on Dobroselo The main part of the Chetniks was located in the area of Lapac while in the winter of 1946 actions were organized against them which testifies about the seriousness of the Chetnik threat 226 AftermathSFR Yugoslavia See also Trial of Mihailovic et al Draza Mihailovic under trial 1946 After the end of World War II the Chetniks were banned in the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia On 29 November 1945 King Peter II was deposed by the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly after an overwhelming referendum result Chetnik leaders either escaped the country or were arrested by the authorities On 13 March 1946 Mihailovic was captured by OZNA the Yugoslav security agency He was put on trial found guilty of high treason against Yugoslavia sentenced to death and then executed by firing squad on 17 July 227 In 1947 Đujic was tried and sentenced in absentia for war crimes by Yugoslavia 228 He was declared a war criminal who as commander of the Dinara Division was responsible for organizing and carrying out a series of mass murders massacres tortures rapes robberies and imprisonments and collaborating with the German and Italian occupiers 229 He was accused of being responsible for the deaths of 1 500 people during the war 230 Following his arrival in the United States Đujic and his fighters played a role in the foundation of the Ravna Gora Movement of Serbian Chetniks 228 Other Chetniks factions found their way to the midwestern United States and to Australia 231 According to Denis Becirovic after the war state structures of Yugoslavia including Bosnia and Herzegovina considered most Serbian Orthodox priests as potential or real enemies of the state The negative attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards the Serbian Orthodox Church was also influenced by the fact that some priests during the war supported Chetnik movement In documents of the Commission for Religious Affairs states that most priests during the war supported and cooperated with Draza Mihailovic s movement that they protected and maintained contact with war criminals and that they appointed persons in the administration of church institutions who were convicted of collaborating with the occupier 232 In January 1951 the Yugoslav government charged 16 individuals that were Chetnik in orientation with being part of a conspiracy that plotted to overthrow the government and reinstate King Petar with French and American military intelligence assistance Of the charged 15 were sentenced to long prison sentences and one was sentenced to death On 12 January 1952 the government reported four or five Chetnik brigades numbering around 400 men each still existed and were at the borders of Hungary Romania Bulgaria and Albania and in Montenegrin forests attacking meetings of the communist party and police buildings As late as November 1952 small Chetnik groups operated in mountains and forests around Kalinovik and Trnovo Trials of wartime Chetniks carried on until 1957 233 In 1957 Blagoje Jovovic along with other former Chetniks living in Argentina received a tip off from an ex Italian general as to the whereabouts of Ante Pavelic former Poglavnik of the NDH who was hiding in Argentina 234 At the time Pavelic had escaped to Argentina with the help from members of the Catholic clergy via the escape route known as the ratlines Jovovic and other Chetniks put into action an assassination plan and on 10 April 1957 Jovovic was able to track down Pavelic 235 Pavelic survived the assassination attempt after receiving two gunshot wounds only to succumb to injuries and die two years later on 28 December 1959 236 In 1975 Nikola Kavaja a diaspora Chetnik sympathizer living in Chicago and belonging to the Serbian National Defense Council SNDC was at his own initiative responsible for bombing a Yugoslav consul s home the first in a series of attacks targeting the Yugoslav state in the United States and Canada He and his co conspirators were captured in a sting set up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and convicted for terrorism for the incident and for planning to bomb two Yugoslav receptions on Yugoslavia s Republic Day Later that year during his flight to receive his sentence he hijacked the American Airlines Flight 293 with the intention of crashing the plane into Tito s Belgrade headquarters but was dissuaded he ultimately received a 67 year prison sentence 231 LegacyYugoslav Wars Momcilo Đujic delivering a speech in Canada July 1991 After Slobodan Milosevic s assumption of power in 1989 various Chetnik groups made a comeback 237 and his regime made a decisive contribution to launching the Chetnik insurrection in 1990 1992 and to funding it thereafter 238 Chetnik ideology was influenced by the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 238 On 28 June 1989 the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Serbs in north Dalmatia Knin Obrovac and Benkovac where there were old Chetnik strongholds held the first anti Croatian government demonstrations 239 On the same day Momcilo Đujic declared Vojislav Seselj at once assumes the role of a Chetnik vojvoda 240 and ordered him to expel all Croats Albanians and other foreign elements from holy Serbian soil stating he would return only when Serbia was cleansed of the last Jew Albanian and Croat 241 The Serbian Orthodox Church began the procession of the reliquary of Prince Lazar who participated in the Battle of Kosovo and was canonized and in the summer it reached the Zvornik Tuzla eparchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina where there was a feeling of historic tragedy of the Serb people which is experiencing a new Kosovo accompanied by nationalist declarations and Chetnik iconography 242 Later that year Vojislav Seselj Vuk Draskovic and Mirko Jovic formed the Serbian National Renewal SNO 243 a Chetnik party 244 In March 1990 Draskovic and Seselj splintered to form a separate Chetnik party 244 the Serbian Renewal Movement SPO 245 On 18 June 1990 Seselj organized the Serbian Chetnik Movement SCP though it wasn t permitted official registration due to its obvious Chetnik identification On 23 February 1991 it merged with the National Radical Party NRS establishing the Serbian Radical Party SRS with Seselj as president and Tomislav Nikolic as vice president 246 It was a Chetnik party 244 oriented towards neo fascism with a striving for the territorial expansion of Serbia 246 247 In July 1991 Serb Croat clashes broke out in Croatia and rallies were held in the Ravna Gora mountains with chants in favor of war and recollected glories of Chetnik massacres of Croats and Muslims during World War II 248 The SPO held many rallies at Ravna Gora 249 250 During the Yugoslav Wars many Serb paramilitaries styled themselves as Chetniks 237 The SRS s military wing was known as Chetniks and received weaponry from the Yugoslav People s Army JNA and Serbian police 251 Seselj personally helped arm Serbs in Croatia 251 and recruited volunteers in Serbia and Montenegro sending 5 000 men to Croatia and up to 30 000 to Bosnia and Herzegovina 252 According to Seselj the Chetniks never acted outside the umbrella of the Yugoslav People s Army and the Serbian police 251 Zeljko Raznatovic a self styled Chetnik led a Chetnik force called the Serb Volunteer Guard SDG 237 established on 11 October 1990 253 The SDG was connected to the Serbian Ministry of Interior 254 operated under JNA command 255 and reported directly to Milosevic 256 It had between 1 000 and 1 500 men 252 Jovic at the time the Serbian Minister of the Interior organized the youth wing of the SNO into the White Eagles 254 a paramilitary closely based on the World War II Chetnik movement 239 and called for a Christian Orthodox Serbia with no Muslims and no unbelievers 257 It came to be associated with the SRS though Seselj denied the connection 258 Both the White Eagles and SDG received instructions from the Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service 251 In September October 1991 the Ozren Chetniks were established to carry on the best Chetnik traditions of the Second World War 259 A paramilitary group called the Chetnik Avengers also existed and was led by Milan Lukic 260 who later took command of the White Eagles 258 A Chetnik unit led by Slavko Aleksic operated under the command of the Army of Republika Srpska In 1991 it fought in the Krajina area of Croatia and in 1992 around Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina 261 Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic the president of the self proclaimed Republika Srpska used the subordinate Chetnik forces of Seselj and Raznatovic as part of their plan to expel non Serbs and form a Greater Serbia through the use of ethnic cleansing terror and demoralization 262 Seselj s and Raznatovic s formations acted as autonomous groups in the RAM Plan 263 which sought to organize Serbs outside Serbia consolidate control of the Serbian Democratic Parties SDS and prepare arms and ammunition 264 in an effort to establish a country where all Serbs with their territories would live together in the same state 265 According to historian Noel Malcolm the steps taken by Karadzic and his party declaring Serb Autonomous Regions the arming of the Serb population minor local incidents non stop propaganda the request for federal army protection matched exactly what had been done in Croatia Few observers could doubt that a single plan was in operation 265 Chetnik units engaged in mass murders and war crimes 237 In 1991 the Croatian town of Erdut was forcefully taken over by the SDG and JNA 266 and annexed to the puppet state of Republic of Serbian Krajina Croats and other non Serbs were either expelled or killed with Serbs repopulating empty villages in the area 267 On 1 April 1992 the SDG attacked Bijeljina and carried out a massacre of Muslim civilians 268 On 4 April Chetnik irregulars helped the JNA in shelling Sarajevo On 6 April Chetniks and the JNA attacked Bijeljina Foca Bratunac and Visegrad On 9 April the SDG and Seselj s Chetniks aided the JNA and special units of the Serbian security force in overtaking Zvornik and ridding it of its local Muslim population 269 Reports sent by Raznatovic to Milosevic Ratko Mladic and Blagoje Adzic stated the plan was progressing noting that the psychological attack on the Bosniak population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was effective and should continue 270 Chetnik forces also engaged in mass murder in Vukovar and Srebrenica 237 The White Eagles were responsible for massacres in Vocin Visegrad Foca Sjeverin and Strpci 258 and for terrorizing the Muslim population in Sandzak 271 In September 1992 Chetniks attempted to force Sandzak Muslims in Pljevlja to flee by demolishing their stores and houses whilst shouting Turks leave and this is Serbia By mid 1993 they suffered over a hundred bombings kidnappings expulsions and shootings The SPO threatened Muslims with expulsion when reacting to requests for autonomy in Sandzak 272 On 15 May 1993 Seselj proclaimed eighteen 18 Chetnik fighters as vojvodas naming towns that were cleansed of non Serbs in their citation and they were blessed by an Orthodox priest afterwards 273 Seselj came to be described as a man whose killer commando units operating in Croatia and Bosnia carried on the very worst of the Chetnik tradition 274 Vojislav Seselj under trial at the ICTY Later the SRS became a government coalition partner of Milosevic and in 1998 Đujic publicly stated that he regretted awarding that title to Seselj He was quoted as saying I was naive when I nominated Seselj as Vojvoda I ask my people to forgive me The greatest gravedigger of Serbdom is Slobodan Milosevic 230 and that he is disappointed in Seselj for openly collaborating with Milosevic s Socialist Party with Communists who have only changed their name Seselj has sullied the reputation of Chetniks and Serbian nationalism 275 In 2000 Raznatovic was assassinated before facing prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ICTY 276 In 2003 Seselj surrendered himself to the ICTY to face war crimes charges 277 and was acquitted in 2016 Nikolic whom Seselj had in 1993 proclaimed vojvoda 278 and awarded the Order of Chetnik Knights for his subordinates personal courage in defending the fatherland 279 took over the SRS 277 He vowed to pursue a Greater Serbia through peaceful means 280 In 2008 Lukic was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity and war crimes 281 The British journalist Misha Glenny author of The Fall of Yugoslavia stated that the revival of the Serb nationalists in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was one of the most hideous and frightening aspects of the fall of communism in Serbia and Yugoslavia and this breed which finds nurture in the perpetration of unspeakable acts of brutality encapsulates all that is irrational and unacceptable in Balkan society 282 Serbian historiography In the 1980s Serbian historians initiated the process of reexamining the narrative of how World War II was told in Yugoslavia which was accompanied by the rehabilitation of Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic 283 284 Being preoccupied with the era Serbian historians have looked to vindicate Chetnik history by portraying Chetniks as righteous freedom fighters battling the Nazis while removing from history books the ambiguous alliances with the Italians and Germans 285 286 287 288 Whereas the crimes committed by Chetniks against Croats and Muslims in Serbian historiography are overall cloaked in silence 209 Contemporary periodSerbia Monument to Draza Mihailovic on Ravna Gora In Serbia there has been a revival of Chetnik movement 289 290 Since the early 1990s the SPO has annually held the Ravna Gora Parliament 291 and in 2005 it was organized with state funding for the first time 292 Croatian president Stjepan Mesic later cancelled a planned visit to Serbia as it coincided with the gathering 293 People who attend the Parliament wear Chetnik iconography and T shirts with the image of Mihailovic 294 or of Mladic 291 who is on trial at the ICTY on charges of genocide crimes against humanity and war crimes 295 The SRS headed by Nikolic still in favor of a Greater Serbia and rooted in the Chetnik movement 296 won the 2003 elections with 27 7 percent and gained 82 seats of the 250 available 290 In 2005 Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church backed the SRS 279 It later won the 2007 elections with 28 7 percent of the vote 290 In 2008 Nikolic split with SRS over the issue of cooperation with the European Union and formed the Serbian Progressive Party 277 Serbian textbooks have contained historical revisionism of the Chetnik role in World War II since the 1990s 297 Reinterpretation and revisionism has focused primarily on three areas Chetnik Partisan relations Axis collaboration and crimes against civilians 298 The 2002 Serbian textbook intended for the final years of high schools 298 hailed Chetniks as national patriots minimized the Partisan movement and resulted in protests from historians who viewed the work as dubious 297 It contained no mention of Chetnik collaboration or of atrocities committed by Chetniks on non Serbs Chetniks that killed individuals who cooperated with communists were said to have been renegades 299 The Chetniks were referred to as the core of the Serb civic resistance and contrary to the communists who wanted to split up the Serb ethnic space sought to expand Serbia by incorporating Montenegro the whole of Bosnia Herzegovina part of Dalmatia including Dubrovnik and Zadar the whole Srem including Vukovar Vinkovi and Dalj Kosovo and Metohija and South Serbia Macedonia and were portrayed as betrayed by the Western Allies 299 The Chetnik movement is claimed to be the sole one with Serb national interests and their defeat was equated with the defeat of Serbia stating in bold that In the Second World War the Serbian citizenry was destroyed the national movement shattered and the intelligentsia demolished 300 After public criticism the 2006 textbook for the final year of elementary school mentioned collaboration but attempted to justify it and stated all factions of the war collaborated 301 In March 2004 the National Assembly of Serbia passed a new law that equalized the Chetniks and Partisans as equivalent anti fascists 302 303 The vote was 176 for 24 against and 4 abstained Vojislav Mihailovic the Vice President of the Serbian Parliament and grandson of Draza Mihailovic stated it was late but it provides satisfaction to a good portion of Serbia their descendants They will not get financial resources but will have the satisfaction that their grandfathers fathers were true fighters for a free Serbia 304 Partisan war veterans associations criticized the law and stated that Serbia was the first country in Europe to declare a quisling movement as being liberating and anti fascist 305 In 2009 Serbian courts rehabilitated one of the chief Chetnik ideologues Dragisa Vasic 306 In September 2012 the Constitutional Court of Serbia declared the 2004 law unconstitutional stating Chetnik veterans were not permitted an allowance and medical assistance while still maintaining their rights to a pension and rehabilitation 307 citation not found According to Goran Markovic today s revisionists see the Chetnik movement as anti fascist although in November 1941 this movement began collaborating with the occupiers and other quislings it actually means that in 1941 we had an anti fascist movement which refused to fight against fascism and collaborated with fascism 308 The Serbian basketball player Milan Gurovic has a tattoo of Mihailovic on his left arm which has resulted in a ban since 2004 in playing in Croatia where it is considered an incitement of racial national or religious hatred 309 Later Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey enacted such a ban 310 Serbian rock musician and poet Bora Đorđevic leader of the highly popular rock band Riblja Corba is also a self declared Chetnik but calling it a national movement that is much older than the WWII and adding that he does not hate other nations and has never been a member of the SRS nor advocated Greater Serbia 311 Montenegro In May 2002 plans were prepared for a Montenegrin Ravna Gora memorial complex to be located near Berane The complex was to be dedicated to Đurisic who not only spent some of his youth at Berane but had also established his wartime headquarters there 312 In June 2003 Vesna Kilibarda the Montenegrin Minister of Culture banned the construction of the monument saying that the Ministry of Culture had not applied for approval to erect it 313 The Association of War Veterans of the National Liberation Army SUBNOR objected to the construction of the monument saying that Đurisic was a war criminal who was responsible for the deaths of many colleagues of the veterans association and 7 000 Muslims 314 The association was also concerned about the organizations that backed the construction including the Serbian Orthodox Church and its Montenegrin wing which is led by Metropolitan Amfilohije 315 The Muslim Association of Montenegro condemned the construction and stated that this is an attempt to rehabilitate him and it is a great insult to the children of the innocent victims and the Muslim people in Montenegro 316 On 4 July the Montenegrin government forbade the unveiling of the monument stating that it caused public concern encouraged division among the citizens of Montenegro and incited national and religious hatred and intolerance 317 A press release from the committee in charge of the construction of the monument stated that the actions taken by the government were absolutely illegal and inappropriate 318 On 7 July the stand that was prepared for the erection of the monument was removed by the police 319 320 In 2011 the Montenegrin Serb political party New Serb Democracy NOVA renewed efforts for a monument to be built and stated that Đurisic and other royal Yugoslav officers were leaders of the 13 July uprising and that they continued their struggle to liberate the country under the leadership of King Peter and the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 321 Bosnia and Herzegovina On 22 July 1996 the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina created a veteran rights law that explicitly covered former Chetniks but did not include former Partisans 322 During the Bosnian War the main traffic road in Brcko was renamed the Boulevard of General Draza Mihailovic and on 8 September 1997 a statue of Mihailovic was established in the town s center 323 In 2000 the street was renamed the Boulevard of Peace 324 and in 2004 after lobbying by Bosniak returnees and intervention from the Office of the High Representative the statue was moved to an Orthodox cemetery located at the outskirts of Brcko 325 It was removed on 20 October 2005 and on 18 August 2013 unveiled in Visegrad 326 In May 1998 the Chetnik Ravna Gora Movement of Republika Srpska was founded and proclaimed itself the military branch of the SDS and the SRS In April 1998 the key date in its recent history occurred when Seselj had held a speech for a gathering in Brcko with representatives from the SDS the SRS the Serb National Alliance SNS the Assembly of Serb Sisters of Mother Jevrosima the High Council of Chetnik Veterans of Republika Srpska and the Chetnik Ravna Gora Movement of Serbia in attendance In April 1999 it was legally registered and later renamed the Serb National Homeland Movement Important individuals in its beginnings included Karadzic Mladic Nikola Poplasen Dragan Cavic Mirko Banjac Mirko Blagojevic Velibor Ostojic Vojo Maksimovic and Bozidar Vucurevic It operated in fourteen regions where members work in trojkas and infiltrate various civilian organisations 327 On 5 May 2001 it disrupted cornerstone laying ceremonies for the destroyed Omer Pasha Mosque in Trebinje 328 and on 7 May for the destroyed Ferhat Pasha Mosque in Banja Luka 327 The Bosnian magazine Dani linked to the Oslobođenje newspapers claimed that the international community and the Organization for Security and Co operation in Europe designated it a terrorist and pro fascist organization 327 In 2005 United States president George W Bush issued an executive order and its US assets were among other organizations frozen for obstructing the Dayton Agreement 329 On 12 July 2007 a day after the 12th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre and the burial of a further 465 victims a group of men dressed in Chetnik uniforms marched the streets of Srebrenica They all wore badges of military units which committed the massacre in July 1995 330 On 11 July 2009 after the burial of 543 victims in Srebrenica members of the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement desecrated the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina marched in the streets wearing T shirts with the face of Mladic and sang Chetnik songs 331 332 333 A group of men and women associated with the Serbian far right group Obraz chanted insults directed towards the victims and in support of the Chetnik movement calling for eradication of Islam 334 A full report of the incident was submitted to the local District Prosecutor s Office but no one has been prosecuted 335 The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been campaigning for a creation of a law that would ban the group within Bosnia 336 Croatia Milorad Pupovac of the Independent Democratic Serb Party in Croatia the present day leader of Serbs of Croatia and member of the Parliament of Croatia described the organization as fascist collaborators 337 United States Serbian Americans set up a monument dedicated to Pavle Đurisic at the Serbian cemetery in Libertyville Illinois The management and players of the football club Red Star Belgrade visited it on 23 May 2010 338 Ukraine In March 2014 Serb volunteers calling themselves Chetniks led by Serbian ultra nationalist Bratislav Zivkovic travelled to Sevastopol in Crimea to support the pro Russian side in the Crimean crisis They spoke of common Slavic blood and Orthodox faith cited similarities with the Cossacks and claimed to be returning the favour of Russian volunteers who fought on the Serbian side of the Yugoslav Wars 339 Participating in the ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine since its inception in early 2014 it was reported in August 2014 that Chetniks killed 23 Ukrainian soldiers and took out a significant amount of armored vehicles during clashes with the Ukrainian army 340 Most of the sympathisers are from Serbia Serb inhabited areas of Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina and according to Ukrainian sources they killed hundreds of Ukrainians during the war 341 According to Serb paramilitary fighter in Ukraine Milutin Malisic who was a former fighter in Kosovo he stated that Serbs have a responsibility to their Orthodox Brethren Chetnik fighters in Ukraine 2014 Bratislav Zivkovic is seen in the center of the second row According to Belgrade based security expert Zoran Dragisic it is indoctrination that draws young Serbian people some of them almost children to join the war 342 A 2014 law in Serbia denounces war tourism among Serb nationals as illegal and in 2018 Serb paramilitary chief Bratislav Zivkovic was arrested in Serbia for having joined the separatist movement in Russia 343 Zivkovic was banned from Romania for 15 years in 2017 after having spied on NATO bases in 2017 344 In June 2018 Ukraine s General Prosecutor s Office launched an investigation into 54 suspected members of a pro Russian foreign legion Among the suspects were six Serbs who later fought in Syria taking part in attacks on Ukrainian troops in the eastern part of the country in 2014 345 Former special police spokesperson Radomir Pocuca posted regular videos photos and Esther entries on Facebook Ukrainian ambassador in Serbia Oleksandr Aleksandrovych stated in November 2017 that Serbia was not doing enough to stop Serb nationals from fighting in eastern Ukraine Aleksandrovych stated that roughly 300 Serbs were operating in Ukraine and he stated that Serb tourists would be halted at the border and if acting suspicious would be arrested since they were there to kill Ukrainians 346 Kyiv then warned Belgrade Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic insisted that Serbia respect Ukraine s territorial integrity Derogatory usageThe term Chetnik is sometimes used as a derogatory term for a Serbian nationalist 347 or an ethnic Serb in general 348 349 According to Jasminka Udovicki during the Croatian War of Independence the Croatian media referred to Serbs as bearded Chetnik hordes terrorists and conspirators and a people ill inclined to democracy Demonizing Serbo Chetnik terrorists became a main preoccupation 350 During the Bosnian War the term entered the mutual ethnic centered propaganda waged by the warring insides and thus for the Bosnian side it was increasingly used to refer to the enemy and villain imagined as primitive untidy long haired and bearded 351 See also Serbia portal World War II portal List of Chetnik voivodesCitations Chetnik Encyclopaedia Britannica Retrieved 20 May 2020 Tomasevich 1975 pp 410 412 Hoare 2006 Milazzo 1975 p 140 Milazzo 1975 pp 103 105 Milazzo 1975 p 182 Milazzo 1975 pp 185 86 a b c d Ramet 2006 p 145 Ramet 2006 p 147 Tomasevich 1975 pp 224 25 MacDonald 2002 pp 140 42 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 65 67 a b Milazzo 1975 preface Hehn 1971 p 350 Pavlowitch 2002 p 141 a b c Tomasevich 1975 p 196 Blic Decenijama palio svecu zaboravljenom heroju blic rs accessed 9 March 2018 better source needed Jadar slavi slobodare www novosti rs in Serbian Retrieved 13 January 2020 better source needed Tomasevich 1975 p 146 Milazzo 1975 p 31 Pavlowitch 2007 p 63 Tomasevich 1975 p 246 Djokic Dejan Coming To Terms With The Past Former Yugoslavia History Today 54 6 2004 17 19 History Reference Center Web 3 Mar 2015 a b c Tomasevich 1975 p 259 a b c Hoare 2006 p 143 a b Tomasevich 1975 pp 256 261 a b Tomasevich 2001 p 747 a b Redzic 2005 p 155 a b Hoare 2006 p 386 a b Veljan amp Cehajic 2020 p 24 Online Etymology Dictionary 2020a Merriam Webster Dictionary 2020 Online Etymology Dictionary 2020b Tomasevich 1975 pp 115 116 Tomasevich 1975 p 116 Judah 2000 p 68 Tomasevich 1975 pp 116 117 Tasic 2020 pp 10 11 Tasic 2020 p 12 Tomasevich 1975 p 117 Tomasevich 1975 pp 117 118 Mitrovic 2007 pp 261 273 Tomasevich 1975 p 118 Figa 2004 p 235 Tomasevich 1975 pp 118 119 a b Newman 2017 Ramet 2006 p 46 Ramet 2006 pp 46 47 Ramet 2006 p 47 Ramet 2006 p 48 a b c d Tomasevich 1975 p 119 Pavlovic amp Mladenovic 2003 Ramet 2006 p 89 Jelic Butic 1986 p 15 Singleton 1985 p 188 Pavlowitch 2007 p 52 Tomasevich 1975 p 120 a b c d e f Tomasevich 1975 p 121 a b Ekmecic 2007 p 434 a b c Ekmecic 2007 p 402 Dimitrijevic 2014 pp 26 27 Peћancu јe dato ovlashћeњe da formira oruzhane chetnichke odrede u smislu nareђeњa ministra voјnog 36 41 i komandanta 5 armiјske oblasti Voјske Kraљevine Јugoslaviјe 1816 41 Pecanac was given the authority to form armed Chetnik detachments via orders from the Minister of War 36 41 and the commander of the 5th Army District of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1816 41 U S Army 1986 p 37 Tomasevich 2001 pp 63 64 Tomasevich 1975 p 262 a b c d e Tomasevich 1975 p 122 Milazzo 1975 pp 12 13 a b Milazzo 1975 p 13 a b Milazzo 1975 p 14 Tomasevich 1975 pp 122 123 Trbovich 2008 p 133 Tomasevich 1975 p 124 a b c d Tomasevich 1975 p 125 a b Pavlowitch 2007 p 54 Tomasevich 1975 pp 125 126 Milazzo 1975 pp 17 18 Roberts 1987 p 22 a b c Tomasevich 1975 p 126 a b Milazzo 1975 p 18 Tomasevich 1975 p 166 Tomasevich 1975 pp 166 169 Judah 2000 pp 121 22 Pavlowitch 2007 p 55 a b Tomasevich 1975 pp 168 170 Prusin 2017 p 82 a b c Tomasevich 1975 p 170 a b Prusin 2017 p 83 a b c Tomasevich 1975 p 171 Pavlowitch 2007 p 112 Tomasevich 1975 p 172 Tomasevich 1975 p 261 a b Tomasevich 1975 p 173 a b c d Redzic 2005 p 152 Tasic 1995 p 448 Ford 1992 p 49 a b Milazzo 1975 p 166 Tomasevich 1975 pp 397 399 a b Tomasevich 2001 p 231 Tomasevich 2001 pp 230 231 Tomasevich 1975 p 399 Hoare 2013 pp 190 191 a b Sirotkovic amp Margetic 1988 p 351 Samardzic amp Duskov 1993 p 70 Trbovich 2008 p 134 Tomasevich 1975 pp 402 403 Karchmar 1987 p 602 Hoare 2013 p 191 Tomasevich 1975 p 403 Karchmar 1987 p 603 Tomasevich 1975 pp 403 404 Roberts 1987 p 199 a b c d Tomasevich 1975 p 175 Hoare 2013 p 8 a b Prusin 2017 pp 82 83 a b c Sadkovich 1998 p 148 Deak 2018 p 160 Tomasevich 1975 pp 173 174 176 Milazzo 1975 p 186 Tomasevich 1975 pp 173 174 Tomasevich 1975 p 158 Tomasevich 2001 p 492 a b Velikonja 2003 p 167 Tomasevich 1975 p 174 a b The Holocaust Encyclopedia 2001 p 712 Cohen 1996 pp 76 77 Tomasevich 1975 p 177 a b Tomasevich 1969 p 97 Tomasevich 1975 pp 187 188 Milazzo 1975 pp 14 15 a b c Roberts 1987 p 21 Roberts 1987 pp 21 22 a b Roberts 1987 p 67 Pavlowitch 2007 p 64 a b Ramet 2006 p 143 Bailey 1998 p 80 Yeomans 2012 p 17 Tomasevich 2001 p 142 Martin 1946 p 174 Bank amp Gevers 2016 p 262 Tomasevich 1975 p 176 Martin 1946 p 178 Martin 1946 p 180 Ramet 2006 p 144 a b Ramet 2006 p 152 Ramet 2006 pp 144 45 a b c d e Ramet 2006 p 147 Roberts 1987 pp 34 35 Lawrence Christie 1946 Irregular Adventure London Faber and Faber Karabegovic 1988 p 145 Bila je to najborbenija i politicki najcvrsca partizanska jedinica u to vrijeme u Krajini organizovana od najboljih boraca iz krajiskih ustanickih zarista Kozare Podgr meca Drvara Petrovca i okoline Petranovic 1981 p 271 a novoformirani Grmecki protucetnicki bataljon od 800 boraca operisao aprila maja protiv cetnickih jedinica Drenovica Vukasina Marcetica i Laze Tesanovica Tillotson 2011 p 155 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Tomasevich 1975 p 226 a b c Cohen 1996 p 40 Velikonja 2003 pp 166 67 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 122 126 Judah 2000 p 131 Mihael Sobolevski 1995 The role of Chetniks in the Independent State of Croatia p 481 1 a b Martin 1946 p 141 Goran Markovic 2014 Cetnici i antifasizam Chetniks and anti fascism in Serbian p 180 Hereticus Casopis za preispitivanje proslosti Vol XII No l 2 2 Martin 1946 p 143 a b Tomasevich 1975 p 352 a b c Sobolevski Mihael 1995 The Role of Chetniks in the Independent State of Croatia Casopis za suvremenu povijest 27 3 483 484 Fikreta Jelic Butic 1986 Cetnici u Hrvatskoj 1941 1945 p 108 Globus ISBN 8634300102 Goran Markovic 2014 Cetnici i antifasizam Chetniks and anti fascism in Serbian p 179 180 Hereticus Casopis za preispitivanje proslosti Vol XII No l 2 3 Tomasevich 1975 pp 226 354 a b Redzic 2005 p 141 Christia Fotini 2012 Alliance Formation in Civil Wars Cambridge University Press pp 206 207 ISBN 978 1 13985 175 6 Redzic 2005 p 88 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 166 167 a b Pavlowitch 2007 p 59 a b Tomasevich 1975 pp 446 449 Tomasevich 2001 p 442 Roberts 1987 p 20 Roberts 1987 p 26 Roberts 1987 p 27 a b Tomasevich 2001 p 308 Rohr 1994 p 358 Ramet 2006 pp 133 135 Tomasevich 2001 p 183 Tomasevich 2001 pp 214 16 a b c Ramet 2006 pp 133 35 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 98 100 Cohen 1996 p 57 Macartney 1957 pp 145 47 Macartney 1957 p 180 Macartney 1957 p 265 Macartney 1957 p 355 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 127 128 Tomasevich 1975 pp 256 57 Pavlowitch 2007 pp 47 49 Malcolm 1994 p 175 Judah 2000 p 120 Tomasevich 1975 pp 171 210 256 Milazzo 1975 p 64 Cigar 1995 p 18 Karchmar 1987 p 397 Pavlowitch 2007 p 80 Cigar 1995 p 19 Hoare 2006 pp 143 45 Hoare 2006 p 145 Noel Malcolm 1995 Povijest Bosne kratki pregled p 251 253 Erasmus Gilda Novi Liber Zagreb Dani Sarajevo ISBN 953 6045 03 6 Fikreta Jelic Butic 1986 Cetnici u Hrvatskoj Chetniks in Croatia 1941 1945 p 161 Globus ISBN 8634300102 a b c Tomasevich 1975 pp 256 61 a b Hoare 2006 pp 146 47 a b c d Tomasevich 1975 pp 258 59 Hoare 2006 p 331 Hoare 2013 p 355 Cutura Vlado Rađa se novi zivot na mucenickoj krvi Glas Koncila Retrieved 30 December 2015 Dusan Plenca Partizanski odredi naroda Dalmacije 1941 1942 Vojnoizdavacki zavod JNA Vojno delo Beograd 1960 str 380 Dizdar amp Sobolevski 1999 p 130 Dizdar amp Sobolevski 1999 p 685 Goldstein 7 November 2012 sfn error no target CITEREFGoldstein 7 November 2012 help a b Ramet 2006 p 146 Vladimir Geiger 2012 Human Losses of the Croats in World War II and the Immediate Post War Period Caused by the Chetniks Yugoslav Army in the Fatherand and the Partisans People s Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army and the Communist Authorities Numerical Indicators Review of Croatian History Zagreb Croatian Institute of History VIII 1 85 87 Mennecke 2012 p 483 a b Becirevic 2014 p 46 Dedijer Vladimir Miletic Antun 1990 Genocid nad Muslimanima 1941 1945 zbornik dokumenata i svedocenja Svjetlost ISBN 978 8 60101 525 8 Tomasevich 1975 pp 259 61 Tomasevich 1975 p 260 West 2012 The historian Mark Wheeler makes the point that men such as Bill Bailey on the Mihailovie staff did not have a golden background These people Bailey more than anyone helped to wreck the career of Mihailovic He reported back to the British the outburst of 28 February 1943 when Mihailovie said that he wanted to liquidate all his enemies In Montenegro at the end of February Draza Mihailovic had made an imprudent and possibly drunken speech in which Tomasevich 1969 pp 101 02 a b Tomasevich 2001 p 228 Ramet 2006 p 158 Roberts 1987 pp 245 257 Cohen 1996 p 48 Tomasevich 1975 p 470 Tomasevich 1975 p 391 Timofejev 2010 p 87 a b Tomasevich 1975 p 392 Tomasevich 1975 p 393 Tomasevich 1975 p 394 Foreign News New Power Time 4 December 1944 Archived from the original on 17 August 2007 Retrieved 28 April 2010 Zdenko Radelic 2003 Pro Yugoslav anti communist guerrillas in Croatia after the Second World War p 475 4 Tomasevich 1975 p 461 a b Washington Times 14 September 1999 Popovic Lolic amp Latas 1988 p 7 a b Binder 1999 a b Hockenos 2003 pp 116 19 Denis Becirovic 2010 Komunisticka vlast i Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini 1945 1955 Pritisci napadi hapsenja i suđenja The Communist Authorities and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia Herzegovina 1945 1955 Pressure Attacks Arrests and Trials p 76 77 Tokovi istorije 5 6 Ramet 2006 pp 188 89 Burzanovic 1998 Matkovic 2002 Fischer 2007 p 211 a b c d e Totten amp Bartrop 2008 p 68 a b Ramet 2006 p 420 a b Tanner 2001 p 218 Cohen 1996 p 207 Velikonja 2003 p 246 Magas amp Zanic 2001 p 347 Bartrop 2012 p 294 a b c Cigar 1995 p 201 Toal amp Dahlman 2011 p 57 a b Ramet 2006 p 359 Bugajski 2002 pp 415 16 Ramet 2006 p 398 Pavlakovic 2005 p 19 Thomas 1999 p 212 a b c d Lukic amp Lynch 1996 p 190 a b Ron 2003 p 48 Thomas 1999 p xix a b Toal amp Dahlman 2011 p 58 Hoare 2001 p 182 Ramet 2006 p 427 Velikonja 2003 p 268 a b c Bartrop 2012 p 193 Goldstein 1999 p 240 Thomas 1999 p 98 Allen 1996 p 155 Ramet 2006 p 429 Allen 1996 p 57 Judah 2000 p 170 a b Lukic amp Lynch 1996 p 204 Engelberg 1991 Burns 1992 Goldstein 1999 p 242 Ramet 2006 p 428 Allen 1996 p 59 Bugajski 2002 p 411 Cigar 1995 p 193 Sells 1998 pp 80 187 Hockenos 2003 p 119 Silber 1993 Bartrop 2012 pp 270 72 a b c Bianchini 2010 p 95 Jungvirth 14 June 2013 a b Phillips 23 July 2008 Strauss 29 December 2003 Bartrop 2012 p 194 EDT Janine di Giovanni on 03 12 14 at 11 13 AM 12 March 2014 Wolves Descend on Crimea Newsweek Emmert Thomas Ingrao Charles 2013 Conflict in Southeastern Europe at the End of the Twentieth Century A Scholars Initiative Assesses Some of the Controversies Routledge p 42 ISBN 9781317970163 Drapac Vesna 2014 Catholic resistance and collaboration in the Second World War From Master Narrative to Practical Application In Rutar Sabine ed Beyond the Balkans Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe LIT Verlag p 282 ISBN 9783643106582 MacDonald 2002 p 138 Ramet Sabrina P 2005 Serbia since 1989 Politics and Society under Milopevic and After University of Washington Press p 129 ISBN 9780295802077 Subotic Jelena 2015 The Mythologizing of Communist Violence In Stan Lavinia Nedelsky Nadya eds Post communist Transitional Justice Lessons from Twenty five Years of Experience Cambridge University Press p 201 ISBN 9781107065567 Finney Patrick 2010 Land of Ghosts Memories of War in the Balkans In Buckley John Kassimeris George eds The Ashgate research companion to modern warfare Routledge p 353 ISBN 9781409499534 Ramet 2010a p 275 a b c Ramet amp Wagner 2010 p 27 a b B92 13 May 2006 Stojanovic 2010 pp 233 234 HRT 17 May 2005 B92 13 May 2007 Bartrop 2012 p 217 Bakke 2010 pp 82 83 a b Hopken 2007 p 184 a b Stojanovic 2010 p 234 a b Stojanovic 2010 pp 234 236 Stojanovic 2010 pp 236 237 Stojanovic 2010 pp 234 235 Ramet 2008 p 143 B92 23 December 2004 Ciric 23 December 2004 Ramet 2010b p 299 Blic 15 December 2009 Dalje 29 September 2012 sfn error no target CITEREFDalje 29 September 2012 help Goran Markovic 2014 Cetnici i antifasizam Chetniks and anti fascism in Serbian p 177 Hereticus Casopis za preispitivanje proslosti Vol XII No l 2 7 ESPN 13 November 2004 Dnevnik 27 August 2010 Dnevnik 22 January 2007 Prijovic 2002 B92 11 June 2003 Sekulovic 2003 BBC 19 May 2003 BBC 20 June 2003 B92 4 July 2003 Prijovic 2003 B92 7 July 2003 BBC 7 July 2003 Vijesti 13 August 2011 Hoare 2007 p 355 Jeffrey 2006 pp 206 211 Jeffrey 2006 p 219 Jeffrey 2006 p 222 Kusmuk 2013 a b c Pecanin 2 August 2002 U S Department of State amp 4 March 2002 Kebo 1 May 2005 Voloder 2007 Horvat 2009 Slobodna Dalamacija 13 July 2009 Index 13 July 2009 B92 13 July 2009 24 sata 7 August 2009 24 sata 24 February 2010 B92 17 May 2005 Gudzevic 2010 Ristic amp 6 March 2014 Ukraine Crisis Serb Chetniks Claim Killings of 23 Ukrainian Soldiers 26 August 2014 Retrieved 16 September 2016 Facebook Reveals Serbian Fighters Role in Ukraine War Balkan Insight 27 December 2017 Retrieved 12 April 2020 Welle www dw com Deutsche Serbian mercenaries fighting in eastern Ukraine DW 14 08 2014 DW COM Serbian Paramilitary Chief Arrested For Allegedly Joining War in Ukraine RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty Romania Expels Serb for Spying for Russia Balkan Insight 15 November 2017 Ukraine Probing Serbian pro Russian Fighters Report Says Balkan Insight 27 June 2018 Russia Using Serbia to Destroy Europe Ukraine Ambassador Balkan Insight 1 November 2017 Dowdall Alex Horne John 2017 Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy Springer p 27 ISBN 978 1 13758 532 5 Carpenter Charli 2010 Forgetting Children Born of War Setting the Human Rights Agenda in Bosnia and Beyond Columbia University Press p 63 ISBN 978 0 23152 230 4 Hodgin Nick Thakkar Amit 2017 Scars and Wounds Film and Legacies of Trauma Springer p 65 ISBN 978 3 31941 024 1 Udovicki Jasminka 2000 Burn This House The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia Duke University Press p 113 ISBN 978 0 82232 590 1 Macek Ivana 2011 Sarajevo Under Siege Anthropology in Wartime University of Pennsylvania Press p 169 ISBN 978 0 81222 189 3 ReferencesBooks Allen Beverly 1996 Rape Warfare The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia Ithaca University of Minnesota Press ISBN 978 0 8014 4158 5 Bailey Ronald H 1998 Partisans and guerrillas Chicago Illinois Time Life Books ISBN 978 0 7835 5719 9 Bakke Elisabeth 2010 Party Systems Since 1989 In Ramet Sabrina P ed Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989 Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 64 90 ISBN 978 1 139 48750 4 Bank Jan Gevers Lieve 2016 Churches and Religion in the Second World War London UK Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN 978 1 4725 0480 7 Bartrop Paul R 2012 A Biographical Encyclopedia of Contemporary Genocide Santa Barbara ABC CLIO ISBN 978 0 313 38679 4 Laqueur Walter Baumel Judith Tydor 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Presucivani cetnicki zlocini u Hrvatskoj i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941 1945 in Croatian Zagreb Croatian Institute of History amp Dom i svijet ISBN 953 6491 28 1 Deak Istvan 2018 Europe on Trial The Story of Collaboration Resistance and Retribution during World War II London Taylor amp Francis ISBN 978 0 429 97350 5 Ekmecic Milorad 2007 Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja Istorija Srba u Novom Veku 1492 1992 Zavod za udzbenike ISBN 9788617145147 Figa Jozef 2004 Framing the Conflict Slovenia in Search of Her Army Civil Military Relations Nation Building and National Identity Comparative Perspectives Westport Connecticut Praeger ISBN 978 0 313 04645 2 Fischer Bernd J 2007 Balkan Strongmen Dictators and Authoritian Rulers of Southeast Europe Purdue University Press ISBN 978 1 55753 455 2 Ford Kirk 1992 OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance 1943 1945 College Station Texas Texas A amp M University Press ISBN 978 1 58544 040 5 Goldstein Ivo 1999 Croatia A History London C Hurst amp Co ISBN 978 1 85065 525 1 Hoare Marko Attila 2001 Civilian Military Relations in Bosnia Herzegovina 1992 1995 In Magas Branka Zanic Ivo eds The War in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina 1991 1995 London Frank Cass pp 178 199 ISBN 978 0 7146 8201 3 Hoare Marko Attila 2006 Genocide and Resistance in Hitler s Bosnia The Partisans and the Chetniks 1941 1943 New York Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 19 726380 8 Hoare Marko Attila 2007 The History of Bosnia From the Middle Ages to the Present Day London Saqi ISBN 978 0 86356 953 1 Hoare Marko Attila 2013 Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War Oxford UK Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 231 70394 9 Hockenos Paul 2003 Homeland Calling Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars Ithaca Cornell University Press ISBN 978 0 8014 4158 5 Hopken Wolfgang 2007 Between Civic Identity and Nationalism History Textbooks in East Central and Southeastern Europe In Ramet Sabrina P Matic Davorka eds Democratic Transition in Croatia Value Transformation Education and Media College 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War 1914 1918 West Lafayette Purdue University Press ISBN 978 1 55753 476 7 Mojzes Paul 2011 Balkan Genocides Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the 20th Century Lanham Maryland Rowman amp Littlefield ISBN 978 1 4422 0665 6 Newman John Paul 2015 Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War Veterans and the Limits of State Building 1903 1945 Cambridge University Press ISBN 978 1 107 07076 9 Pajovic Radoje 1977 Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori Cetnicki i federalisticki pokret 1941 1945 in Serbo Croatian Cetinje Yugoslavia Obod Pavlakovic Vjeran 2005 Serbia Transformed In Ramet Sabrina P ed Serbia since 1989 Politics and Society under Milosevic and After Seattle University of Washington Press ISBN 978 0 295 80207 7 Pavlowitch Stevan K 2002 Serbia the History behind the Name London C Hurst amp Co Publishers ISBN 978 1 85065 476 6 Pavlowitch Stevan K 2007 Hitler s New Disorder The Second World War in Yugoslavia New York Columbia University Press ISBN 978 1 85065 895 5 Popovic Jovo Lolic Marko Latas Branko 1988 Pop izdaje Cetnicki vojvoda Momcilo Đujic Traitor Priest The Chetnik Vojvoda Momcilo Đujic PDF in Serbo Croatian Zagreb Yugoslavia Stvarnost ISBN 978 86 7075 039 5 Prusin Alexander 2017 Serbia Under the Swastika A World War II Occupation Urbana Illinois University of Illinois Press ISBN 978 0 252 09961 8 Ramet Sabrina P 2006 The Three Yugoslavias State Building and Legitimation 1918 2005 Bloomington Indiana University Press ISBN 978 0 253 34656 8 Ramet Sabrina P 2008 Serbia Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War Selected Writings 1983 2007 Berlin LIT Verlag ISBN 978 3 03735 912 9 Ramet Sabrina P 2010a Politics in Croatia Since 1990 In Ramet Sabrina P ed Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989 Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 258 285 ISBN 978 1 139 48750 4 Ramet Sabrina P 2010b Serbia and Montenegro Since 1989 In Ramet Sabrina P ed Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989 Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 286 310 ISBN 978 1 139 48750 4 Ramet Sabrina P Wagner Peter F 2010 Post socialist Models of Rule in Cental and Southeast Europe In Ramet Sabrina P ed Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989 Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 9 36 ISBN 978 1 139 48750 4 Redzic Enver 2005 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War Abingdon Frank Cass ISBN 978 0 7146 5625 0 Roberts Walter R 1987 Tito Mihailovic and the Allies 1941 1945 New Brunswick NJ Duke University Press ISBN 978 0 8223 0773 0 Rohr Werner ed 1994 Europa unterm Hakenkreuz Okkupation und Kollaboration 1938 1945 in German Berlin Huthig Ron James 2003 Frontiers and Ghettos State Violence in Serbia and Israel Berkeley University of California Press ISBN 978 0 520 93690 4 Sadkovich James J 1998 The U S Media and Yugoslavia 1991 1995 Greenwood Publishing Group ISBN 978 0 275 95046 0 Samardzic Radovan Duskov Milan 1993 Serbs in European Civilization Belgrade Serbia and Montenegro Nova ISBN 978 86 7583 015 3 Sells Michael Anthony 1998 The Bridge Betrayed Religion and Genocide in Bosnia Berkeley University of California Press ISBN 978 0 520 92209 9 Shub Boris 1943 Hitler s Ten Year War on the Jews New York Institute of Jewish Affairs Singleton Frederick Bernard 1985 A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples New York Cambridge University Press ISBN 978 0 521 27485 2 Sirotkovic Hodimir Margetic Lujo 1988 Povijest drzava i prava naroda SFR Jugoslavije The History of the States and the Rights of the People of SFR Yugoslavia in Serbo Croatian Zagreb Yugoslavia Skolska knj ISBN 978 86 03 99180 2 Stojanovic Dubravka 2010 Value Changes in the Interpretations of History in Serbia In Listhaug Ola Ramet Sabrina P Dulic Dragana eds Civic and Uncivic Values Serbia in the Post Milosevic Era Budapest Central European University Press pp 221 240 ISBN 978 963 9776 98 2 Tanner Marcus 2001 Croatia a nation forged in war 2nd ed New Haven London Yale University Press ISBN 0 300 09125 7 Tasic Dmitar 2020 Paramilitarism in the Balkans Yugoslavia Bulgaria and 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